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THE ART OF Knowing Ones Self: OR, A DILIGENT SEARCH AFTER *The Springs of Morality.*

The First Part.

Written in French
By the Famous PIERRE BOHER.

Translated into English *by* P. H.

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To the moſt Noble

WILLIAM

Duke and Earl of *Bedford*, Marquis of *Taviſtoke*, Lord *Ruſſell*, Baron *Ruſſell* of *Thornehaugh*, Knight of the Moſt Noble Order of the *Garter*, and one of His Majeſty's moſt Honorable *Privy-Council.*

THE *Art of* Knowing Ones Self *is ſo well known to Your Lordſhip, that through the whole*

Dedication.

Courſe of Your Life You have ſhewn Your Self Practically Maſter thereof; Its Original Language is no more a Stranger to You than the Subject, ſo that on no account can I preſume to lay any thing herein New before Your Lordſhip. It was, indeed, another Motive which induced me hereto, which was that of owning to all the World, as well as Your Lordſhip, how glad I am, on all Accounts, of being

Your Lordſhip's moſt

Obliged, Humble,

and Faithful Servant,

P. Hanbury.

The ART
OF
Knowing Ones SELF.



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THE

THE ART OF Knowing Ones Self: OR, A DILIGENT SEARCH After the SPRING of MORALITY.

MORALITY, or the Science of Manners is *the Art of Regulating a Man's Heart by Virtue, and to make him Happy in well living.*

This Science which the Ancients called by the Name of Wisdom, and some a-

mongſt them boaſt to have cauſed to quit Heaven for Earth, has not always been Treated of in the ſame Method, nor with the ſame Succeſs. For it ſeems to have taken a Tincture of different Prejudices of Men of different Times and Conditions.

Paganiſm in general, has taken from it all its Force, its Motives, and Examples. It is eaſie to conceive how little Men found themſelves diſpoſed to live well by the Motives of a Religion which they look'd upon as a Collection of Ridiculous Dreams, and a prodigious Texture of Fictions, not to be credited by the meaneſt Capacities.

Eſſe aliquos manes, & ſubterranea regna,
Et contum, & Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras;
Atque una tranſire vadum tot millia cymba,
Nec pueri credunt, niſi qui nondum æra lavantur.

JUV. Sat. 2.

The Philoſophers who have made Profeſſion of a more refin'd Doctrine, are not much before the others in this reſpect, for they have not had any true Idea of

of the Natural Dignity of Man, whom they have taken pleaſure to confound with the Beaſts, that they might without ſcruple plunge themſelves in Voluptuouſneſs with them; the others have wandered in perpetual incertitudes, which has given them no opportunity of eſtabliſhing their fine Precepts upon any certain Foundation.

Nay, even *Morality* of the moſt Noble and Sublime Structure they could frame, has not been exempt from this fault. It has been able to elevate a Man, but not to humble him: It may be ſaid of all theſe Philoſophers what was ſaid of ſome who deſpiſed the Vanity of others with too much Oſtentation, and cruſht their Pride with a greater of their own: They did acknowledge the defects of Human Nature, the better to Magnifie their own Wiſdom that had freed them from ſuch, and refuſing to live like other Men, they durſt prefer themſelves to the greateſt of their Gods.

The *Morality* that Springs from the Revelation of the *Old* and *New Teſtament*, has quite oppoſite Characters to thoſe we have been Treating of. It has certain Principles. It follows the Light of Truth. It is ſuſtain'd by very powerful Motives

and perfect Examples. It conſiders Man as coming from God, and returning to him, and having no leſs than Eternity for his Aim. It exalts Man, abaſed by his Paſſions, made vile by Superſtition, and degraded by the Infamy of what he holds deareſt to him; and that which is admirable, it exalts Man without Pride, it abaſes him, but diminiſhes not his Dignity: It takes from him his Pride, in Communicating to him true Glory, and raiſes his Excellence in forming his Humility by the Divine Commerce of our Souls with God, which Religion acquaints us with all, in the which God deſcends even to us, without diminution of his Grandeur, and we mount up to God, without any loſs of that proſtration we ought to aproach him withall.

This Science which teaches us not only to live well, but likewiſe to acquire an Eternal good in living well, is one part of that ſo important Religion which God would not (under any pretence) we were ignorant of. And whereas the greateſt part of things here, are not known to us, unleſs by Reaſon, or by Feeling, or by Faith, he would that the Morality of his Goſpel ſhould be known in them all. The Faith forces its reception becauſe that

that Chriſt and the Apoſtles have taught and practiſed it. The feeling of the Conſcience makes us approve it, becauſe it ſatisfies us, it raiſes us and comforts us. Reaſon gives its ſuffrage for it, becauſe there is nothing but what is conformable to the Maxims of good Senſe, whether it be in the Principles upon which it is eſtabliſhed, or the Rules it preſcribes us.

God makes uſe almoſt of the ſame method in the nouriſhing of our Souls as our Bodies; he has not given us Reaſon alone to provide for the ſubſiſtence of the latter; for although this Reaſon be neceſſary, it is not ſufficient to make us chuſe the nouriſhments deſign'd for our preſervation in that regularity which is neceſſary to make them produce their Effect. He has been pleas'd to add taſte which makes us find them agreeable, and the Opinion which we have had of them who have made us take them before we were capable of making any Tryal. For the Author of Nature, who ſaw well how inconvenient it would be to ſend Man to eat and to drink, untill that he had known by Reaſoning, after what manner the Nouriſhment would change into Chyle, the Chyle into Blood, the Blood into Fleſh, Bones, *&c.* and how

the losses of the natural Body which come by transpiration, repair themselves by Nourtriture, has found it good to ingage Men to take their Nourishment by a shorter way, which is that of Tasting, unto which may be added the Opinion which they had of their Fathers and Mothers, the imitation of whom, is to them a natural Reason which spares them the Discussion.

They may as well say, that should a Man be oblig'd to know by Reason the Immortality of his Soul, his End and his Duties, which are the most general Principles of Morality, to be able to discharge his Duty herein, he must of necessity be a Philosopher to be a good Man. God who is the Author of Religion as well as of Nature, has shewn us a shorter way, in making us know by Faith, the Principal Truths of Morality, and in making us taste them by our Sentiments; for the Faith which we have in Jesus Christ, instructs us that we ought to be conformable to him for a time, so that we may be partakers of his Glory eternally, and Conscience yields in that Piety which it prescribes us, an agreeable Sentiment and Divine taste which doth ingage us to the practice thereof; but as Reason is not unprofitable to the preservation of the

Body

Body in Nature, ſo neither is it to the ſanctification of the Soul in Religion. It ſupports the Faith, it confirms the Sentiments. Thoſe that would know Morality by Faith, let them read the Scriptures. Thoſe that would know it by Senſe, let them ſearch their own Hearts, with the aſſiſtance of the Revelation which God affords them; and it will be ſufficient at leaſt in joyning theſe two Methods together, to have all the Principles of the Science of well living: But it is to be hoped, the Deſign is not to be blamed which we have in this Writing, to lead Men as much as is poſſible by Reaſon, there where Religion leads us by Faith, and there where Conſcience leads us by our Sentiments. Reaſon as well as Faith and Conſcience, is a Preſent which God has made us, their Lights come aſſuredly from the Father of Lights, the Author of every Excellent Gift; And I know no better uſe that we can make of our Mind, than to employ it in the conſideration of that which is moſt important to us.

This Study is not the ſhorteſt way ſimply for to learn theſe Duties: But it is extreamly proper for to nouriſh the acknowledgments which we ought to have for the Author of our Being, to confirm the Faith that we have in Jeſus Chriſt, to take

from the incredulous that proud prejudice, That our Morality was made only for People who had not Wit enough to keep themſelves from being deceiv'd; and in fine, To elevate our Spirits and Hearts, in ſhewing us the ways of God in the Inclinations of Men, and the Duties of Man in the ways of God.

We ſhall ſee by this Meditation, the Divine Relation that is between Nature and the Goſpel, and that Reaſon leads us to the Confines of Religion. We ſhall learn that the light of Nature, whilſt it is pure and exempt from prejudices, will it ſelf conduct us to the moſt ſublime Duties of Man, ſhew us to what heighth he is deſign'd, and the Glory of his Condition. We will endeavour to ſay nothing but what relates to the Principles of our Faith, which we will ſhow to be thoſe of Nature, in what concerns the Science of Manners, and if we be obliged to ſtop at any abſtracted Truths, we ſhall do it only for as much as they ſhall lead us to the truth of Senſe; in a word, we will ſeek not only Truth, but likewiſe profit in our Diſcoveries, not forgetting the deſign of the Science we treat of. In effect, Morality being to our Souls what Phyſick is to our Bodies, and having for its end the curing us of our

Spi-

Spiritual Maladies, it ought to apply it ſelf principally to two things, firſt, to find out the Diſtemper, and afterwards the Remedy, theſe two deſigns divide Morality: but they are too vaſt, and would carry us too far, we will confine our ſelves to the firſt, waiting till Providence ſhall afford us means to treat of the latter.

We ſeek here the Knowledge of Man, but not as Phyſick, Anatomy, Metaphyſick, Logick, which conſider him as a Corporal Being, or ſimply as a Spiritual Subſtance; as an Animal, or as a Rational Animal. We will conſider him only as a Creature capable of Virtue and Happineſs, and who finds himſelf in a ſtate of Corruption and Miſery.

As Morality obliges us to conſider our ſelves in this reſpect, ſo it does engage us to borrow from ſome of thoſe other Sciences, certain Principles which they hold to be moſt evident.

For to underſtand well the Corruption and Miſery of Man, one muſt neceſſarily comprehend what is his Nature, his End and Excellency. That if what we have to ſay upon this Subject, appears in ſome places a little abſtracted, and out of the Ordinary reach of People, it is to be remembred that we Treat of the *Spring* of

Morali-

Morality, and if we do not always agree with Vulgar Opinions, 'tis becauſe we have not room to reſpect pre-judgments, this being writ to diſperſe the Confuſions of our Ideas, and to juſtifie by Reaſon what we perceive by Senſe.

This work muſt therefore be divided into Two Parts, in the Firſt we will ſhow what Man is, what he ought, and what he may be; that is to ſay, we will Treat of his Nature, of his Perfections, of his End, of his Duties and Natural Obligations, of his Force, of the Motives and Objects which may principally govern his Actions.

In the Second, we will Treat of his Irregularities in general and particular, We will ſeek the Spring of his Corruption, we will conſider his Streams, we will ſee the force of his Endearments, the Extent of his Paſſions, the Principle of his Vices, and through all we will ſhow a Rule to diſcover his Errors, and will juſtifie the greatneſs of our fall in ſhowing the degree of our Elevation. God who is the Maſter of Spirits, purifie our Hearts by his Grace, that we may ſay nothing but what relates to his Glory, and that may be conformable to the Holy and Eternal Truths of his Goſpel. *Amen.*

The

The Firſt Part.

Which Treats of the Nature of Man, his End, his Perfections, his Duties, and his Powers.

CHAP. I.

Wherein is given a general Idea of the Abaſement and Miſery of Man, which are the firſt of thoſe Qualities which ſtrike upon our Minds.

IT is certain that Man appears but a very ſmall thing whilſt he is judged of by the Prejudices of Senſe: 'tis no wonder he is thought incapable of Virtue whilſt his Abaſement is conſidered, and incapable of Good, whilſt his Miſery is reflected on.

The

The ſmallneſs of his Body is the firſt thing that preſents it ſelf to our Eyes; the Holy Bible ſhows it us in ſaying, *That Man has his Foundation in the Duſt, that he inhabits a Tabernacle of Clay, and that he is conſumed by the hap of the ſmalleſt worm.* And Nature on the other Hand makes us ſo ſenſible of it, that it is impoſſible for our Pride to diſpute it. It is true that as we are wont to meaſure all things by their Relation to our ſelves, we look upon our ſelves as the Center of Perfection, and Judge the Bodies about us too big or too little, according as they agree or differ with the ſize of our own: but you need only change the Scene, or to ſee things by other Eyes than your own, or to conſider them in an oppoſite Senſe for to diſabuſe you in this reſpect. Aſcend a *Mountain* and tell me what is the bulk of a *Man* that appears in the *Plain*. Suppoſe that the Cœleſtial Bodies were animated with a Spirit like yours, and that they had Eyes to behold you, and tell me what your Body would appear to them; or compare the Dimenſions of this Body to the vaſt Spheres which ſurround you; to thoſe movable Worlds and Lights which the Hand of the Creator ſeems to have ſown about

you

you, the better to convince you of the ſmallneſs of that Tabernacle of Duſt you inhabit, the weakneſs of *Man* is proportion'd to his ſmallneſs, and his lowneſs to his weakneſs; both the one and the other was in the Spirit of the Prophet, when he cry'd ſpeaking unto God, *Wilt thou ſhow thy ſtrength againſt a leaf which the wind carrieth away*; or in the Spirit of the *Pſalmiſt*, when he ſpake by a ſort of Hyperbole fill'd with Senſe and Truth, *That if they weighed Man with nothing, they would find that nothing weighed more than Man.* We may ſay in a manner, that nothing ſurrounds *Man* on all ſides: as to what is paſt he is no more, what's to come, he is not yet; and as to the preſent, he partly is, and partly is not. In vain does he endeavour to fix what is paſt by remembrance, and to anticipate what is to come by Hope, or frame to himſelf a preſent of larger extent; it is a Flower which in the morning ſprings, flouriſhes at noon, and withers at night.

Man conſidered in his divers States, is a Creature conſtantly miſerable, who finds (as one of the Ancients ſaid very well) *Sin in his Conception, Travail in his Birth, Pain in his Life, and the deſpair of an*

an inevitable neceſſity in his Death. Every one of his Ages bring ſome particular weakneſs or miſery along with it: Infancy is but a forgetfulneſs and ignorance of ones ſelf; Youth but a during Rage, a long Fury, and Old Age but a languiſhing Death under the appearance of Life, it is followed by ſo many Infirmities. There are few things about him which pronounce not his End; he finds the Principles of that Death which he fears above all things, both in the Air which he breaths, and the Nouriſhment which he receives, and in the Springs of Life which conſume themſelves: And ſuch is his Deſtiny, that after having ſhun'd the greateſt Perils, Fires, Shipwrack, Diſeaſes, he finds at laſt, all theſe pretended Deliverances to terminate in Death.

His Body is the Center of Infirmities; his Mind is filled with Errors, and his Heart with irregular Affections; he ſuffers in the Conſideration of what is paſt, and cannot be recall'd; and by that which is to come, which is inevitable. In vain would he ſtop to gain leiſure to taſte any delights which preſent themſelves on the way. Time is as a Storm that hurries him on, inexorable to his Regrets and Complaints. We are not able alone

to

to bear the ſight of our ſelves and the neceſſity which is impos'd upon the pleaſures of the World of paſſing away in an inſtant; united by Society with others we do but, as I may ſay, multiply our ſelves in others, for to participate more of the common miſery of Humane Kind.

It is a very grievous thing to a Creature that loves its ſelf ſo much, to ſee himſelf continually dying, and to be ſenſible of life, but by the meaſure of loſing it: Infancy is Death for Youth, that for maturity of Age, that for Age advanced, and that for extream old Age; we are dead in regard of ſo many Perſons we have dearly loved and have loſt; and in regard of ſeveral Pleaſures and ſeveral Advantages which following the Deſtiny of the World, conſume themſelves by their proper uſe, whereas there remains nothing but a ſlight remembrance thereof, incapable of ſatisfying us, and very proper to torment us. Tho' the Life of *Man* ſhould be very long, the good that would accompany it, would not be conſiderable; and tho' the Felicity we find here below, ſhould be as full as it is defective, it would be but a ſmall matter, being at laſt to terminate in Death, What would it be then, when we are convinced

of

of the little reality of theſe advantages, and of the brevity of Life, which is ſuch, if we would ſpeak properly, it ſcarſely gives us time to put our Affairs in order, to take our leaves of each other, and to make our Will as we ought.

Man who is naturally convinced of theſe Truths, ſeeks means of Comfort to theſe Misfortunes, to which the quality of *Man* expoſes him. He avoids in this deſign any ſelf-repreſentation, or to make himſelf eſteem'd by others on that account. He would not be look'd upon but as being cloathed with ſome Exterior advantages, which makes the difference of Conditions, and the diſtinctions of Perſons: But if there be ſo much Dignity in the *Man* of whom Religion gives us but the glimpſe, there will be more Reaſon a thouſand times, for to value him for the qualities which are common unto us, than for thoſe which diſtinguiſh us.

And if on the contrary, there be ſo much Honour in poſſeſſing thoſe Exterior Advantages as the World would perſuade us, *Man* muſt be in himſelf a very ſmall matter; which we cannot think, without betraying not only the Honour of our Nature, but likewiſe the Sentiments of our Vanity. Me-

Methinks one might define the Man of the World, who for to cure or comfort himſelf in his natural Poverty, and Miſery, loves to wrap himſelf up in imaginary Good, (*A Fantaſm that walks among things which have but an appearance.*) I call a Fantaſm, not a Man of Nature Compos'd of a Body and a Soul, which God has form'd; but the Man of Cupidité, Compos'd of Dreams and Fictions of Self-love: I call the things that have but an appearance (and that after the *Pſalmiſt*) the advantages which the World ſeeks after with ſo much Paſſion, theſe great Vacuums fill'd with our proper Vanity, or rather theſe great Nothings which poſſeſs ſo great aſpace in our irregular imaginations.

Whilſt we endeavour to diſſipate theſe Fantaſms of Pride and Cupidité which we find in Man, our deſign is not to ſubſcribe to the Eternal Decree of our Miſery, and Abaſement. Let us penerate into thoſe appearances which even now ſeem'd ſo ſad to us, and we ſhall find ſome reaſon of Comfort; but for to find what we deſire, we muſt ſeek the Man in the Man, and not in thoſe exterior differences which Cupidité hunts after with ſo much paſſion: for it is not the deſign of

God to raiſe a Man, or a certain Order of Men unto a good that may ſeem proper to them. Your deſire deceives you in the very firſt ſtep ſhe cauſes you to make in ſearch after a Supream good; you ſeek for a particular good, and diſtinguiſh'd glory; ſo much the worſe for you if you find it, becauſe the true good which you ought to aſpire to, is a common felicity, and which ought to be participated by an infinity of Creatures who are to compoſe the Family of God.

But if the Man of the World be compoſed but of imaginary goods & perfection, wherein we ſhall find his real Dignities and true Advantages; 'tis that weare now to ſee, and to that purpoſe, methinks we ſhould not do amiſs, if we ſhould ſtill look upon Man as a Fantaſm, and to conſider under that Idea, not only the Man of Cupidité which he hath made himſelf: but likewiſe the Man of Nature, whom we have conſidered hitherto, as the work of God, and whom we look upon yet as having neither Original nor Principal well underſtood by us.

CHAP. II.

CHAP. II.

Wherein are made particular Reflections upon Man, and wherein is attempted the Diſcovery of his Nature, his Perfections and his End, to find ſome Comfort for that we have diſcover'd of his Baſeneſs and Miſery.

WE look upon as a Fantaſm every Body wherein is found a preſence of Underſtanding, or Characters of Intelligence, when, for other reaſons, we are perſuaded, that it ought to have none. This is that preſents it ſelf to our Conſideration; for in fine, this Man whom I ſee before me, and who talks to me, is but originally a Portion of Matter, and why in this Portion of Matter ſhould there be any thing that ſhould Think, that ſhould Doubt, or that ſhould Reaſon with me? Is it becauſe this Body has certain Organs, a Head, Feet, a Brain, a Heart, Nerves, *&c.* but there is no relation between theſe Corporeal parts and the Intelligence. Is it becauſe this Corporeal Machine is fill'd with blood, which does

therein what water does in a Mill: that is to ſay, which ſets all the Engines a moving? if a Mill were poſſeſs'd by Intelligence, it would begin to be a Fantaſm in this regard; for it would be capable of thought, which has no relation to the Structure of its parts. May it be ſaid that this Prodigy comes from the Spirits, that is to ſay, from thoſe parts of the Blood which are moſt fine and ſubtil, which are the moſt capable of Action, becauſe they move with the greateſt Swiftneſs? But what ſignifies the Smallneſs of Parts, or the Swiftneſs of Motion, for to produce Intelligence? which has no more Correſpondence with great Bodies than ſmall, nor with ſwift Motions than with thoſe that are ſlow? Suppoſe, if you pleaſe, that all the Nerves which are filled with theſe Spirits, ſhould abutt upon the pineal Glandules, and ſhould ſhake it a thouſand ways by their motions, and that ſo it ſhould receive the motion of all the objects that touch the Body, in what manner ſoever. I ſee nothing in this but a great number of lines, which terminate in one Centre, or Cords whoſe trembling anſwer the ſame place; I ſee parts of matter link'd and depending one upon another. And is it this that you

call

call Thought? That which encreaſes our ſurpriſe is, that we are well enough acquainted with Matter to perſuade our ſelves, that it puts on no new form whilſt it is in repoſe, and that its only way to act, is motion, and that we have an Idea of Motion, and an Idea of Thought, which we need only compare for to ſee clearly that it is poſſible, that Thought ſhould ſpeak ſomething elſe than Motion, and that movement is not Thought. There are two ſorts of things, whereof there is an impoſſibility of proving; either things ſo falſe, that they cannot be ſuſtain'd by any Reaſon; or things ſo evident, that they cannot be proved by a greater evidence; and it is amongſt the latter of theſe, that you muſt rank this certainty that we have, that the paſſage of a Body from one place to another, is not thought.

Certainty, as in the firſt of theſe notions, it is impoſſible for a thing to be and not to be, the whole is greater than its part, the Truth diſcovers it ſelf to my Underſtanding without Reaſoning, becauſe I perceive clearly the Agreement, or the Oppoſition which is between the terms. So it is impoſſible that I ſhould have an Idea of Motion, and an Idea of my Thought, without ſeeing diſtinctly

that the one is not the other. All the Men in the World, if they would ſpeak ſincerely, would ſay, that they in this reſpect, had the ſame perception of things with us; and they ſee clearly, that a motion of a little Body, how little ſoever it may be, and how quick ſoever it may move, is not a doubt, and that a part of Matter can never attain to doubting or thinking, becauſe it goes from hence thither, and that its parts are ſcattered, or gathered together. It muſt be noted in the ſecond place, that Men perceive more diſtinctly the difference which is between the nature of Motion and the nature of Thought, according as they have accuſtom'd themſelves to renounce the prejudices of Senſe, and to put in order the confuſion of their Thoughts, and to have Things and Idea's diſtinct; and in fine, the ſame eloigment which we find between Motion in general, and thought in general; we find it likewiſe between the kinds of Thought and thoſe of Motion. Let Anatomy ſet in order the parts of my Body, and make me admire the Structure; let Chymiſtry find the Salts and the volatile Spirits in the Blood which ſlide in this Machine; let Phyſick ſearch diligently what it is

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that ſpoils or re-eſtabliſhes its Engines; let them explain to us the manner by which our Nouriſhment becomes liquid by Concoction, how the Chyle refines it, ſtrains it, how it enters into our Veins, the Blood ferments, circulates and ſlides through all, how the Spirits act the Nerves, and all this does but confirm this Principle; becauſe every thing that explains to me the Motions, the moſt particular and circumſtantial of the Engines of my Body, does but ſet me at diſtance from the Idea of Thought; I may look upon theſe Bodies which ſurround me animated by this Spirit, or I know not which ſurpriſes me; I may look upon them as Fantaſms: But a Fantaſm is nothing real, and is compoſed altogether of appearances; and I cannot doubt but Man muſt be ſomething by the experience that I make of my own proper Exiſtence. I cannot ſay why I think in this Body this moment, not with all theſe Organs which do nothing eſſentially to Thought, nor have any natural relation to it, but nevertheleſs I know very well that I think, and this is a Truth of Senſe; let us abandon this Principle, which is, it may be, as profitable in the *Search after the Springs of Morality*, as in the Diſcuſſion of natural Truths.

If I think without the motion of Body be my Thought, or make my Thought, I conceive diſtinctly, that all that is within me, is not Corporeal; that there is a Being in this Compoſition, which does not depend on the Body, can ſubſiſt without the Body; that there is no neceſſity that my Spirit ſhould be ſwallowed up in the ruins of this material Being, which will periſh ſuddainly.

I conceive then hence, ſome hopes to find a remedy unto all thoſe Miſeries which I had thought not to ſuffer. It is not neceſſary that I ſhould have recourſe to ſenſeleſs Dreams of Vanity which ſeduce me, for to ſave me from the general Shipwrack of all Corporeal things, to which I ſee my ſelf expos'd. The nature of my Spirit ſtrengthens me in ſome reſpect, and begins to give me an interview of ſomething in my ſelf, which may very well, being above the nature of theſe Corporeal things, be above their Condition and their Deſtiny.

This Reflection makes me conſider Man with more attention, and not being ſatisfied with this interview of his Nature, I ſeek to know his Perfections.

I ſhall not ſtop on this occaſion, at any of his Corporeal Qualities, which would

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be uſeleſs to me in my Search, becauſe I think to diſcover nothing but what periſhes not. I obſerve very well, that there is a ſtrait dependance between that which thinks, and that which is extended in me. But after what I have diſcovered of the Nature of the one and the other, which it is not neceſſary to enlarge on here, methinks I might ſuppoſe that there is not a Natural Dependance, but an Union of Inſtitution, made by a Being more Wiſe and Powerful than I, who without conſulting me hath affixt that which I am ſenſible which thinks, unto that which I ſee, which is material of one ſort, that the Motions of this Body are the occaſion which give birth to the Thoughts of this Spirit; and I ought to believe likewiſe, that thoſe who take away the Scaffolds, would not deſtroy by that the Building. Death in taking away the occaſion of Thought, would not deſtroy the Foundation and the Reality.

Theſe Thoughts generally ſpeaking fall under three Heads, which are the Senſes, the Thoughts, and the Sentiments of the Heart. Both the one and the other give me a great Idea of Man, and ſhew his Dignity. I grant that the Senſes, according to the School Terms, which are the

Functions

Functions of the Sight, the Hearing, the Smelling, the Taſting, and the Feeling, appear unto us to be common with the Beaſts, which ſeems to abate very much of their Dignity: but let not us paſs our ſentence on the inward condition of Beaſts which is unknown to us; for at bottom the Opinion of thoſe who have made them, has not been well refuted. If the Beaſts reſemble Man, certain *Automata's* invented by the Wit of Man, have likewiſe their apparent Conformity with us; yet nevertheleſs there is no Compariſon to be made between the grand Architect who has made the firſt, and him that has made the others. I know not if there be a Man in the World ſo bold, who durſt to ſay, that God by his infinite Wiſdom, might not make, if he pleaſed, an *Automata*, which without having any Knowledge, might perfectly imitate thoſe things that have: Why ſhould that be denied to God, ſince it ſcarcely exceeds the Power of Man; and if they do agree that the Wiſdom of God could make it, how can they affirm that God has not done it? In truth I cannot decide whence is the greateſt difficulty, whether in the Syſtem of thoſe who explain the inſtinct of Beaſts by a Mechanical

chanical motion; or in the Opinion of thoſe who attribute it to Senſe, or in that of thoſe who add Knowledge thereto: but I know this very well, that if Prejudice be againſt the firſt Opinion, Reaſon declares very much againſt the others. For as to Senſe it is certain that it is not ſufficient for to explain the actions of Animals. For Example, it is not enough that a Swallow has ſeen ſlime upon the ſide of a River, and elſewhere Straw, little Twiggs, Hair, and Moſs, and all thoſe little Materials, of which the Houſe ſhe afterwards builds is Compoſed; it muſt, beſides that, have an Intelligence either within or without it, which knew the agreement that might be between all theſe things, and which judged that the ſlime ſhould be like Mortar for to unite the Twiggs and build a Wall, that theſe Hairs ſhould ſerve to entertain the heat of the Cover, that the Neſt ſhould be cover'd, that the Figure of the Neſt ſhould be oval, for to concenter the heat, that it was neceſſary that its overture ſhould be proportioned to the Body of the Bird, who is both Hoſt and Builder; that it ſhould not be too low, or too near the ground, for fear of being within the reach of Creatures which might

might either kill or devour its young ones.

There is no more ſatisfaction in calling Reaſon to the aſſiſtance of Senſe, and in attributing that to Beaſts: put, if you pleaſe, the Intelligence of a Man into a Swallow juſt hatch'd, you do not make him thereby in a condition to do all that which his inſtinct carries him to. For this Intelligence will never draw thoſe conſequences from Principles which are unknown to it. Who is it has learnt the Swallow the Rules of Architecture? How comes it that amongſt the Birds of this kind, the one is no more ignorant than the other, and that thoſe which were bred this year, and have learnt nothing of their Father and Mother, who were dead ſo ſoon as they were hatch'd, fail not of building their Neſts with the ſame juſtneſs and ſymmetry? Why on the other Hand, do Men deceive themſelves too often in what they do by their own proper Knowledge, and that Beaſts deceive themſelves never in what Nature ſets them at work on; unleſs becauſe Men guide themſelves by their own Reaſon, and that Beaſts act by a ſtrange Reaſon, more perfect than that of Man; a Knowledge as that of Man, which is acquir'd by de-

degrees, would not be ſufficient unto a Swallow. You muſt ſuppoſe Enthuſiaſm & Inſpiration. You would not, it may be, be at the loſs that commonly Men are on this account, if you'd conſider that the Mechanichal motions have a greater ſhare than either the Senſe or the Reaſon, in theſe Actions, which are common to us with Beaſts. For Example, when you eat, it is impoſſible you ſhould explain the impreſſion which the Meats make upon your Imagination, without conſidering firſt, thoſe they make upon your Body; and although you were uſed to think only of that, you ought to acknowledge that there muſt be a motion of the Air which ſhould move the Optick Nerve for to make you ſee, and that of the Smelling to make you ſmell, and which receiving a certain impreſſion of your Brain, repreſents to you the pleaſure which you have already had: but in vain will your Imagination be ticled by the Idea of the pleaſure you are about to taſte, unleſs you can cauſe your Hand to move, which ſhould carry this nouriſhment to your Mouth, call your Reaſon to the aſſiſtance of your Senſe, that is as ignorant as the other, which way the Animal Spirits which are to ſlide into

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the Hand to make it act, are to take, it knows neither where those Spirits are, nor through what Nerves they ought to run, and nevertheless this motion is made with that measure and justness, which is necessary for to obey both Sense and Reason. The Knowledge Commands, but Executes nothing, and I find here beside the Intelligence of Man, an Intelligence without, or abroad, a Reason of an *Automata*, which must necessarily be confounded with the Wisdom and Intelligence of the Great Worker who form'd us. And why should the instinct of Beasts have any other Principle, but let them attribute it to a Mechanical motion, or to a strange impulse, or to any Spirit of an inferior order to ours, which may animate the Beasts; but 'tis no matter, what we have to say upon this Subject, is reducible to two things very incontestable.

The first is, That the State of Beasts is something most obscure and most unknown. The second, That since we are ignorant of it, it ought not to make us reject those things which we know distinctly; that if it were permitted us here to shock the most rooted prejudices in the Mind of Man, and if they would Pardon the

the conſiderations which would appeaſe, it may be too much abſtracted in favour of the importance of the matter, and likewiſe the advantage of this ſort of Knowledge, we would apply our ſelves one moment to ſeek, why Nature has affix'd our Sentiments to exterior Objects. The firſt Reaſon that we find then, is that the way of Sentiment which affixes our proper perceptions unto Objects, is much ſhorter for us to make uſe of, than the way of diſtinct Ideas and Intelligence. Reaſon might, it may be, free the oppoſition which there is between Water and Fire; but Nature in affixing its Sentiments to theſe two Objects, finds much ſooner that difference, and is much more ſtruck with it.

I add, that this way of Sentiment which our Soul fixes on that which is the occaſion of it, is more ſure than that of Intelligence: For the latter may deceive it ſelf, and is often deceived; whereas the way of Sentiment which always deceives in appearance, never deceives in effect; we may likewiſe boldly ſay, that it is the means which the Wiſdom of the Creator has imploy'd for to ſecure us from a thouſand Errors, which would be very lamentable to us. Our Intelligence

gence not acting readily enough, for to be able in an inſtant to diſcern the Objects one from another, by their proper Characters. We ſhould find our ſelves in a neceſſity of confounding them perpetually, if Nature had not found a very wiſe and ſhort way, to make us readily diſtinguiſh them, in cloathing them with our own Sentiments.

That which permits us not to doubt hereof, is, that Nature affixes our Sentiments more or leſs to the Objects, according as there is more or leſs danger, if we be deceiv'd in taking the one for the other. And ſo ſhe has affixt no pain to a Needle which pricks me, becauſe there is not much danger that I ſhould be miſtaken, in believing that this pain is cauſed by any other thing: but ſhe has affixt in ſome ſort, pain unto Fire, in making me conceive in this Element a ſort of ſharp and ſmarting heat, like unto that which I feel, and which nevertheleſs is not in it; and nevertheleſs that which cauſes the pain that I feel, when I approach too near, it is but a Collection of inviſible Needles which enter into my Fleſh: but there is a Senſe which tells me, that it is the viſible Needle which cauſes my pain. I have notice thereof by my Sight;

Sight, and that ſo it is not neceſſary to affix pain to this object, to make me know it in the relation it has to me; whereas thoſe penetrating and ſubtil Needles which are in the Fire, not being perceptible to the Sight, I ſhould not ſhun them, nor guard my ſelf againſt them, not knowing whence they were, if Nature had not affixt the Sentiment of pain they give me.

By the ſame Reaſon Nature ſhould affix the Odor unto the Odoriferous Objects, although this ſcent be in us, and not in them; ſince being agreeable or unpleaſant, it incloſes a Senſe of Grief or Pleaſure, the which Senſe exiſts never but in our Souls. You will tell me, that in Odor there are two things, the Senſe and the Principle which produces it, and that it is this, and not that which is in the Odoriferous Object. That is true; but take care that it is the Odor which your imagination affixes naturally to the Object which is the occaſion. You fanſie, that there is an agreeable Odor in the Roſe, that you ſmell it, that it enters into your Soul; nevertheleſs this agreeable Scent was never but in you, as that which cauſed it cannot but be out of your Soul.

Methinks this Truth appears more ſenſible upon the account of Hearing, than that of Smelling.

When I hear the clear and argutive ſound of a Bell, I believe that it is without me; and nevertheleſs, it is very certain, that it exiſts not but in my Soul; for this argutive ſound is an agreeable ſound; that is to ſay, actually agreeable as this incloſeth actually a ſenſe of Pleaſure; a ſenſe of Pleaſure is in our Soul, and not without us; and in effect Reaſon tells us, that there are in this ſound two things, the agitation of the Air by the Bell, with the moving of a certain Nerve or Organ of the Hearing, by this moved Air: And in the ſecond place, a Senſe, which is that clear and argutive ſound. The Intelligence which Reaſon affixes to the Motion of the Bell, is the agitation of the Air; but it conceives that the Senſe is affixt unto our Soul: but the Senſe ſucceeds better in the intention which Nature has of Characterizing the exterior Objects, for it has affixt the Senſe it ſelf to the motion of the Bell, ſo that it ſeems to us, that the agreeable ſound is preciſely there, where the Bell agitates the Air. How elſe can you judge of the diſtance that there is between it and you?

you? If Reaſon were to Calculate how much ſo many degrees of diſtance would weaken the agitation which cauſes the ſound, and how much the Senſe is weakened by the diſtance, it would never be done; and the beſt Geometrician in the World could not judge of the diſtance of a Bell that ſoundeth.

If this agrees with the Touch, with the Smell, and the Hearing; why ſhould the Sight be excepted out of this Rule? The aſſiſtance of the viſual Species which the School of *Ariſtotle* has invented, for to inſtruct us in what manner the Soul ſees the Objects which are diſtant from her, are ſo little reaſonable, or rather ſo ridiculous, that a Man ſhould be almoſt one of the other World, for to amuſe himſelf to refute them, for theſe Images, if they have place upon the Subject of viſible Objects, have they place likewiſe upon the Subject of ſounds; but an Image that ſhould preſent to me the agitation of the Air, ſhould be the Image of a particular motion, and nothing but that; it ſhould not be a ſound, and much leſs a ſweet and agreeable ſound. That if the Air agitated, were ſufficient to be the occaſion of this prodigious variety of ſounds: why might not a more ſub-

tile Air be ſufficient to be the occaſion of a prodigious variety of colours? For if the Senſe do enter eſſentially into the ſound, which cannot but be agreeable or diſagreeable to the Law: The Senſe enters not leſs eſſentially into the colours that are agreeable or diſagreeable to the Sight. We muſt be very groſly deceived to imagine that the Sun, when it dazles our ſight, ſends toward us a ſingle Image, and that its brightneſs does not cloſe up the Sight. The Thought is more perfect than the Sun; nevertheleſs it does not dazle us, and why? Becauſe we know Thought by an Idea which repreſents it to us, without Sentiment, and that we perceive the light of the Sun by a Sentiment, and not by a ſimple Image of that Star, which permits us not to doubt, and cannot be diſagreed to, that there can be no Sentiment there, where there is more and leſs Sentiment, than in light there is more and leſs Sentiment; the light of a ſmall Wax Candle contains leſs Sentiment than that of a huge Flambeaux; that leſs than that of the Sun; the light of the Sun leſs than that of Lightning. The Sentiment, they will tell you, is not in the light, but is cauſed by the light in our Soul. I grant it; but I likewiſe maintain,

tain, that our Souls naturally affixes this Sentiment unto the ſmall Wax Candle, to a Flambeaux, to the Sun, and to Lightning. That which proves it, *viz.* that it is pleaſed with the Candle, it rejoyces with the Flambeaux, it is dazled with the Sun, and it is frightned with Lightning; not only by the reflection it makes upon all things; but by the firſt Sentiment it has thereof.

On the other Hand, the Hypotheſis of viſual Images doth not deſtroy our Syſtem: For whenyou ſhall ſuppoſe that we ſee the Objects which are at diſtance from us by the Images which they ſend us, that doth not hinder our Soul from believing it ſees the Objects immediately. Nature doth not tell us that we ſee the Earth by an Image which ariſes to us from the Earth: but we ſee it without painting, and immediate; ſo that ſhould you not grant that Nature doth affix our Sentiments to exterior Objects, you muſt grant ſhe has there fixt at leaſt her Ideas and Repreſentations; which will work the ſame effect for us.

But it would be in vain to conteſt a thing that one might demonſtrate to be poſſible, that it is neceſſary, and that it is actually. For to ſhow that it is poſſible,

we need but call to mind here what we have ſaid to juſtifie our other Sentiments. For ſuppoſing that the light is a Sentiment, and that colours are but a Light modified by the different manners of Bodies which it meets, who ſees not, that the ſame judgment ought to be made of it as of ſounds? I ſay, that it is neceſſarily ſo: For if we ſee by viſible Images, how can we judge of the diſtance of viſible Objects? One muſt reaſon for to know how much a viſible Species loſes of its Being, in being removed a League or two from us. And where ſhall we then be, when we can judge only by the diſtance of the Object. Whereas Nature affixing our Senſe to the Objects, which are the colours or the light, we no ſooner perceive the Object, but we perceive the diſtance by the ſame Senſe, which diverſifies it ſelf according to that diſtance. But why to be blind againſt matter of fact? The colours in the Cœleſtial Bow are colours: We ſee them truly, for it cannot be ſaid of us, that we are Viſionaries, whilſt we ſay that we ſee them. We may ſay the ſame thing of thoſe which we perceive in a Priſm of Glaſs, which changeth colour as often as we turn it. All the World agrees neverthe-

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leſs that theſe colours are not affixt to the Object. What other thing then can theſe colours be which we really ſee, yet are not real; but the Sentiments of the Soul, which our Soul affixes to certain Objects where they are not truly; and what difference do you think is there between the colours of the Heavenly Bow and the other, unleſs the matter which is the occaſion of the firſt being leſs conſtant, leſs durable in its ſtate than the other. Which is ſo true, that it might be boldly affirmed, that if that Luminous Dew which ſhows thoſe colours in the Rain-bow, were likewiſe as durable as the verdure of our Fields, the colours of the Flowers which are in our Gardens, would not appear to us more real than the colours of the Rain-bow. This Principle is, it may be, more important than may be imagined towards the Knowledge of ones ſelf; but I muſt not puſh the Diſcuſſion too far.

The moſt viſible Perfections of the World do ſubſiſt but by the Light, the Senſe, the Colours, the Odours, and the Savours; which are, to ſpeak truly, the Sentiments of our Spirits: ſo that it happens, we thinking to admire the Beauty of the Heavens, the Splen-

dour of the Stars, the ſhining Glory of Meteors, the delicious Fruits of the Earth, the Spices of *Arabia*, &c. That which we admire is more in our ſelves than in the apparent Object of our Admiration.

And that is ſo great a Character, that I dare boldly advance, That Man is little leſs the Image of God by the Knowledge of Senſe, than by that of Reaſon, ſince dwelling in one Corner of the World, he ſtretches himſelf all over the Univerſe; and that all the Beauties and Perfections of the viſible World ſpring in a manner from his Judgment: an Advantage ſo conſiderable, that for fear leſt Men ſhould take an Occaſion to confound himſelf with the Divinity, and leſt he ſhould be idolized by his Self-Love, the Author of Nature would have him covered under ſome low Conformities, which he ſeems to have with Beaſts, and under the Prejudices and the confus'd Idea's of Infancy, which makes him confound his Sentiments with the things about him: and in fine, that he ſhould be wrap'd up in the Ruines of his Body by the Deſtruction of the Organs of his Senſation.

And from hence might be drawn divers important Concluſions, if I were not to haſten to paſs to other Diſcoveries. Firſt, By this may be ſeen how much they deceive themſelves that reject with ſo much diſdain the Thought which they had, That the World had been made for Man. For certainly it is much more ſurprizing ſtill, to ſee that whatever is moſt fine and perfect in the World, ſprings from the Foundation of our own Nature, and is not different from our ſelves. It might be inferr'd in the ſecond place, that the Good or Miſery of Man is not in the Power of this Maſs of corporal Things, which ſurround him, which of themſelves are incapable of doing him either good or harm; but in the Power of the Supream Being, who would affix our Joy or Grief to things at that diſtance from our Nature and Perfection, that the Character and Seal of our Dependance might be upon him. It is eaſie to ſee by this, in the third place, That the Alarm that we have taken at the Revolutions of time, which triumphs over all things, and by which we expect to be hurried away, was but ill grounded. For we ſee very well, that Time conſumes both

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our Bodies, and thoſe about us: but we ſee not, that it carries away the Foundation of our Thought, that Spirit which animates our Body, and which ſeems likewiſe (as I may ſay) to be the general Soul of all that we ſee. It is true we ſee not the ſame Man who diſcours'd with us, when Death has deſtroy'd the Organs by which he had Commerce with others: but is it not true, that it is ſufficient to conceive the Deſtructions of thoſe Organs, without ſuppoſing any thing elſe for to conceive the Ceſſation of this Commerce. Certainly we ſhould be very much miſtaken, if we ſhould imagine that the Organs of our Bodies had been neceſſary to form the Subſtance of our Spirit; and to the end that a thing ſhould be capable of Thinking, it ſhould have Eyes, Ears, a Mouth, Brains, *&c.* Theſe Parts were not neceſſary for to make us Think; but to form the exchange of Thoughts which is between Men, and to eſtabliſh Commerce: And it was afterwards neceſſary to affix certain Sentiments to the motions of our Bodies, for to inform us of that which might deſtroy and preſerve the latter. So that one may ſay, that reaſonable Society is the End of the Corporal Life,

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as the Preſervation of this Life is the End of the greateſt part of our Senſations. When then this Life expires, that ſays, that the Divine Providence would not that we ſhould have any longer Conference with Men, that we ſhould either ſee or diſcourſe with them, or that they ſhould ſee or diſcourſe with us. Death makes us ceaſe living with others; but it makes us not ceaſe living in effect. We think no longer by the occaſion of certain Organs and certain Bodies, with which it is no longer neceſſary we ſhould have any relation; but we think always, becauſe they were neither theſe Bodies, nor theſe Organs, that made us think.

We may ſee by this, in the fourth place, That nothing is more falſe than the ordinary Prejudice of Men, who imagine that they know their Bodies, and that they know not their Spirits: for it may be ſaid, by an Inverſion of their Thought, that they know their Spirits, and that they know not ſo well their Bodies.

What they call Metaphyſical and confuſed Idea's, are often Idea's very diſtinct; and what they call Knowledge, Experience, and Sentiment, (take care) are often confuſed Idea's. For the firſt thing

thing they do, is to cloth corporal things with Savours, Odours, Sounds, and Light, and other Sentiments, which are in them no more or leſs than the Pain is in the Soul, and not in the Needle which pricks us: and then the Pain which they fanſie they feel in an Arm that is loſt, is in the Soul which exiſteth, and not in the Arm which is no more. Then when theſe exteriour things are once cloathed with our proper Sentiments, Men who attribute more unto Sentiment than unto ſimple Knowledge, becauſe Sentiment is more lively, and intereſſes them more, are accuſtomed to preferr the Perception of theſe exteriour Things before the diſtinct Knowledge they might have. They call that Feeling and Touching; and that, according to their way, is to Know diſtinctly: but according to our way, that is rather called Feeling than Knowing; and to Feel, is to Know confuſedly.

When they ſhall once have rendered to the Body that which belongs to the Body, and to the Soul that which belongs thereto, they will know that there is nothing worſe grounded than their Prejudice.

We ſee here again, in the fifth place, the

the Error of thoſe who imagine that the World, which is the Maſs of Corruptible Objects, is very near to us, and that God is at a great diſtance from us. For to take the World for the Corporal Objects, one may ſay that God is between Us and the World, becauſe that theſe Objects do not abſolutely contribute any thing unto our Thoughts or Sentiments by the way of an efficient Cauſe, not being of an Order noble enough for that; that they are not purely but the Occaſion; and that it is the force of the Divine Inſtitution which cauſes us to have theſe Thoughts and Sentiments in the preſence of Objects; whether it be thought that this Inſtitution determines the Virtue which God hath put into our Spirits to act, or whether it be that it immediately produces our divers Sentiments; for we will not here enter into metaphyſical Examinations, which are good for nothing: And it were to be wiſh'd, that for to avoid the furthering the Speculation in theſe ſorts of things, we ſhould conſider, that Men are not ſimply deſigned to know the Truth; but for to know profitable Truths, and that they ſhould let alone for a certain Faith that which is of no other uſe than for to ſatisfie the

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Curioſities of their Wits. And certainly when I conſider that God, without changing any thing in this World, either in my Body or my Soul, could, if it had pleaſed him, by a free Inſtitution of his Wiſdom, have affix'd Pain unto all the Corporal Objects unto which it hath pleaſed him to have affix'd Pleaſure, becauſe theſe Objects in themſelves have as little relation with the one as with the other: So that Man, inſtead of loving himſelf by the Motives of the Pleaſure which is occaſionally affix'd unto ſo many different Bodies which ſurround him, he would hate himſelf by the Motives of Pain which God had affix'd in that caſe to theſe ſame Objects; and would find in a neceſſity of living, a greater Deſpair than Men ordinarily find in a neceſſity of dying. I want no greater proof for to comprehend the Bounty and Wiſdom of God.

But this is not a place for to lengthen our Conſiderations in, becauſe we do but touch upon them wherein they are capable of informing us of the Perfections of Man.

We will not ſtop upon the Imagination, which is but, properly ſpeaking, an Amaſs of weakned Senſations, which ſubſiſt

ſubſiſt ſtill in our Soul by reaſon of the Marks which exteriour Objects have left in our Brain; an Amaſs, I ſay, of Senſations, which the Soul puts in order, and which ſhe makes uſe of afterwards for to repreſent other Objects to her ſelf.

But we cannot enough admire this Intelligence of Man, which rectifies his Senſe, which corrects his Imagination, purifies and enlarges the Perception born by the Occaſion of Bodies, which unites ſeveral Idea's in the Judgment which it forms of Things, and ſeveral Judgments in the Reaſoning, which weighs, compares, examines, ſearches, and by relation which ſhe finds between Things, makes the Dependance of Arts, of Sciences, of Governments, and produces all the Marvels of reaſonable Society.

Is it not extravagant to ſay, that this Intelligence has for its Principle the Motion of Nature, and that it is but an arraigning of Atomes, which agitated in a certain manner, acquire another Situation? Can it well be conceived, that an Atom, without going forth of the Body, ſhould run through the Earth and the Heavens in a moment? That it ſhould go every where without moving in a

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more noble and admirable manner than if it moved it ſelf? A portion of Matter can it know others, and afterwards know it ſelf? Act upon it ſelf, relye not only upon it ſelf, but upon its manner of acting, and upon the manner of that manner, and upon the Reflexion which it makes in this manner *ad infinitum?* Is it then true, that certain Atomes ſhut in I know not what little Pipe, ſhould judge of the Place of the Univerſe, of the Deſign of the World, and ſhould know the Wiſdom of the Creator? Is this one property of this Thinking motion, not only to make Atoms more, but to repreſent that of the Celeſtial Bodies, and that of the Spheres, which are only in the Order of Things poſſible? Theſe Atoms whoſe Shock is a Thought, have they this admirable virtue of Power, when they meet, not to ſtrike? But the general Degree of being, or that of Subſtance, or the general Notion of Bodies, without ſhocking the individual in this Motion, a Thought which we call Preciſian. Has there never been heard of a Motion properly call'd, without a Body's properly moving from one place to another? as the Thought which paſſes from what's paſt, which is no more, to what's to come,

come, which is not yet; and goes from Nothing, which preceded our being, to the Nothingneſs which terminates the hopes of the Incredulous. The Spirit of Man is not only above the Condition of Matter; but that which is admirable, it has a Species of Infinity in its Acts; for it flies from Object to Object, and it multiplies them to Infinity: it is never weary of Knowing: and although its Perfections be in effect bounded, becauſe it knows not all things, it is certain that its Excellency in ſome regard is without limits, becauſe it may ſucceſſively know all things.

As the Spirit of Man is never weary of Knowing, his Heart is never weary of Deſiring; and ſuch as is the depth of Knowledge, ſuch is the depth of deſiring within us.

That Ambitious Prince whoſe Heart was greater than the Univerſe, of which he was Maſter, had not at the bottom more vaſt and elevated Sentiments than thoſe which lie hid in the ſecret Diſpoſition of each of us; and the Heart of a Hero is not different from that of other Men: It depends but upon Proſperity and great Occaſions, that the Man who dwells in a Cabbin wiſhes not for

new Worlds to Conquer. When a Man is in Poverty, he makes Vows only for what is neceſſary: when he has what's neceſſary for Nature, he requires what is neceſſary to his Condition. Is he arrived at that ſtate? he ſeeks that which may ſatisfie his Cupidity. Has he obtained all that which his Heart can ſeem to deſire? he forms, contrary to Reaſon, new Deſires ſtill. Behold theſe Maſters of the World! who after having elevated themſelves above other Men, wiſh for the Condition of Beaſts; which they may ceaſe from acquiring, but cannot ceaſe from deſiring. Such is the Excellency of Man, that it appears even in his moſt ſhameful Irregularities: for do not imagine that this inſatiable Avidity of our Hearts had its firſt Source from our Corruption. Thoſe Men are blameable who apply themſelves with too much Paſſion to the ſearch of the Goods of this World: but they have reaſon not to be content with finite Goods, they who are deſigned for the poſſeſſion of the Sovereign Good.

And thus it muſt be; for we ſee that in Nature every thing is contented with the Goods which are due to its Species. The Fiſh content themſelves in the Wa-

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ter where they ſwim; the Birds are ſatisfied to fly in the Air; the Beaſts of the Field have no more to deſire when they have found Graſs, which ſerves them for Nouriſhment. And whence comes it then, that Man is ſo little ſatisfied with theſe temporal Advantages, if it be true that they ought to form all his portion? Should one believe that the Wiſdom of the Creator ſhould have fail'd preciſely in this? Did it not well know, either the Nature of the Goods of the World incapable of ſatisfying us, or the Nature of our Hearts incapable of being ſatisfied? or rather, Is it not knowing the Goods of the World, our Hearts, and the natural Diſproportion which is between them. God has form'd things in that Order, becauſe he reſerved our Souls to himſelf, for to repleniſh them himſelf, for to ſatisfie them, and for to anſwer by his Excellencies and by his infinite Beatitude, unto the infinite Succeſſion of our Thoughts and our Deſires; or, if you pleaſe, to the infinite Searchings of a Spirit which ſearches to know all things, becauſe he is deſtined to know God, and to the infinite Avidity of a Heart, which is ſatisfied with no particular Good, becauſe it is deſtin'd for the

Poſſeſſion of a Sovereign Good, which incloſes all others.

The Nature, the Perfections, and the End of a Man, form that which we call his natural Dignity: but all that turns upon his eternal Duration. We ſhould draw but very ſmall Advantage from our being ſpiritual in our Eſſence, if this Idea did not include that of Immortality. But it would be extravagant to imagine, that becauſe that which diſſolves periſhes, that which is incapable of Diſſolution ſhould periſh. What did I ſay? What is extended is not loſt, although it acquire another manner of being, and the Body of Man after Death to be Aſhes, or Fleſh, or Dirt, or Worms, or Vapour, or Duſt, does not ceaſe from being a Body. Death in its proper Idea is a Deſtruction or a Diſſolution of the Organs. If then Death annihilates not the Body, whoſe Parts it ſeparates, how ſhould it then annihilate that Spirit, that Intelligence; which being neither Extent, nor Movement, nor Union of Parts, and not having evidently any natural Relation unto all theſe things ſuſceptible of Diſſolution?

The Perfections of Man depend likewiſe upon his Immortality. In vain ſhould

ſhould we find a Species of Infinity in the Senſations of our Souls, infinitely varied according to the Diverſity of exteriour things, which are the Occaſion of them; in our Imagination, capable of gathering Images without number for to repreſent the Objects; in our Mind, which is never weary of Knowing, and in our Hearts, which deſire without end, it having been made but for a time, and being to remain but ſome Years, we might not have had, but a number of Senſations limited, nor have imagined but for a certain ſhort time, nor to have had a Succeſſion of Thoughts proportionable to the Brevity of our Lives; nor at laſt poſſeſs but a tranſitory and bounded Felicity; for there is but one Succeſſion of infinite Durance, which does ſort this infinite Succeſſion of Sentiments, of Thoughts and Deſires, of which Man finds himſelf naturally capable.

Let us ſay then what it is in the immortal Man that we find of Nature, the Perfections, and the End of Man, which form his natural Dignity.

As the Nature and the Perfections of Man have given us an Interview of his End, his End informs us likewiſe what are his Duties and natural Obligations.

Which is that which we will conſider in the following Chapter.

CHAP. III.

Wherein is endeavour'd to know Man, in conſidering the Nature and the Extent of his Duties.

OUR Duties flow from Nature, and do not proceed only from Education, as ſome have imagined: for to juſtifie which, one need but ſuppoſe two Principles; the firſt is, That we naturally love our ſelves, being ſenſible of Pleaſure, and hating Evil, deſiring Good, and having a care of our Preſervation. The ſecond, That with this Bent to Self-love, Nature has given us a Reaſon to guide us. We love our ſelves naturally, it is a Truth of Senſe; we are capable of Reaſon, it is a Truth of Fact. Nature prompts us to make uſe of Reaſon for to direct this Love of our ſelves, that ſprings from the Principle of the latter in a manner altogether neceſſary, it not being poſſible that we ſhould truly

ly love our ſelves, without employing all our Lights in the ſearch of what's agreeable to us.

Then ſince Nature orders us to ſearch after our Good, it follows, that it cannot be ſaid, without an evident Contradiction, that a Man is naturally without Duty and Law. We muſt agree about the eſſential Difference which there is between the Moral Good, and Bad, becauſe the firſt conſiſts in following the Law of reaſonable Nature, and the other in violating it. This natural Law in general, may be divided into four others, which are its particular Species; the Law of Temperance, which makes us avoid Exceſſes and Debauches, which ruin our Bodies, and prejudice our Souls; the Law of Juſtice, which makes us give every Man his due, and do as we would be done by; the Law of Moderation, which forbids us Revenge, knowing that we cannot make uſe thereof but at our Expence; and to reſpect in that the Right of God, that is to take care of our ſelves; and in ſhort, the Law of Beneficence, which obliges us to do Good to our Neighbours.

It is certain, that the Immortality of Man makes the Perfection and the Extent

of theſe four ſorts of Law. A Man who knows himſelf under the Idea of an Immortal Being, would not make pleaſures his end, which the Author of Nature has affixt unto that which is for the conſervation or the propagation of the Body. We would not do wrong unto others if we did not only fear a return of injuſtice in this Life; but if beſides we ſhould apprehend the doing our ſelves an eternal prejudice. He who is employed, as he ought to be, by his natural Dignity, which raiſes him without doubt extreamly above the outrages he may receive, far from deſiring ſatisfaction at the expence of the Glory of God, will conceive with difficulty and reſentment in what manner ſoever he be treated. In ſhort, if this natural and temporal Communion which we have with other Men in Society, can cauſe to ſpring any Benevolence between us, which increaſes according to the degree of Temporal Commerce we have with them: What Motives of love and beneficence ſhould we not find in the Idea of the Eternal Society, which we muſt, or which we may have with them? So the Nature of Law is in Man: but the perfection and extent of that Law, is in the Immortal Man. As to the

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reſt, theſe four ſorts of Law form that which we call Natural Law, the which is the moſt Ancient, the moſt General, the moſt Eſſential of all, and the Foundation of others. It is the moſt Ancient, becauſe the love of our ſelves precedes in us all ſorts of Bents and Law. It is the moſt General, becauſe there has been ſeveral Men, who have not heard talk of reveal'd Right; but there has been none enter'd this World, without that Law which carry'd them to the ſearch of their own good. It is the moſt Eſſential, for it is not here, neither the Law of the *Jew* nor the Law of the *Chriſtian* ſimply, 'tis the Law of Man; it does not belong ſimply to the Law, or to the Goſpel; but unto Nature in whatſoever State it finds it. In fine, it is the Foundation of all others.

It is eaſie to ſee, if one conſiders, that all the other Laws are nothing elſe, than the Law of Nature renewed and accommodated unto the certain States wherein Men are. You find the natural Law in that which God gave our firſt Parents. The Legiſlator ſuppoſes there, that Man loves himſelf, becauſe his Law is founded upon Promiſes and Threatnings. He propoſes to him Good and Evil. He enlightens him

him to know the one and the other. He engages him to the Acknowledgment which Nature it ſelf preſcribes us. God requires a homage for ſo many favours which he has afforded him, and this homage conſiſts in abſtaining from eating the Fruit of one only Tree. He preſcribes him the duty of his Preſervation (*in the day that thou eateſt thereof, thou ſhalt die the death*;) as likewiſe the Law of Juſtice. For what is there more juſt, than to yield unto the Creator the Empire of his Works, and not to make uſe of his Creatures in ſpight of him. Then this is the Natural Law, accommodated to the State wherein *Adam* found himſelf then.

In effect he could not as yet forbid him the uſe of Idols, which were unknown to him, neither Blaſpheming the Name of the Lord, then when he did but begin for to bleſs him, nor for to reſt one day in a week, he who was always to reſt, nor the killing his Neighbour, who as yet had no exiſtence, nor committing Adultery ſince he had but one Woman; nor robbing at a time wherein all things appertain'd to him; nor for to bear falſe witneſs, then when he could not bear it, unleſs againſt himſelf; nor for to covet,

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becauſe all things were his own. But when Men were multiplied upon the Earth, as they changed State, God from time to time traced back this natural Law, and gave it unto Men under another form, becauſe it was to be proportioned to the circumſtances wherein they were. Therefore it muſt not be imagined, that when it is ſaid that the Decalogue contains the Natural Law, ſhould be underſtood, that it contains any thing elſe, than theſe ſimple and common Principles of the Natural Law, which ought to guide all Men. I grant that the Decalogue is the Natural Law renew'd and trac'd back to the Eyes of the *Iſraelites*: but it is certain likewiſe, that it is the Natural Law accommodated to the State wherein the *Iſraelites* then were. The truth whereof, theſe Remarks make moſt evident.

The *Iſraelites* had been delivered from the Captivity of *Ægypt*. That was the reaſon the Legiſlator cloathed himſelf, as I may ſo ſay, in this Bleſſing, for to induce them to the Obedience which they owed him. *I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Ægypt, out of the Houſe of Bondage. Thou ſhalt have no other*, &c. One may plainly ſee that the

the motive has not the ſame force upon the Hearts of Men who had not their ſhare in the deliverance. It would be to no purpoſe, to ſay, that if they had not all their parts in the temporal deliverance of the *Iſraelites*; that they have been Spiritually delivered from the *Ægypt* of ſin. The Myſtical Senſe is good in a ſimple teaching deſigned for inſtruction, but it is not of uſe in a Precept, which does require an exact Obedience, nor conceived in terms too exact, nor too proper; and how many People are there, unto whom God has certainly given natural Law, as unto others, who have never heard talk of the deliverance of the *Iſraelites* by the Miniſtry of *Moſes*, and who by conſequence could not therein find an Emblem of their Spiritual Deliverance. Secondly, the *Iſraelites* being in a Deſart, where they could not drink but Water, nor eat but Manna, had no occaſion to be taught the Precepts which ſhould lead them to Sobriety, in making them ſhun Drunkenneſs and the Exceſſes of good Cheer, it is the only reaſon which can be given, why the Legiſlator in the Decalogue has not forbid this ſort of Intemperance, which has always paſt for a very Capital Vice.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The *Canaanites*, who by their Idolatry, had drawn down the anger of God, and ſuffer'd the puniſhment of their proper ſins, did nevertheleſs appear to be Curſed both outwardly and interpretatively, as they ſpeak in the School, by the occaſion of the Crime of *Cam* who diſcovered his Father's ſhame, and was puniſhed by this Prophetick Malediction, which did preſage the ruine of the Poſterity of *Canaan*, the Off-ſpring of that Wretch. It cannot be deny'd but that the Decalogue does make a manifeſt Alluſion in the fifth Precept conceived in theſe terms: *Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy days may be long in the Land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee*; it is certain that by the Land is to be underſtood, not the Land of the Living in general; but that Land which had been given to be divided among the *Iſraelites*, which is evident by this Expreſſion (*the which the Lord thy God giveth thee*;) and there is no doubt, but that the Senſe of the Law is, that they ſhould ſhun the Crime of *Cam*, which became dreadful to his Poſterity, and endeavour to obtain by an oppoſite Conduct, the Bleſſing of God, which might ſecure them in their Poſſeſſions.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, It is certain that Nature teaches us to Conſecrate a part of our lives unto the Service of God; for ſince we hold by him all the Moments of our Duration, both Acknowledgment and Juſtice require that we ſhould Dedicate ſome of them to him, and likewiſe that we ſhould have certain times, which we ſhould particularly Conſecrate unto Piety: but to obſerve the ſeventh day rather than another, and to extend the Obſervations thereof even unto Beaſts, which has a relation, no more with Nature, but with the preſent State of that People; God would not, that they ſhould loſe the Memory of the Bleſſing of the Creation, in neglecting to practiſe a Feaſt, which he had inſtituted with an intention to perpetuate the Memory of that great event.

By all theſe Characters it may be ſeen that the Law of the Decalogue doth not differ from the natural Law in its foundation and in its firſt Principles: but only in this manner, and in the extent which muſt be given it, for to proportion it to the State, and occaſions of the People of *Iſrael*; that is evident by one general Remark which may be made upon the Subject; which is, that the great Motives, which do ſuſtain the Precepts of this

this Law in general, are Temporal Bleſſings and Curſings, which are the Motives, which the Sovereign Legiſlator has pleaſed to make uſe of to make himſelf Obey'd; he that could threaten Men with Eternal Pains deſigned for the wicked, and pronounce an Eternal and Happy Life to thoſe who ſhould obſerve his Law, whence comes it that he ſuppreſſes theſe powerful Motives, theſe dreadful Objects, or at leaſt that he lets us know them but in a confuſed manner, whilſt he takes all the force of his Promiſes and of his Comminations, from the greatneſs of Corporal Goods and Evils? Becauſe he proportioned his Law to the State in which the Children of *Iſrael* then were, the time being not yet come of revealing clearly the Life and bleſſed Immortality in Jeſus Chriſt, who among other Characters of his Divine Vocation, ſhould have that of a clear and abundant Revelation.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Wherein we continue to make ſome Reflections upon the Decalogue, conſidering it as the Expreſſion of the Natural Law, accomodated to the State of the Iſraelites.

THE firſt Precept which it contains, is of ſo great importance, that it ſeems to contain it ſelf alone, Morality and Religion. It includes a Command and a Forbidding. The Command is to *love God with all our heart, with all our ſtrength, and with all our mind.* What is Forbid, is the having any other God before the face of the Lord.

For to comprehend well this Precept, one muſt mark in general, that a Man may love another by Sentiment, or by Reaſon, or in fine, by Sentiment and Reaſon both together. That is called loving by Sentiment, to love a Man for the good which he does one, or for the pleaſure which he gives one. That is called loving by Reaſon, to love the Perfection for the Perfection it ſelf. That is called loving by Sentiment and Reaſon, to love any one

one becauſe of the Merit and the Perfections which he poſſeſſes; and becauſe of the good which he does, or may do us.

The love of Reaſon appears not at bottom different from eſteem, and it ſpeaks no more than an eſteem, which intereſſes its ſelf for the Object eſteem'd, which ſeeks to do it good, or which wiſhes it. We love in that manner the merit of a Stranger, at a diſtance, and who has no relation with us; but as we will ſee hereafter, it is not eaſie to find inſtances of this.

We love on the contrary our ſelves, by Sentiment and not by Reaſon. The love of our ſelves precedes the Judgment which we make, that we ought to love our ſelves; and ſhould we frame a thouſand Arguments to the contrary of this Bent of ours, we ſhould nevertheleſs love our ſelves ſtill.

In fine, God loves himſelf by Reaſon and by Sentiment; by Reaſon, becauſe he knows his proper Perfections; by Sentiment, becauſe he taſtes his infinite Beatitude, and it is by Reaſon and by Sentiment that we alſo ought to love him. By Reaſon, becauſe he poſſeſſes all Perfections; by Sentiment, becauſe he Communicates to us all the goods

which we can be ſenſible of and poſſeſs. God ſeems to demand here, the love of the Sentiment. He does not ſay, I am the God who have all the Perfections, *&c.* but I am the Eternal, *thy God who have brought thee out of the Land of Ægypt*, &c. And it is remarkable, that this Character is common to all his Revelations which he addreſſes unto Men upon Earth, that is to manifeſt himſelf unto them, cloathed with ſome of his bleſſings for to gain the Heart by acknowledgment. He was ſerved by the Ancient World by the Name of the God who is, and is a rewarder of them that call upon him. He was afterwards known by the Name of the God of *Abraham*, the God of *Iſaac*, and the God of *Jacob*. Afterwards he gave his Law in declaring himſelf the Lord, who had brought forth his People from out the Land of *Ægypt*. Afterwards a Prophet declares that the time is come, in the which they ſhall ſay no more, the Lord is he who hath brought his People out of the Land of *Ægypt*: but that the Lord is he that hath cauſed his People for to return out of the Country of *Babylon*. And in fine, when the time deſign'd for the Redemption of Man was come, God call'd himſelf no more but

the God of Mercy, and the Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt; they then deceive themſelves very much in this matter, who imagine that it is to offend God, to love him otherwiſe than for the love of himſelf, and that there is no intereſſed motion in our Hearts but what is Criminal. We need only to refute theſe ſpeculations, but make a reflection upon the Conduct of God, who not only conſents that we ſhould love him by the motives of good, which we find in his Poſſeſſion: but who would and does proportion his Revelations, to this deſign; and likewiſe it may be ſaid that we glorifie the Sovereign good then, when we ardently deſire him, and when we find neither reſt, nor Joy, but in his Communion.

This grand Precept may be propoſed to the Mortal Man for to confound him, in making him ſee his impoſſibility of accompliſhing the Law of God: but there is none but the immortal Man that can fullfil this Duty. It is not the Man that periſhes, who is ſenſible of the great obligations he has to God, but the Man who ſubſiſts eternally. And it is not in a Collection of periſhable favours, but in an amaſs of incorruptible goods, that we find the motives of a love and of

an acknowledgment worthy of God.

So likewiſe the Man of Nature conſidered as a Man, who has relations ſhort and tranſitory with other Men, cannot nor ought not to love others ſo much as himſelf. If we were oblig'd to love one indifferent and a Stranger to us, as much as a Father loves his Children, or as the Children love their Father, certainly all things would be in confuſion and diſorder in the reaſonable World. We ought to love our Children more than our Parents, our Parents more than indifferent perſons; then ſince it is the love of our ſelves makes this inequality, and this variety in our Affections, it follows that there is a juſt Law of Nature, which would that we ſhould love our ſelves more than others; but the Immortal Man has other ſights and other obligations. All theſe divers ſorts of Proximity and of Relation which regard this life, diſappear before the Relations of the Eternal Society, which we are to have with others. A Temporal Neighbour which Nature ſhews us, is not ſo conſiderable as the Eternal Neighbour which Faith diſcovers in him. As to the reſt, there are perſons who love themſelves with ſo much irregularity, that it is no ways

ways good that they ſhould love others, as they love themſelves. For it is not true, that if we ſhould ſay unto a Man, I wiſh you may be Ungrateful, Blind, Paſſionate, Vindicative, Proud, Voluptuous, Covetous, that you may have more pleaſure in the World; he would have reaſon to think, either that we were mad, or that we would make him but a very bad Compliment, and nevertheleſs this might be to love ones Neighbour as one does ones ſelf.

For to have a right of loving ones Neighbour as ones ſelf, one ought to love ones ſelf by relation to Eternity; and there is none but the Immortal Man in a condition well to obſerve this Precept. It is required here, if ſince the Law does ordain that we ſhould love our Neighbour as our ſelves, it would that we ſhould love him by the motives of that love which we have for God, or by the motives of that which we have for our ſelves. I anſwer, in diſtinguiſhing always a love of Reaſon, and a love of Sentiment. When we love the Neighbour with a love of Reaſon, it is certain, that the motives of this love ought to be taken from the love which we have for God. When we love the Neighbour

with a love of Sentiment, the motives of that love cannot be taken, but from the affection that we have for our ſelves. So that it may be anſwered in a word, that he muſt be beloved by the one and the other of theſe two motives; and it ſeems that the Law of the Decalogue confirms us in this opinion. For it puts the Precept which regards the Neighbour, immediately after that which regardeth God, for to teach us that the one has a dependance upon the other, and that we ought to love the Neighbour by the love of God; and on the other ſide, he calls him whom he recommends to our loving, by the Name of Neighbour, for to tell us that we are intereſſed to love him, becauſe that he is a perſon, who belongs to us. Reaſon tells us, that God being the ſupreme and infinite Beauty, is amiable for himſelf, and that all things are ſo for the love of him. It would have us love the Objects according to the relation and agreement that they have with God; the experience which we make of our Being, accompanied with joy and pleaſure, obliging us to love our ſelves in the firſt place. Nature teaches us to love the perſons, more or leſs according to the Proximity or Agreement which they have with

us;

us: Theſe two Laws diſagree not at all, the one (as I may ſay) the Law of Reaſon, and the other the Law of Sentiment; the one is the inſtinct of Nature, which periſhes; and the other the inſtinct of the Immortal Nature: The one relates to the ſhort Society, which we ought to have one with another; and the other to the Eternal Commerce we ought to have with them in God.

CHAP. V.

Wherein is examined the extent of our Duties, in conſidering the Law of the Decalogue.

SInce we muſt love God, it follows, that we ought not to confound him with his Creatures by Idolatry. The Forbidding naturally follows the Commandment in that regard.

God in eſtabliſhing the natural Order which we ſee in this World, has certainly taken all the meaſures for to hinder us from falling into Idolatry. For in the firſt place, for to keep us from the Idolatry of our ſelves, he would not that we

ſhould know our Perfections, but in acknowledging our dependance. Our Perfections are our Sentiments, our Thoughts, and our divers Affections. If all the Perfections, or the Spiritual Qualities did ſpring in our ſelves and were found in us, without their being affixt unto exterior cauſes, there would be danger, leaſt we ſhould apply to our ſelves the Idea which we have of God, which is that of a Being altogether perfect. For if it depended upon our Will, independent of the matter, and of the things without, to ſee ſuch a colour, ſuch a mixture of light as we pleaſed, to hear every where, and at all times ſuch voice, or ſuch harmony which ſhould ſeem good to us; that we might have likewiſe to infinity, Sentiments quite new, informing ſimply the empty deſign of having them there, there would be a manifeſt danger that we ſhould take our ſelves for God.

Methinks one might make the ſame remark upon that he has choſen for the occaſional cauſes of our Thoughts, not Creatures as perfect or more perfect than us, as the Angels, or other Intelligences of an equal Order, or ſuperior unto theirs; but matter diverſified by its

Figure,

Figure, by its Motion, by its Reſt, and the arraignment of its Parts; that is to ſay, the ſubject of the World which we conceive, which is the leaſt capable of Perfection.

That if God has given leave, that Men ſhould cloath the exterior things with their proper Perfections, that has been with a precaution, which hinders us from taking them for the Object of our Adoration. For take notice, that he has affixt the moſt lively Sentiments of Man, and thoſe, by conſequence, which contain the greateſt Perfection, unto the parts of matter which our own ſenſe repreſents to us as the leaſt perfect. That which tickles the moſt, is that which abaſes the moſt. The lively Sentiments of his excellence, is joined with the greateſt marks of his abaſement. For doubt not that pleaſure is not ſomething Divine, and that it makes not at the bottom a very great Character of the excellency of Man. Whence comes it then, that this pleaſure is greater, proportionably as it is affixt to the loweſt Objects, and that after ſo ſenſible a manner, that even the confuſed Ideas are ſufficient to ſhew it us; it is that God would hinder us from taking for the Object of our Adoration

oration, the exterior things, ſeeing how much we ſhould be inclined to love them for the pleaſure, of which they are the occaſion, in making us ſee that thoſe which flatter us the moſt, are thoſe which merit moſt our contempt.

Let us go farther: God would not manifeſt himſelf under any viſible form. He forbids the making any Corporeal repreſentation of him. *Thou ſhalt not make to thy ſelf any graven Image, nor the likeneſs of any thing that is in Heaven above, or in the Earth*, &c. and he grounds this defence upon this important remark, *Remember that when thou wert in Horeb, thou didſt hear a Voice, but thou ſaweſt no reſemblance; therefore thou ſhalt take care upon thy Soul*, &c.

It is becauſe the ſenſe repreſents always an Object under a determinate form, a Tree appears to us always a Tree; the Earth, the Earth; the Heaven, the Heaven; that which carries a limitted perfection, incloſed in a ſingle Idea, and diſtinct from all others. Then as God contains all the Perfections, and that it is not true to ſay, that he is in ſuch a manner one thing, that he is not another, becauſe he contains eminently all the Glory and all the Perfection, which can

can be conceived, it follows that our Senſes would repreſent him under a very falſe Idea, had they leave to repreſent him.

The Objects of Senſe are more Noble than are commonly imagined. For they are cloathed with Spiritual qualities of our Souls, which are the Sentiments; and although our imagination cheats it ſelf in the confuſed Idea which ſhe has, this Error does honour unto matter, and it is not at all inconſiſtent, but it would not be the ſame, if God becoming the Object of our Senſe, we ſhould confound the Sentiments of our Soul with the perfection of that all-perfect Being, for it would happen then, that we ſhould both be culpable of Impiety, in having an Idea of God which agrees not properly but with our ſelves, and we ſhould be culpable of Idolatry, in tranſporting into the Object of our Adoration, our proper Sentiments.

So that it may be ſaid, ſince God would make himſelf preſent to our Senſe, his principal deſign has been to keep us from Idolatry, and put us in a condition of glorifying him by the natural ſearch, which our Spirit makes after his Perfections; which we will endeavour to explain

plain here with a little more extent, because of the importance of the matter.

We are not of the Opinion of Mr. *Des Cartes*, who believed that all Men that came into the World, had naturally an Idea of God imprinted on their Minds. This Opinion in truth would appear very convenient and of great use to us both in Morality, and Theology; but what signifies its appearing convenient, if we cannot persuade our selves of the truth thereof; to speak what we think thereof, we must divide our Knowledge into four Species, according to the received Division of the School; which are the simple Apprehension, the Judgment, the Reasoning, and the Method. The Method gathers several Reasonings, the Reasoning several Judgments, the Judgment several Ideas. So that it may be said, That the last are the first Elements, unto which our Knowledge reduces it self.

These Ideas are likewise of two Orders, the one is simple, and the other is compound. The simple Idea is that which is not composed of several others. The compound Idea, is that which containeth several simple Ideas. The Idea of Being, that of Substance, that of the Body,

Body, that of Thought, are ſimple Ideas. The Idea of a Houſe, of a Republick, *&c.* are compound Ideas. So that as all the other manners of Knowledge reduce themſelves to Ideas, ſo it may be truly ſaid, that all Ideas reduce themſelves to ſimple Ideas which are as the Elements and the Materials of which all others are compoſed.

The ſimple Ideas are again of two Orders, the Ideas of Sentiment, and the Ideas of Preciſion. I will explain the Terms. The Ideas of Sentiment are the Ideas which repreſent to us ſome Sentiment of our Soul, or Objects cloathed with a Sentiment. The Idea of a Fire is an Idea of Sentiment. It repreſents to me a Body cloathed in a manner with that which I feel, when I approach the ſame.

The Ideas of things which we perceive, or which we have perceived by Senſe, are manifeſtly of this Order. The Ideas of Preciſion are the general Ideas which the Soul has of things, when ſhe conceives them under common notions; ſo the Idea of Being is an Idea of Preciſion, becauſe it repreſents to our Soul, but the general Attribute in which all things that exiſt, do agree. The ſame

thing

thing may be ſaid of the Idea of Subſtance, Perfection, of perfect Being, *&c.* The Ideas of Sentiment are reduced to two Orders, the firſt comprehends thoſe which we have upon the occaſion of Bodies ſtriking the Organ of our Sentiment. One muſt be mightily deceived no doubt, to imagine that we perceive then Corporal Qualities, in the things which are about us. For theſe qualities which our imagination attributes unto them, being our own proper Sentiments, it is not to be doubted, but that they are Spiritual qualities; and I know not whether it may not be ſaid without advancing too great a Paradox, that the ſenſe does repreſent unto us not leſs our ſelves than the things about us. The ſecond Order of Ideas of Sentiment, are the Spiritual Ideas which we have of the Thoughts, of Doubt and Reaſoning, then when we know that we think, that we doubt, and that we reaſon, *&c.* for one may ſay, that it is impoſſible to think, without perceiving that one thinks by the Sentiment it ſelf of the Thought.

One muſt not imagine, as ſome weak Heads have done, That the Ideas of Preciſion, for to call it abſtracted, and for to ſet it at a diſtance from the Idea of Senti-

Sentiment, containeth leſs of reality and truth than the others; and it is ſufficient for to convince us of the truth of the contrary, that without a ſupply of Ideas, we ſhould have nothing, but the Idea of our ſelves; and ſo that we ſhould not know the things that are without us.

After having made all theſe obſervations, I conſider the Idea of God, and I examine of what it is compoſed; it is certain, that it is but the Ideas of Sentiment, or abſtracted Ideas, or the one and the other confounded together. If there ſhould enter into this Idea, the Ideas of Sentiment, and that there ſhould be Corporal Ideas, this Idea is falſe and imperfect, and it muſt be corrected by the order of God himſelf. (*Unto what wilt thou liken me, hath not my hand made all theſe things?*) That if we ſtop at the Ideas of Spiritual Sentiments, for to introduce them into the Idea of God, we ſhould only cloath God with the Sentiments and Qualities of our Underſtanding, *to wit*, of Thought, of Intelligence, of Bounty and Wiſdom which we find in him. That if we repreſent God as a Being, as a perfect Being; theſe are the abſtracted Ideas, which comes

comes to the relief of the Ideas of Sentiment. For the Idea of a Being altogether perfect, is not an Idea, which actually and distinctly containeth all Perfections. One cannot say all the Perfections, there where there is an infinity thereof. Should we have an Idea which might particularly and distinctly represent this infinity of Perfections, which are in the Supreme Being, we should know God, as God knows himself; and our Understanding would be capable of seeing the infinite all at a time; which is extreamly out of our reach and condition. What then is the Idea of an all-perfect Being? It is an Idea composed by the Intelligence, extended by the Spirit, accommodated by the understanding, and composed of divers reasonings of an Intelligence, which seeing that God has necessarily this Perfection, and still that other, that he wants not any one, that he cannot want, forms an Idea of an infinite Perfection to it self, in denying that it hath any bounds. So the Idea of God is formed of certain materials, which we find in our selves of Being, of Substance, of Spirit, of Intelligence, of Wisdom, of Bounty, *&c.* but for to make a proper Idea of God, and which cannot agree with

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any thing elſe; this Idea muſt receive all its Perfection from Reaſoning. It is certain that this Idea, for having been acquired by reaſoning, is not leſs natural, becauſe it is impoſſible for Man, who makes a legitimate uſe of his Reaſon, not for to have it in a diſtinct Idea. I cannot conſider the dependance which is between the Acts of my Soul and the exterior things, without acknowledging the exiſtence of God.

In effect, ſince matter, nor its Motion, nor the Arrangement of its parts, nor their Diſperſion, nor their Shock, nor their Figure have any relation with the Sentiments of my Spirit; and that on the other hand, the Spirit neither could nor would affix its Acts to theſe exterior things, becauſe its Miſery conſiſteth in theſe grievous Sentiments, that thoſe things exiſt in ſpight of him, it is evident that he muſt have recourſe to a Being more powerful than us, which has made this Dependence, and this Union; and in regard of the confuſed *Idea*, it aſſembles all the Perfections of the World for to carry them unto God, as to their Principle, who containeth them eminently.

I know very well, that ſhould we have any one of our *Ideas*, which ſhould be naturally imprinted in us, it ought to be that of a perfect Being: But, in fine, Reaſon and Experience permit us not to think it. It is the Character of natural Things to be uniform, and for to reſemble in all Subjects wherein they are. Pleaſure, Joy, Grief, Fear, Deſire, are the Motions which may be look'd upon as natural, becauſe they are the ſame in all Men in the World; whereas the *Idea* of G O D is divers, according to the diverſity of Subjects wherein it is found: For in what did the Idolatry of the *Gentiles* conſiſt, unleſs it were in that, that theſe Men, abandon'd to the Darkneſs of their own Corruption, imagin'd a *Jupiter*, who held the Empire of Heaven, but not that of Hell; who could command Men, but not Deſtiny? The God of War, according to them, was not that of Eloquence; they ſeparated theſe two Qualities, for to attribute them unto different Subjects. Juſtice agreed with one, Beauty with another, *&c.* far from gathering all the Perfections for to attribute them unto God: Their Superſtition conſiſted eſſentially in ſeparating them.

And

And take notice, If Superſtition and Idolatry conſiſt in not having an *Idea* of the moſt perfect Being, or in deſtroying that *Idea* when received, the Vices and the Corruptions of Man conſiſt eſſentially in not rendring unto God, that which this *Idea* requires to be rendred Him. Blaſphemy and Impiety deſtroy it, in attributing unto God Vices moſt oppoſite to his holy Nature. Incredulity queſtions his Truth, diſtruſts his Providence and Bounty; Ingratitude, his Mercies; and Vengeance, his Juſtice, *&c.*

Although in the holy Scriptures in general, nor in the Decalogue in particular, God be not defined in expreſs terms and forms (*the All-perfect Being*) one may ſay, that if the terms be not, the thing is ſo evident, that there is no poſſibility of diſputing it: For why is it that the Author of *Geneſis* has made a Catalogue of all the Creatures, and hath ſhown us that God hath produced them all by his ſingle Will? Were it not to convince us, that God containeth all Perfections, becauſe that he is the Spring of all Beings. And why doth God cry out, by the mouth of his Prophets, *Unto whom will you liken me? Hath not my Hand made all theſe Things?* unleſs it were to tell

us, That an Eſſence that had made all Things, and which conſequently contained all Perfections, could not be preſented by an Image, or by any determinate Form?

And that, without doubt, is the reaſon for the which God would not that they ſhould repreſent his Eſſence by any corporal Image. That which is ſurprizing is, That at the ſame time that the Legiſlator forbids us making any corporal Repreſentation of God, the Scripture makes no difficulty to paint him to our Imaginations by corporal *Ideas:* Let us ſeek the reaſon.

It is certain, that our Senſe doth repreſent to us Objects under a limited and determinated Form, and that the Imagination has a ſpecies of Infinity in its Acts, which makes it gather, when it pleaſes, an infinite variety of Images for to repreſent to us the ſame Object. If then the Senſes ſhould repreſent God, they would deceive us; for repreſenting him to us under a particular Form, incompatible with all other, they would tell us, that he hath this Perfection, and not that. If he were repreſented, for example, like a Man, he would not be like a Star: If he were painted like a

Star,

Star, he would not be like a Man; but the Imagination making uſe ſometimes of a Man, ſometimes of a Star, by and by of a Light, and then of Whirlwinds; and heaping an infinite number of Images, which the Reaſon corrects and purifies after, it repreſents to us by this variety without end of different *Ideas*, a Subject which has no limited Perfection.

It is for that reaſon that God would manifeſt himſelf unto Reaſon and Intelligence, which having no particular ſimple *Idea* for to repreſent God to us, it might make uſe of an infinity of *Ideas*, which it conſiders ſucceſſively; and of an infinity of Reaſonings, which purifie and extend theſe *Ideas*, for to repreſent to us in ſome ſort, and as much as we are capable of, the infinite Perfections of God. And it is for the ſame reaſon ſtill, that God would communicate himſelf, and make himſelf felt in the Heart of Man. For as that deſires without bounds, it can ſearch after the Sovereign Good by that infinite ſucceſſion of Deſires and Affections, as the Imagination and the Spirit teach, by an infinite number of *Ideas* and Reaſonings; God having put a Species of In-

finity in the Imagination, in the Spirit, and in the Heart of Man, that Man be capable of ſearching after the Infinity of God.

I muſt confeſs, that the knowledge of our natural Dignity, ſerves excellently well for to ſecure us from that baſe Superſtition, which confounds the Object of our Senſes with that of our Adoration: Every reaſonable Man ought to be aſhamed to proſtrate himſelf before dead and inſenſible Divinities; but particularly the immortal Man: And it is not difficult to ſhew, that it is principally the Sentiment of our Immortality, which puts us in a ſtate of obſerving the other Precepts of the Decalogue. It is ordinary with Men, who meaſure the Good and bad of their Condition, by relation to the ſhort durance of this Life, to abandon themſelves to Murmurings and Blaſphemies againſt God, then when they hope no more in this World; the which appears by the example of the *Iſraelites* fearing to die in the Deſart: But it is natural that the immortal Man ſhould reſpect the adorable Author of his Being, who muſt be for him a Spring of Life after Death.

A Man, who thinks of living but few Years, ſeeks to make the moſt of his Time and Life, by taſting of Pleaſures; but the Man who findeth that he is made for Eternity, thinks he can make no better uſe of his time, than to employ it in the commerce of Piety.

The immortal Man acquits himſelf equally well, both of the Duties of a Subject, and thoſe of a Superiour: A temporal Dependance afflicts not his Heart; and an Empire that muſt end, puffs not up his Soul. Exempt from the Mortifications of Obedience, and the Fierceneſs of Commands by the ſentiment of his Immortality, he carries an equal Soul through all, and nothing hinders him from elevating himſelf in obeying, and from ſubmitting and humbling himſelf in the Authority which elevates him.

In fine, it is eaſie to comprehend, that a Man who looks on himſelf in the eternal Relations which he hath with his Neighbour, is far from being willing to wrong him, in taking from him his Goods, his Honour, and his Life; and that the Goods of the World which periſh, do not appear to him conſiderable enough to be the principal Object of his Affections.

CHAP. VI.

Wherein is ſhown the extent of the natural Law, in conſidering it in the Goſpel, and by relation to the immortal Man.

IF this Law of *Moſes* was the natural Law, accommodated to the ſtate of the mortal Man, and to the ſtate of the *Iſraelites* in particular; the Goſpel is the natural Law, accommodated to the ſtate and to the relations of the immortal Man.

This appears enough by the different *Genius* of the two Oeconomies. Under the Oeconomy of the Law, God ſeems not to manifeſt himſelf, but for to cleave the Walls, for to open the abyſs of the Earth, for to burn the Mountains, and ſend fire from Heaven; for to threaten the Bodies with his Judgments, or for to execute the Arreſts of his Juſtice upon periſhable nature. But under the new Diſpenſation of Grace, Men are ſeen, animated by the Spirit of God, deſpiſing the Injury of the Elements, and the Precautions of Men, ſuffering with

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ſo much Conſtancy; as if they ſuffered in Bodies that were borrowed, tranſported with Joy in the midſt of the Fire which conſumes them, and triumph in ſeeing this Compoſure diſſolve, which other Men preſerve ſo precioufly, becauſe they are ſuſtained by the *Idea* of Eternity, which the Mercy of God has diſtinctly informed them of.

It is not but that the Law of *Moſes* does contain ſome regard and ſome relation to Eternity; for that Law hath at leaſt the Shadow of future Goods. We cannot deny likewiſe but that the Goſpel ſuppoſes the *Ideas* of the lowneſs and the mortality of Man; for it contains all our Remedies, and all our Conſolations in that regard: But that which is true, is, that the Law of *Moſes* regards directly the preſent Life, and indirectly Eternity; whereas the Goſpel regards Eternity as its principal Object, and indirectly the preſent Life. As for Nature, it finds it ſelf equally in the one and the other Oeconomy. The Goſpel is hid in Nature, and Nature is hid in the Goſpel, if I may ſo ſay. But it is the immortal Nature that muſt be underſtood here; and it is therein that we ſhall find the Solution of ſome Difficulties

ties which might have given us ſome trouble.

In effect, it ſeems againſt Nature to love ones Enemies, and to look upon Adverſity as a Good, and Afflictions as a ſubject of Joy, and to give way to Injuſtice, in giving what it demands, nay, more than it demands; which are the Maxims of the Goſpel. I grant, that all this is contrary to the Sentiment of periſhable Nature, which meaſures all things by their relation to this preſent Life; but nevertheleſs, this is not againſt the Intereſt of the immortal Nature, which reckons Time as nothing, and fixeth all its ſight on Eternity.

Our Enemies are an Obſtacle to the eſtabliſhment of our Fortune in the World; but there is nothing but the Hatred which we may bear them, which may be an Obſtacle to our Salvation; and it is the laſt which the immortal Man conſiders. He deſpiſes their little Reaſons of Hatred, which Cupidity repreſents to our Hearts, and regards the eternal Relations, which we have with others, in God, who is our common Father, as the moſt mighty motions of Love, which we ought to have for our Neighbour.

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Abundance and Proſperity charm the Heart which hath incloſed in the World, which periſheth, its Hopes and its Pretenſions; but the immortal Man finds therein more ſubject of Fear, as there is more of Sentiment or Pleaſure: He looks upon theſe Goods imaginary which employ us, and ſatisfie us not, theſe lively Sentiments which are an Obſtacle to the knowledge of his true Intereſt. He looks upon Proſperity as the Kingdom of Paſſions which ſeduces us. He is perſuaded, that Afflictions, in taking from us their agreeable Sentiments, do but drive an infinite number of Impoſtures from our Soul.

He does not think likewiſe that the Goods of the World do merit our Envy, and to make us ſtrive one with another; above all, when Religion perſuades him that theſe Hatreds and Conteſtations, which ſpring from the occaſion of this corruptible World, may do him an eternal prejudice. Wherefore if the Right of Man be to demand that which appertaineth to him, God having eſtabliſhed for that Tribunals in Society, the which would be but an union of Robberies, and a ſucceſſion of Murders and Crimes, without the exerciſe of Juſtice; never-

nevertheleſs, the Prudence of the immortal Man doth not permit him to require his Right with rigour, when there is the leaſt probability that he may prejudice the Intereſt of his Soul. From whence it may be concluded, that the Morality of the Goſpel is but the Expreſſion of the Heart of the immortal Man; but we ſhall have room to ſpeak of that elſewhere.

We have ſeen that the Perfections of Man turn upon his Immortality, which only renders him capable of Happineſs; we come now to ſee what is that Immortality, which makes the extent of our Duties, and of our Obligations: We are going to ſhow ſtill, that it is that which makes the force of our Soul, or the weight which may determine us to act well.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Moral Forces of Man, or the Motives which he finds in himſelf, whereby to determine his Actions.

IF God had been an Enemy to Man, he had affix'd Pain to all the Objects unto which it hath pleaſed him to affix Pleaſure; the one was as eaſie to him as the other, and then Man had been an Enemy to himſelf, whereas he loves himſelf naturally. For it muſt be by an eſſential Chain of Things, that he who feels Pain, hates it; and if this pain be conſtant and inſeparable, he muſt hate his proper Being, knowing well that the ſenſe of that pain could not be, without his exiſtence. So that there is nothing ſo eaſie as to conceive, that the damned Spirits hate themſelves in the place of their puniſhment; and that if Self-love in this World has been the Spring of their Corruption, the hatred of themſelves becomes afterwards the Inſtrument of their puniſhment.

It is conceived likewiſe, that a Man can-

cannot be ſenſible of Pleaſure, without loving that Pleaſure which he feels, and without wiſhing the preſervation of himſelf, who is the Subject. Pleaſure makes him love his Exiſtence; becauſe without that Exiſtence, that Pleaſure could not ſubſiſt.

From thence it follows, that it depends on God in forming Man, to make him love himſelf; or that he ſhould not love himſelf, becauſe it depended on him to have affix'd, or not to have affix'd, Pleaſure to certain Objects: So that the love of ones ſelf, is a natural bent in ones ſelf. It is Nature which makes us love Pleaſure, and hate Pain, and by conſequence it is Nature that makes us love our ſelves. This Inclination then doth not wait for the Reflections of our Mind to ſpring in our Soul; it precedes all our Reaſonings.

The *Stoicks* deſerve to be laugh'd at by all Ages, if they had thoſe Sentiments which were attributed to them: They pretended, that Man was wiſe in ceaſing to be a Man; which was a very great Extravagance: But they were no leſs out, in that they conceived ſome ſort of weakneſs and baſeneſs, in that which is moſt natural in our Heart.

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The love of our ſelves, in the ſecond place, is originally a divine Bent; we do not love our ſelves, but becauſe that God hath loved us; we ſhould hate our ſelves, if God had hated us. There is no reaſon then that we ſhould decry all thoſe things which the love of our ſelves makes us do; as if they were ſo many Weakneſſes, and ſo many Crimes, according to the dangerous Morality of ſome, who have pretended to anihilate the Excellency of all Vertues, upon the Principle that they all ſprung from the Boſom of Self-love, and that there were none which had not an intereſſed Good; an ill conſequence, becauſe that the love of ones ſelf is a Bent from a divine and celeſtial Spring.

The love of our ſelves is, in fine, a neceſſary bent; it is not then to be imagined, that our Soul ſhould be indifferent to carry it ſelf, or not to carry it ſelf, towards that which it judges advantageous to it ſelf. Theſe indifferencies of free Arbitration, are Dreams of People, who have not enough ſtudied Nature, or who will not know themſelves. As to the reſt, God has found it good to mix Knowledge and Sentiment, to the end that Knowledge might govern

govern Sentiment, and Sentiment fix Knowledge. Had Man nothing but Reaſon, we ſhould go aſtray in our Thoughts, and we ſhould diſſipate our ſelves in vain Speculations, ſetting our ſelves to know every thing but that which were of moment to us. The Sentiment then is deſigned to fix this Intelligence, and to apply it principally to the Objects which concern it. Were there nothing but Sentiment in Man, he might have Bents and Deſires, ſuch as the Sentiment might produce; but he would want a Light and a Guide for to find the things unto which theſe Deſires naturally carry him; and the love of Voluptuouſneſs being blind and ill manag'd, would make him fall into all ſorts of Precipices.

Reaſon then is deſigned to govern Sentiment: Reaſon is the Counſellor of the Soul; Sentiment is as its Force or Weight which determines it; and this Force is greater or leſs, according to the Differences of the Sentiment.

In the compariſon which we make, the Soul conſiders not only that which affords it pleaſure at the inſtant; but more, that which may afford it pleaſure in the concluſion. It compares the Pleaſure with

with the Pain, the preſent Good with the Good at a diſtance; the Good which it hopes for, with the Dangers it muſt underdo; and determines it ſelf according to the Inſtructions it receives in the different Searches, its Liberty not being, as I may ſay, but the extent of its Knowledge, and the Power which it has of not chuſing but after having examin'd all.

This being granted, it is eaſie to judge, that it is a preſent Utility, which conſiſts in a Sentiment of Pleaſure; or the Utility to come, which conſiſts in all that can give us Joy, or make us happy, or preſerve our Happineſs, in preſerving our ſelves, which makes all the force which our Soul hath, for to determine in its Deſigns, or in its Conduct.

This force is very ſmall, when you encloſe it in the Circle of the Objects of the World. The Strength which we have humanly, for to keep us from being covetous, will conſiſt in the fear we have of prejudicing our Honour by the baſeneſs of Intereſt; the Power which we have for to keep us from being Prodigals, will conſiſt in the fear of ruining our Eſtates, whilſt we aſpire to make our ſelves eſteemed by others for

our Liberalities. The fear of Sickneſs will make us reſiſt the Temptations of Voluptuouſneſs; the love of our ſelves will make us moderate and circumſpect; and through Pride we will appear humble and modeſt: But this is nothing but to paſs from one Vice to another.

For to give our Soul a Strength to elevate it ſelf above the falling from one Weakneſs to another, we muſt make it act by Motives not taken from the World. The Sights of Time may make it paſs from one Irregularity to another; but the ſight of Eternity alone, contains the proper Motives for to elivate it above all its Weakneſſes. There is nothing but this Object which toucheth and which ſanctifieth, becauſe nothing but it places us in a ſituation high enough, for to renounce the World in every ſence. It has been known, that Preachers of a moſt ſublime Eloquence have had no effect, becauſe they knew not, as they ought, to intereſs the immortal Nature: And it has been ſeen, on the contrary, that a very indifferent Talent has touch'd every body, by Diſcourſes without Art, becauſe that they went to the Mark, and that they took Men by the Motives of Eternity: Motives, which repeated

a hundred ways, and ſometimes groſly enough, win the moſt enlightned Souls, becauſe it takes them by that which is moſt great in them, and moſt conſiderable in all the exterior Objects. The Motives of Time have but a limited Power; but the Motives of Eternity are as an infinite Power, which is not ſuſpended but by our Corruption.

From thence it follows, that as the love of ones ſelf is the general Spring of Motives which determine our Hearts, it is Self-love, which with all its force turneth towards Eternity, which affords all the Strength that we have of elevating our ſelves above the World.

There is no better way to juſtifie this laſt Truth, than to ſee what the Sentiment of our Immortality can do in us, what influence it has upon our Motions and Actions, and of what uſe it is in our Heart: It is that which we are going to examine with ſome extent.

CHAP. VIII.

Wherein is explained what the Sentiment of Immortality may work upon our Hearts.

IT is certain, that it is from thence that we ſee flow all that that comforts us, that raiſes us, and ſatisfies us.

We find not but in the *Idea* and Sentiment of our Immortality, the true and ſolid Conſolations againſt the fears of Death, as it is eaſie to be ſhown in conſidering this Object on all ſides.

The *Idea* of Death containeth Six others; which are, An *Idea* of Abandoning; an *Idea* of Neceſſity; an *Idea* of Solitude; an *Idea* of Deſtruction; an *Idea* of Judgment; and, an *Idea* of Miſery.

The abandoning *Idea* tells us, that we abandon all things, and that all things abandon us. This *Idea* afflicts Self-love, becauſe it makes it ſee its attachments broken; it ſees the preſent Time loſt to it, and a Curtain drawn upon what is to come: And I grant likewiſe, that a Man has very juſt cauſe of alarm, until that

that the Curtain be drawn away by Repentance, and that he can aſſure himſelf of the remiſſion of his Sins; without which, neither in Life nor in Death can a Man receive Conſolation: But when he has made his peace with God, which he may know by the ſtate of his Heart, and the Sentiment of his Conſcience, he muſt certainly have other *Ideas* of Death. That which he bewails is a ſmall thing, if he compare it not only with the glorious Eternity which the Goſpel promiſes him, but likewiſe with his natural Excellence. He ought to be aſtoniſhed that a Spirit, which by the moſt inviolable Bents of its Nature, flyeth towards the Infinite, ſhould employ it ſelf ſo long a time in the trifles of this Life; and it may be ſaid, without an Hyperbole, unto this Spirit, That if it has loſt any thing, it is Life, and not Death, that ought to be charged with it: Life has made it loſe many precious things, its Holineſs, its Sentiments of the Love of God, *&c.* and hath given it nothing to indemnifie it but appearances; but Death indemnifieth it advantageouſly, provided it die in the Lord.

We loſe all our Five Senſes by Death, upon which Self-love is founded: That if it be a great Affliction to a Man to loſe his Sight, or his Hearing, it is a greater to loſe all his Senſes at a time. But Self-love is miſtaken; not only we do not loſe our Five Senſes, but it is certain that we loſe not one really; we become not incapable of Seeing, Hearing, and Speaking.

It is not the nature of Things, but the free inſtitution of God, which has affix'd the Sentiments of our Soul, to the Organs of our Body, with which they had naturally no more relation than with the Matter which is hid in the centre of the Earth, with whatſoever prejudices Men may fill themſelves in this regard. Shall it be ſaid, that a Man has loſt his Sight, unto whom God ſhall have changed the natural Order of his Faculties in ſuch a manner, that he has order'd that his Eyes ſhall not be more priviledg'd than the reſt, and that all the other Parts of his Body ſhall be capable of ſeeing. This is the *Idea* of a Man, who by Death loſes one manner of Sentiment, and who ſees the infinite Fund of Senſibility fill'd, which is naturally in him.

Theſe Loſſes which prepoſſeſs'd Nature imagineth to loſe by death, are ſo much the more ſenſible to it, as by neceſſity they are impoſed on it, and a fatal neceſſity, the which no perſon is able to reſiſt. Man hath always lookt upon this neceſſity as a dreadful miſery. The irregular bent which he hath of loving things more ardently, according to the meaſure of their being forbidden him, which cauſed this ſaying to one, *deſine vitia irritare, vetando*, augments the love which he hath for life, by the impoſſibility wherein he findeth himſelf of extending their limits, and makes him look upon death with more horror, by the impoſſibility of avoiding it. But if the Wiſdom of God had impoſed upon Man the neceſſity of living, as he hath impoſed the neceſſity of dying, one might almoſt aſſure ones ſelf, that in time, he would afflict himſelf with his immortality, as he afflicted himſelf with his mortality. The neceſſity of dying makes him give more attention to the agreements of life, than unto the miſchiefs by which it is travers'd: But then the neceſſity of living, would make him give a greater attention unto the Evils of life than unto its agreements.

Our Soul oweth aſſuredly unto Cuſtom, and its prejudices, a great part of the repugnancy which it hath to the quitting the Body. For to ſee this, one need but make a reflection upon ones life paſt, and to recollect the Pleaſures, and to ask ones ſelf whether all that be worth the while of regretting. That ſhould it pleaſe the Author of Nature, on one ſide, to make a Spirit know moſt diſtinctly, which is formed to animate a Body; the Dignities and Perfections of its Nature, the Grandeur of its End, and the Nobleneſs of its Original; and that on the other hand, he ſhould inform it diſtinctly of all its weakneſs, and of all its low and painful dependances, which he is going to wed in wedding this Body, is it not true, that what you call the firſt moments of its life, would appear to it the firſt inſtants of its death; ſo likewiſe has it been neceſſary for this reaſon, that the confuſed Sentiments of Nature, which affix us unto life, ſhould precede theſe diſtinct Ideas which are proper enough in themſelves for to looſen us, and that the firſt ſhould have naturally more force than the others. For although God would not that we ſhould affix our ſelves unto life with exceſs, the Author of Nature

ture hath intereſſed us in the preſervation of Corporal Nature, without which there would be no Society.

Death hath two Faces very different the one from the other; and likewiſe very oppoſite, according as it is conſidered in relation to the Soul: For it may be ſaid, that Life and Death do make each of them the Abaſement and the Glory of Man; Life makes the Glory of our Body, and Abaſement of our Soul. It is by Life, that the Body extendeth it ſelf unto the Juſt and Natural proportion of its parts. Life giveth it Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, addreſs and formeth in a word all its Perfections. But life abaſeth our Soul. It affixeth it to Objects which have no relation with its Natural Excellency. It cauſeth this Spirit to imploy it ſelf in the leaſt Affairs, and to ſhut it ſelf up in a Mannage, in a Field, in a Vine, in the loweſt occaſions of the Body; as if this Immortal Spirit were made for nothing but to prolong for ſome moments the adoration of this frail Machine unto which it is affixt.

If Life makes the Glory of the Body, and the Abaſement of the Spirit, it may be ſaid, that Death makes the Glory of the Spirit and the Abaſement of the

the Body. The Body falleth, but the Spirit riſeth. The Body diminiſheth, and in time is reduced to a little duſt: But theSpirit extendeth it ſelf as aDivine Sphere, which becomes great as it draweth nearer unto God. The Body loſeth the motion which it had, the Spirit acquireth Knowledges which it had not. The Body is confounded with the Earth, the Spirit is reunited with God. The Abaſement which followeth Death, is an Abaſement of an inſenſible matter. A Carcaſs gnawn by the Worms that devour it, ſuffers no pain. It ſmells not the ill ſcent it exhales. It's not frightned by the darkneſs that ſurrounds it, and it diſpleaſeth not it ſelf, even then when it is no more than a ſad compoſition of Fleſh and Dirt, when a horrid mixture of Earth and Blood, of Bones and Rottenneſs. It is an illuſion of prejudiced Nature, which makes us affix our proper Sentiments to Objects which are not but the ſimple occaſion. Matter without Life and without Sentiment, is in its Natural State; that is no Abaſement to it. The diſhonour is but in our imaginations: but it is not the ſame of the Abaſement, whereunto Life makes us deſcend.

This State is not natural to a Spirit as ours;

ours; and without doubt, likewiſe the Author of Nature had not abandoned it without the conſideration of its ſin, Man ſhould live, but his life ſhould be more Noble. It is to deceive ones ſelf, to pretend that the Death of Man begins the puniſhment of his corruption. Life hath already puniſhed the criminal Man by his ſad dependances; which affix the Thoughts, the Cares, the Deſires and Affections of a Spirit ſo Great and ſo Noble to the Preſervations of this baſe Houſe of Clay, which we call our Bodies.

Such is nevertheleſs the weakneſs of Man, that he will perceive an Abaſement which is not in him, and will not perceive an Abaſement which is in himſelf. He frightneth himſelf with the imagined Abaſement, and cannot perceive the real Abaſement.

But in fine, let the Body be really abaſed, what imports it to me, if my Spirit gain infinitely more than my Body loſeth? Have we ſo weak an imagination as to believe that our Happineſs is ſo affixt unto certain Affairs, certain Poſſeſſions, certain Charges, certain Domeſticks, and a certain Circle of Perſons with whom we have Society; that we cannot be happy, when we ſhall have loſt all theſe

theſe things; we have almoſt the Ideas of Death which Children have, when they think of annoying themſelves in the Grave, or dare not abide alone in the dark. We frighten our ſelves with our own Fantaſms, we do ſo confound our own Sentiments with the Tomb which they have for their Object, that we do imagine, or very near, to find in the Tomb, this horror which doth exiſt but in our Soul.

We ſhould not fear this pretended Solitude; and this apparent privation which follows Death, if ſubſtituting the diſtinct Ideas of Reaſon to the confuſed Sentiments of Nature, we would conſider that by Death we do loſe neither Subject, nor the cauſe of the Pleaſures which we may have had in the World. For the Subject is our Soul which abideth. The cauſe is God who is Immortal and Immovable.

That which makes us regret the Heavens, the Earth, the Elements, the Society, is becauſe we cloath all thoſe things with agreeable Sentiments, which we have had by occaſion of them; not conſidering that we carry away with us the Colours and the Cloth, the Paint and Pencil which are neceſſary for us, for to draw theſe admirable pieces, and that

if God be not wanting to us, we can never want any thing.

The Idea of Deſtruction which is contained in Death, ought to give us no more pain, than that Idea of Solitude, of which we have but now been ſhowing the falſhood. It is true that Death ſeems to deſtroy the Man in ſeveral and different manners, it deſtroys the World in his regard, it being certain that the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, the Air, the Earth, the Sea, if they annihilate not of themſelves, annihilate in ſome ſort to him, becauſe it is impoſſible for him to make any more uſe thereof. The Man is not annihilated in himſelf, but he is in the Nature which he admired, and which to him periſheth; in the Society where he had his indearments, and which ceaſe to be in regard to him; in his Body the Organ of his Pleaſure which loſes it ſelf in the duſt of the Tomb. Let us ſearch if there be any thing real in theſe three ſorts of Deſtructions.

Firſt, It cannot be ſaid, that exterior things annihilate not only in themſelves, but likewiſe in regard to their uſe. For what know we, whether the ſame Inſtitution ſubſiſt not, although the manner of this Inſtitution ſubſiſts no more: It is true

true that there is not much appearance, that we ſhould have after our Death the like Senſations unto thoſe which we had during our Life. For it is no more neceſſary that theſe Senſations ſhould be proportioned unto the State and Conſervation of a Body, which ſubſiſts no more for us. The deſign that the Author of Nature had to intereſs us in the Conſervation of the Body, by the Pleaſure which the Elements gave us being ceas'd; it is eaſie to conceive, that the pleaſure of Taſting is not a Sentiment, which ſhould have place after Death, unleſs God ſhould affix it unto other Objects for other Ends; but methinks the Hearing and the Sight, not only being deſign'd for the preſervation of the Body: but likewiſe for the ſearch of all that which might nouriſh the admiration and the acknowledgment, which we have for the Creator; we have no good Reaſon to believe, that theſe Senſations ſubſiſt not after our Death. I grant that we ſhall not ſee by the moving of the Optick Nerve; but that does not hinder, but that we may ſee. For at bottom what is it that this motion of the Optick Nerve has in common with the Sentiment of the Light; theſe things have not naturally any relation one

with

with another; and if we ſee the Light and the viſible things by the occaſion of the Optick Nerve agitated in a certain manner; nothing hinders, but that we ſhould have the ſame Senſations by the occaſion of the Etherial Matter, which is wont to move the Optick Nerve; which may be ſaid proportionably of Hearing. But ſhould we not have theſe ſame Senſations, what would it ſignifie, becauſe we ſhall have others, and beſides of a more elevated order. For as in loſing the Body, we ſhall have loſt but that which conſtrain'd and abas'd us; we ought not to fear, that our Spirit ſhould loſe any thing, in freeing it ſelf from matter, by the Purity and Nobleneſs of its Operations.

It is neither permitted, neither is it profitable, to abandon ones ſelf unto conjectures upon thoſe things which it hath pleaſed God to hide from us: but would it not be too much boldneſs to conjecture, that as the Abaſement of Man during his life, conſiſts in that the Intelligence is ſubmitted unto Sentiment, the Glory which ſhall follow Death, will conſiſt in that the Sentiment ſhall be perfectly ſubmitted to the Intelligence. In effect at preſent, that the Soul is deſcend-

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ed from Heaven to Earth, for to inhabit a Houſe of Clay, it is not requiſite for to extend its Sights and its Lights: but it is neceſſary on the contrary for to cloſe them and for to bound them, that they may not diſdain to be employ'd in the Conſervation of the Body. But then when the Soul ſhall mount from the Earth towards Heaven, where it muſt work no more, for the Conſervation of a Body, but for to Glorifie God, it will imploy it ſelf no more in bounding and ſtreightning its Knowledge: But for to extend and purifie it, for to render it more worthy of God, whom it ſhall have for its Object. The ſecond Deſtruction which we find in Death, is not leſs imaginary. For if we ſhould break the Cords which tye us to Society, we ought not to believe that we ſhould remain thereby without an endearment to it. The Society of Spirits exceeds that of Bodies, whatſoever weak and prejudiced Nature may think; and when we ſhall loſe theſe Eyes and theſe Ears, deſign'd for Commerce, which we have among Men, we comfort our ſelves, becauſe we cannot doubt but that we ſhall acquire another manner of Sentiment and Knowledge by the force of another Inſtitution proportion'd to

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our State. In fine, I grant that a Man who abides in this World, and loſes the Limbs of his Body, may complain: But when a Man is tranſported into another World, that he ſees another Oeconomy of Objects; what ſhould he do with the Senſes, which have relation with this World, and which have none with his State? The miſchief comes from this, that we give too much to the Body, and too little to the Soul in the ordinary Idea which we have of our ſelves, inſtead of following the diſtinct Idea of things; we cannot give too much to the Spirit, nor too little to the Matter.

And here I dare boldly advance a Maxim which will appear a Paradox extraordinary enough; that is, That although according to the confuſed Idea that we have of things, Death be much more capable for to humble us than Life; nevertheleſs, according to the diſtinct Idea and in the truth of the thing, Life is a more humbling Object than Death.

Death humbles the great Lord, the Prince, the Monarch; but Life humbles the Man, and that is to ſay, a great deal more. Death takes from us the ſtaies of our Vanity: but Life in the abaſement whereto it reduces us, ſuſpends

in us almoſt all the Sentiments of our true Grandeur. Death makes the Body deſcend into the Grave: but Life makes, as I may ſay, our Soul deſcend from Heaven to Earth. Death finiſheth the Commerce which we have with the World: but Life ſuſpends the natural Commerce, which we ought to have with God, and for which our Heart finds it ſelf made. Death is followed by Darkneſs, Worms, Rottenneſs, which we feel not: Life is all compoſed of Weakneſſes, Baſeneſſes, Infirmities, Diſgraces, all which we feel.

It is then true, that he is prejudiced and deceiveth himſelf, who frightens himſelf by the Ideas of abandoning, of Neceſſity, of Solitude and of Deſtruction, which enter into the Image of Death; but ſee here wherein they deceive not themſelves; 'tis then when they fear that the Judgment of God accompanies Death. For it is certain that this Judgment cannot but be terrible to a Conſcience, which feels it ſelf loaded with divers ſins; and where is the Man that finds himſelf not in this State, with the little Reflection he may make upon the life paſt? It is true that Man is to be feared, upon which it is conceived that all Eternity depends: But certainly the Heart of Man

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makes to it ſelf divers illuſions in that: He does imagine, that it is the moment of Death, which is the price of Life Eternal; and he ſees not that it is not this moment, but all his Life that God demands; that this moment hath nothing in ſelf more agreeable unto God; and that all its importance conſiſteth ſimply in that it is the laſt moment; and that in fine, it is not this moment that contracts with the Juſtice of God, but all the time that he has paſt in impenitence. The Sentiment, then of our Immortality, and of our Perfections, and of our End, will agree admirably well, both with the other Sentiments of Nature, and with the Principles of the Religion which God hath given for to comfort us, in ſpight of all that, that this King of Terrors may appear to have of frightful and terrible.

CHAP. IX.

Wherein is continued to be ſhewn what the Sentiment of our Immortality can effect upon our Heart.

CErtainly the Idea of our Immortality cannot be too preſent unto our Spirit for our Conſolation, in this Eternal circle of ſad Objects which ſurrounds us, and in the midſt of theſe publick and particular Diſgraces, which the ſeverity of God has diverſified in ſo many manners, for to make room for the ſweet variety of his Deliverances and his Conſolations.

What imports it to us after all, that we are Infirm, and Mortal in our Bodies; this State will not laſt? What have we to do to trouble our ſelves with Cares and Foreſights for the ſhort time to come of this life? Have we not another to come, which is well worthy of the imploying principally our Heart and our Spirit? In vain ſhould the World threaten us. What can it do? It may cruſh us; but it cannot deſtroy us. Let the World periſh, let Nature tremble, let the

the Elements conſume, let our Bodies change into Duſt, or into Worms, or into Vapour; let them deſcend towards the Ground, or let them be dilated into Air. The Ruins of the World ſhall not deſtroy our Spirits, and ſhall not diſſolve that which is not even capable of Diſſolution. We believe that we are in a Body which is our ſelves. We deceive our ſelves. This Houſe of Clay is not us, nor ever ſhall be. God ſhall re-eſtabliſh it with Honour, for to ſerve for a Tabernacle for the Spirit which it firſt lodged: but it ſhall be no more with the ſame ſubmiſſion, nor with the ſame dependance. The Spirit ſhall follow no more the condition of the Body: but the Body ſhall follow, as much as is poſſible, the condition of the Spirit, and as the Spirit did abaſe it ſelf to the State of the Body, for to ſhun God, and for to affix it ſelf to the Earth; the Body ſhall ſeem to elevate itſelf to the State of the Spirit, for to quit the Earth, and for to go and Glorifie God in Heaven. Certainly we ought not to be ſurpriz'd, that the Goſpel comforts us. I will not ſay, better than Human Wiſdom had done: but ſtill a great deal better than the Law *Divine* as it was, becauſe it reveals to us clear-

ly Life and Immortality, which are the only Objects capable of ſatisfying a Spirit and a Heart as ours, and that ſo it has Divine relations with us. But as we find in this Object, every thing that may comfort us in the Sentiment of ſo many Miſeries that ſurround us, ſo likewiſe it diſcovers every thing that may truly elevate us. The Sentiment of our Immortality joyn'd to the conſideration of the Glory and Happineſs which Religion promiſes us, elevates us more than the World, more than the Wiſdom the Philoſophers ſo much boaſted of, and even more than the Virtues Men have known. Therein is found the Grandeur of the Paſſions, the Grandeur of the Underſtanding, which governs over the Paſſions; and the Grandeur of the Virtue which regulates the Underſtanding. I ſay that therein is found the Grandeur of the Paſſions, and this expreſſion ought not to choak any one, for although the Paſſions are in ſome ſenſe great weakneſſes, it is certain that they are grafted in ſome ſort upon the Sentiments of the Dignity, and of the Natural Grandeur of Man.

Hatered, Choler, Rage, which are Paſſions ſo criminal, and which renders us

us averſe both to Humanity and Chriſtianity, proceed, if you mind, from a Sentiment of our own proper excellence, ill guided and accompanied by Illuſions of Self-love, which makes us conceive of the Excellency in us, excluſively unto thoſe who have offended us; as if our Enemies were not Men as well as we, which ſhows that this Sentiment of our Excellence is in all Men; nay, even they themſelves who have the leaſt part in the eſteem of others, ceaſe not to eſteem themſelves and to comfort themſelves by the publick Infamy. It is not pretended here to juſtifie all the Extravagancies of a Man fill'd with Preſumption, who prefers himſelf before thoſe unto whom he owes reſpect. By no means. I know there is an exceſs, and a criminal exceſs in this diſpoſition of Heart: But the exceſs is not it may be there, where Men imagine it is; and if I ſhould expreſs my whole Thought; the irregularity doth not come ſo much from that, that Men eſteem themſelves too much, as from that, that they eſteem themſelves not enough. I ſay, that they eſteem not enough themſelves, becauſe that they eſteem themſelves preferrably to other Men, who have the ſame Nature and the

ſame Perfections. A Man who eſteems himſelf by his exterior advantages, which diſtinguiſh him, ſeems to renounce therein the Perfections of Humane Nature which are common to him with others. He is almoſt in the ſame State which *Nero* was in, who being able to make himſelf eſteem'd by the Character of Emperor; he aſpired to the Glory of appearing a good Watch-man. Certainly nothing is ſo Noble in Man as Man. It is to undervalue himſelf in ſome ſort, to go about to make himſelf principally eſteem'd by the advantages, which make the difference of conditions, and the diſtinctions of Perſons in Society, becauſe it is a renouncing that which is in effect the moſt eſtimable in himſelf. The ways of Pride muſt be over-turn'd here, as Pride would over-turn the ways of Providence. Theſe exteriour Advantages ought to be an occaſion of paying to God his Homages, and not an occaſion of robbing him of that which appertains to him.

Men who would make themſelves eſteemed before others, do little conſider theſe things; but when Fortune, as they ſay, or the Injuſtice of Men, has robbed them of theſe Advantages,

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Nature is not wanting in them; and being no longer ſenſible of this imagined Grandeur which came to them from without, they are ſenſible ſtill of their natural Grandeur, whoſe legitimate effect ought to be to make them ſuffer very indifferently the Contempts which others have for them; but which, by an effect of their Corruption, ſerves to render them inflexible, and for to caſt into their unworthy Souls the Seeds of diſcontented Pride, which Fear makes them conceal; but which upon the leaſt occaſion ſtruggles to ſhow it ſelf; and ſhows, that in whatſoever ſtate Men are, they are no more docible to ſuffer the greateſt Contempts than the leaſt.

The Grandeur unto which Pride aſpires, conſiſts in two things; firſt to extend it ſelf, and then to perpetuate it ſelf. To extend it ſelf in ſpight of the Condition of corporal Nature, which is ſo abandon'd; and to perpetuate it ſelf, in ſpight of the Deſtiny of temporal Things, which endure ſo ſhort a time.

It is not neceſſary to ſhow, that our Vanity does not obtain the two Ends which it propoſes to it ſelf. Every body

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ſees it enough; becauſe that in extending its Conqueſts, it extends its Injuſtice rather than its Excellence; and that the Marble which ſeems to perpetuate our Glory, does but ordinarily eternize our Vanity.

But Nature and Grace are more happy than Corruption: Nature ſcatcers, as I may ſay, Man in all the Univerſe, in affixing his Sentiments to the Objects which ſurround him, and therein forming the Majeſty, the Beauty, the Magnificence, and the Price of all the Parts of the Univerſe, which gives us the moſt admiration. Grace gives to Man ſtill a greater extent, by the commerce which it makes him have with God; and as to the regard of Immortality, we have no reaſon to look for an imaginary one, ſince we have a real one, nor to torment our ſelves for to live in the Memory of others, being aſſured to live eternally in our ſelves, and in God.

Likewiſe Death, deſtin'd by God for to confound the Deſigns of our Pride; this Miniſter of his Majeſty, and his Juſtice, which makes ſo bright a reparation to him for the Inſolence we have had, in willing to glorifie our ſelves in

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ſpight of him, does but confirm us in the Sentiments of this elevation of Man, who follows Nature, and whom Grace accompanies.

It is a vain Glory that follows a Prince upon the Throne, and which accompanies him not upon the Bed of Infirmities, which ſurrounds him during his Life, and which diſappears at the moment of his Death; which appears to his Eyes, and is loſt to the Eyes of his Spirit. All the World ſees in him the Maſter of others; he finds in himſelf a Man vexing himſelf, who ſuffers, and who ſhall ſuddenly die.

I will not then clothe my ſelf with Goods, with Riches, Poſſeſſions, Places, Dignities, Glories, Knowledge, Eloquence, memorable Actions, Conqueſts, Applauſes, to make big the Fantaſm of Pride, and for to appear more great than other Men; but I will take away the Swelling, the forc'd Grandeur, and the extent which is not natural, in getting from the Objects of Cupidity, in keeping my ſelf upon the level of other Men. I ſhall obtain, by this humble Equality, that which a proud Preference would never have obtained. I will clothe my ſelf with all the Splendours of Heaven, and

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all the Beauties of the Earth, the Goods of Grace, and the Treaſures of Nature, for to render all theſe things unto him who hath clothed me, and find in the reſtitution it ſelf; a Glory which I had not met withal in all my Uſurpations. I will raiſe my ſelf above all the things about me, by the diſtinct *Idea* of my Perfections, of which the things without are not capable; but I will not mount ſo high, but for to deſcend more low, in the preſence of him who produces in me all theſe Perfections, and who could likewiſe diverſifie to Infinity, the Sentiments of my Excellency and his Bounty.

Ambition thinks to elevate it ſelf very much, and to get it ſelf out of the Rank of other Men, becauſe it puts us in a condition of commanding them; and I grant, that it has reaſon in the Syſtem of Pride, which meaſures not the Price of Advantages it poſſeſſes, but by the degree of elevation which it procures over others.

But, in the firſt place, it is very certain, that human Authority does not give unto Men any Empire over the Spirits of their like, although it may be they may imagine the contrary, in putting

ting the exteriour Differences which they have for them, Differences which appear to addreſs themſelves to their Perſon, but which goes directly to their Fortune. Thoſe who judge the moſt ſoundly, reſpect the Order of God, and the ways of his Wiſdom, in their elevation: They ſubmit their Bodies to Princes, becauſe they ſubmit their Souls to God. Nevertheleſs, they who reign over the Body, cannot therefore reign over the Soul. They are eſteemed if they merit it; they are diſdain'd, if they be worthy of Diſdain; and they diſdain them likewiſe with much more pleaſure, as Men conceive Grief againſt that which puts them under, and abaſes them. So that if Fear obliges them to reſpect, for their Intereſt, the eſtabliſh'd Authority, and if Religion makes them reſpect the Order of God, nevertheleſs there does remain in their Hearts a ſecret Diſpoſition to murmur againſt that legitimate Elevation; which is the occaſion of Mens being ſo precipitate and ſo raſh in their Judgments which they make of their Princes, and that they never pardon their Maſters any thing, by the ſecret averſion which they have for the Dependance, and for the Command.

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It is certain, that Empire ſprings not out of any natural Prerogative which ſome have over others; wherefore this Uſe is nicely eſtabliſh'd, of affixing temporal Grandeur unto Birth; that is done likely for to manage the Pride of other Men, who would ſuffer too much, if all the Preferences which they are oblig'd to make of other Men to themſelves for the good of Society, came from a Preference of Merit.

It ſeems in that, that it has pleaſed God to take meaſures in the Plan of his Wiſdom, for to hinder Man from lying down under the Temptations of Vainglory: For he would that the confuſed Sentiments of our Nature ſhould affix the Glory of the World unto exteriour Objects and Strangers to our regard, and that diſtinct *Ideas* might not make us return from that Errour; and inſtruct us, that this Glory, in the moſt excellent Part of it ſelf, ſprings from our Bottom, without knowing that it is God that immediately produces it in us.

We find, in the Principle we have eſtabliſh'd, not only the Grandeur of the Paſſions, but likewiſe that of Vertue.

It is not neceſſary, for the Juſtification thereof, to make an exact Catalogue; one need but conſider them confuſedly, as they preſent themſelves to our Imaginations.

Temperance, without doubt, is a Vertue that elevates a Man; but Temperance cannot be ſuſtained but by the Motives of its Immortality, and eternal Happineſs, unto which it aſpires. I grant, that Reaſon alone is capable of inſtructing us not to prejudice our Health, and not for to become Enemies to our ſelves by the exceſs of Debauchery: But this Conſideration carries us not very far, becauſe Intemperance doth not conſiſt ſimply in the exceſs of Pleaſure, but likewiſe for to uſe moderately forbidden Pleaſure. That which can elevate us to that high Seat, where one muſt be to abſtain from unlawful Pleaſures, is the conſideration of Eternity, for the which we were made.

The Juſtice which is practis'd in the World, has not a great elevation, becauſe Men will have it, that it is no other thing than a fear of a return of Injuſtice; and that we are not apprehenſive of doing evil to others, but by the fear of doing evil to our ſelves. That

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is true, when a Man does not practice Juſtice but in baſe Regards and worldly Intereſt. But when a Man is juſt, becauſe fill'd with vaſt Thoughts of Eternity, he will affix himſelf unto an Intereſt which is worthy of his Endearments, it may be ſaid that he is equitable without weakneſs, and that his Vertue is always like unto it ſelf.

Diſintereſſment paſſes for a Play of Self-love, which turns to profit, like apparent refuſing of little things, for to arrive more ſecurely at a greater advantage; that is true of a Polity and artificial diſintereſſment of a Man of the World. For ſhutting in all his Pretenſions, and all his Advantages, in the ſhort limits of this Life, the way to conceive that he deſires nothing of the Goods which other Men ſeek after, or rather that he ſeems not to turn his back upon Fortune, but that he might more infallibly meet her. It is not ſo with the Man who conſiders himſelf with relation to Eternity; if he be intereſſed, it is in a Species of Intereſt, ſo great, ſo ſublime, that he need not only not bluſh to own it, but that it ſhould be that that ſhould be all his Glory. Immortal as he is, it is honourable for him to take his

his flight towards Eternity, and to have nothing but diſdain and contempt for all things which might hinder him. He looks like a great Monarch in this State, who bluſhes when he is ſurprized in baſe Occupations, and takes a great deal of pains not to be ſeen intereſſed in little Affairs, call'd as he is, to great and important Employs, and who ought to rowl none but vaſt Deſigns in his Mind.

Liberality has but ordinarily an appearance of Diſintereſſment: A liberal Man does not deſpiſe what he gives; but he ſtill more eſteems the Glory of Giving; and, on the other hand, he will acquire ſacred and inviolable Rights upon the Hearts of thoſe whom he favours with his good Acts.

Ordinarily Liberality is but a ſort of Commerce and fine Traffick of Self-love; which making ſemblance of obliging others, does but oblige it ſelf in winning them to it. All that is true in the Sphere of temporal Goods, wherein the Man of the World ſuppoſes himſelf. In this Circle of corruptible Objects, Cupidity doth not give but for to receive; it doth not make Loſſes to impoveriſh it ſelf.

But elevate your ſelf above theſe corruptible Objects, and you ſhall diſcover another World, which making you deſpiſe that which you know, ſhall put you in a ſtate of giving, without hope of any human remuneration.

You take an extreme care to hide the intereſſed deſigns of your Heart, becauſe that on one ſide you have the Sentiment of what you are; and that on the other ſide the Objects to which you are induced are but of indifferent value; become but capable of this infinite intereſt, and you will have no occaſion of hiding them. A Heart open towards Heaven, has no need of diſguiſing it ſelf; he has nothing to do but to know himſelf, and to act upon that principle, and to ſhew himſelf ſuch as he is. The ſhame we conceive at Mens knowing us too near, comes not from that of our knowing our ſelves too well: But from that, that we have not known to know our ſelves.

Such is the Modeſty, the Virtue of the poliſh'd and reaſonable World: or rather the artificial diſguiſement of our Intemperance and our Voluptuouſneſs, which hinders not from thinking with delight upon the ſame Voluptuouſneſſes, of which we but ſpeak with pain, has a great deal

deal of difficulty for to regulate our deſires; as if corruption rather conſiſted in the expreſſion than in the Sentiment.

This Virtue all defective and all falſe as it is, has nevertheleſs thitherto a Spring fine enough. It is certain that it ſprings from a Sentiment of our Natural Excellence, that if we were deſtin'd by Nature but to Animal Actions, as we conceive that Beaſts have no other end, we ſhould bluſh no more than they at thoſe acts, which carry the Character of the Conformity that we have with them: but immortal and incorruptible, as we are naturally, it is very difficult into whatſoever State of Abaſement and Ignorance to which ſin ſhall have reduc'd us, but that we ſhould have ſome glimpſe of that Dignity which diſtinguiſhes us ſo nobly; and ſo conſequently, that we ſhould have ſome ſhame at all that which ſeems to abaſe us.

But in fine, this Virtue, as we have already ſaid, elevates not very high, when it is only practis'd by the confus'd Sentiment of Nature and Education. If you would it ſhould purifie your Heart, as well as your Words, you muſt go forth of this Horrizon of your Vanity

and mount even to God, that is the Principle of your Immortality: The commerce you ſhall have with him, will elevate you in ſuch a manner, that without any violence, and without any difficulty, you will find your ſelf diſpoſed to renounce all Affections unworthy of your ſelf and him. Certainly it belongs not to the carnal Man and Animal, to bluſh at the baſe Things of Nature; it appertains but to the immortal Man to have any confuſion thereat. The Modeſty of a Man of the World, may aſpire to gain the eſteem of others by a ſtudied Purity; but the immortal Man ſeeks that he may be able to eſteem himſelf, if he fears not to be able to honour himſelf, in reſpect of his Perfections. In effect, Debauchery contains a doubt of its true Condition. Conſummated Intemperance is the proſtitution of a Soul which renounces its Dignity; that is to ſay, that to differ nothing from Beaſts, is but to renounce Baſhfulneſs, and to abandon ones ſelf to Senſuality.

The ſame Judgment muſt be made very near of Baſhfulneſs and Modeſty. If Approbation of Men were a Good great enough for us, we ſhould have

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no reaſon to hide the Deſign we have conceived of attracting it to us, nor the Joy which this Approbation gives us: But as the ſame Inſtinct that perſuades us of our Excellency, convinces us ſecretly, that this Eſteem is too ſmall a thing for to bound all our Pretenſions, it is no wonder if we take ſo much pains to hide the deſire we have to be eſteem'd, or the eſteem that we have for our ſelves. Nevertheleſs, if one looks near, one ſhall find that it is generally but falſeneſs and hypocriſie in this Vertue, ſuch as it is practiſed in the World. Men who are modeſt when they are prais'd, are by no means ſo when they are blam'd. There is no wonder then; for there is no great force in a Vertue which our Weakneſs produces; and a Man elevates himſelf not very high then, when he falls into the centre of his Vanity, which makes an apparent Grandeur, and an effective Abaſement. The Modeſty which proceeds from the knowledge of Immortality, and by conſequence above that Eſteem which affixes it ſelf unto temporal things, has quite another force, and another elevation: It deſpiſes almoſt equally Blame and Praiſe, and makes us eſteem only thoſe things which relate to that great

Eternity, which is the Rule, by relation, by which we meaſure the price of all Things. And as it is ſeen, that very eminent Perſons, or who appear ſo in their own eyes, ſeem more capable of Modeſty than others, becauſe that their real or imaginary elevation, puts them, as bove the Sentiments of common Men, ſo may we ſay with more truth ſtill, That a Man well inſtructed by the diſtinct *Ideas* of Nature, and by the Promiſes of Religion of the high Deſtinies of Man, is not at all tempted to dazzle himſelf, in whatſoever degree of Proſperity and temporal Glory he ſhall find himſelf.

I will ſay more, Humility, which is the Soul of Modeſty, and all the Vertues, cannot ſpring but from the Sentiment of our natural Grandeur. Whilſt you look not upon Man, as Man, you cannot but eſteem thoſe weak Advantages which make the differences of Conditions, and diſtinctions of Perſons; and you cannot, by conſequence, forbear having Contempt for thoſe who want theſe Advantages, to treat them with leſs conſideration, to prefer your ſelf before them, and to elevate your ſelf, as it were, upon their Lowneſs, which is the moſt dangerous Character of Pride. But

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if you are perſuaded, that it is the Man who is principally worthy of eſteem in Man, you would reſpect, in your Neighbour, that which is common with you; and although the Order of Society, which is that of God Himſelf, eſtabliſhing a ſubordination between you, aſſures you of his Submiſſion and exteriour Homages, you ſhould have for him an interiour conſideration, like unto that which he has for you, and diſengage your ſelf of thoſe Dependencies which render you his Superiour; an original and eternal Grandeur, which renders him your Equal, in that which you moſt eſteem of in your Condition.

It is then that we may conceive a Man moderate in abundance of temporal goods, conſtant in adverſity, and magnanimous throughout. If the Moderation which the Men of the World ſhow, in the higheſt Elevations, be but a ſecret deſire of appearing greater than the Things which raiſe them, the moderation of the immortal Man is but a Sentiment of his Excellence, which elevates him, in effect, above all thoſe Things which ſeem to be able to cauſe his Elevation. It belongs not but to Pride to diſguiſe it ſelf, for to hide the diſproportion which it finds

between what it is, and that which it is thought to be in the World.

Piety, which ſees Atoms there where the World imagines Coloſſuſes, need but keep it ſelf in this ſtation ſo elevated, which is natural to it, for to ſee paſs under its feet both the vain Pomp of human Grandeurs, and the as vain Heap of Diſgraces and Calamities, which, as a Whirlwind that paſſes, agitates this Houſe of Clay, and throws down theſe Tabernacles of Duſt.

The worldly Man may affect a Conſtancy which he has not, for to be thought that he is ſtronger than Adverſity, and that his firmneſs places him above bad Fortune. This Sentiment fits not well the Man who encloſes all his Endeavours in Time; but it fits well the Man who feels that he is made for Eternity. Without counterfeiting for to appear Magnanimous, Nature and Religion elevates him enough for to make him ſuffer without impatience, and to render him conſtant without affectation.

Such a Man might fill the *Idea* and the Plan of ſupream Valour, when his Vocation ſhall call him to expoſe himſelf to the Dangers of War, and make Men ſee, what they have never ſeen in the World,

a Man brave by Reaſon, and brave without managing; his Valour will not owe all its force to the ſtupidity which hinders it from reflecting upon what it is doing, unto Example which obliges it to follow others in peril, to the Conſiderations of the World, which permits it not to draw back where Honour calls it; and, in fine, to that heap of Conſiderations of which it hath made aſſail, for to hinder it ſelf from ſeeing the Danger wherewith it is threatned. The immortal Man expoſes himſelf to death, becauſe he knows very well that he cannot die.

There is no Hero in the World, becauſe there is none that fears not Death, or who owes not his Intrepidity to his own Weakneſs: For to be brave, they ceaſe to be a Man; and for to go to Death, they begin to loſe ſight of themſelves. But the immortal Man expoſes himſelf, becauſe he knows himſelf.

Although there be no true Hero in the World, we forbear not loving thoſe who have the appearance. Heroiſm, in the Principles of a Man, who confines his Hopes is an Extravagancy, and nevertheleſs we ceaſe not, in ſpight of our ſelves,

ſelves, to admire thoſe who bear the Character. That proceeds, without doubt, from a Sentiment of our Grandeur, which inſtructs us confuſedly, and without the admiſſion of Reaſon, unto theſe Myſteries of the Heart, that Man is above all. There is a ſecret Pleaſure felt in ſeeing a Hero quarrel with the Deſtinies and Fortune: We love to ſee him above all Dangers by his Valour, and above all Applauſes by his Modeſty: We would have nothing move his Courage; and although we cannot ſuffer that his Fierceneſs ſhould deſpiſe us, we love that it ſhould deſpiſe all the Injuries of the Elements, all the Perſecution of Men, and that he ſhould ſhow himſelf ſo great, that all things in the World ſhould not be able to abaſe him: Firmneſs is ill placed in a man who loſes every thing; but it agrees with I know not what confuſed Sentiment of our Grandeur, which finds nothing diſproportionable to it ſelf.

It is from thence ſtill, without doubt, that is ſprung that *Idea* of Sage, which the *Stoicks* have vainly endeavour'd to fill; for indeed their Paradoxes, in the Principles of a Man who doth not believe Eternity, are very extravagant;

but

but however extravagant they may be, they ceaſe not to make ſpring I know not what Admiration in our Hearts, which we are not wont to have for Things purely impoſſible. We ſhould laugh at a Man's Folly that ſhould believe that he had Wings to fly: The Thought of the wiſe Man, who pretends to be above all Events, and who conſiders himſelf as a mortal Man, is not leſs mad. Nevertheleſs, we find in this latter Sentiment ſomething which doth not diſpleaſe us, and that our Soul admires without perceiving it; which, without doubt, proceeds not but from that, that theſe Paradoxes agree with a confuſed Sentiment of our natural Dignity which abandons us not, although it be ordinarily unknown to us. It is a hidden Sentiment amongſt the weakneſſes and apparent baſeneſſes of our Nature, as Diamonds are in the Intrails of the Earth, mix'd with Dirt and Clay; and as theſe latter muſt be purified, that we may ſee their luſtre, and for to know their price; ſo likewiſe it is neceſſary for to purifie this Knowledge of our natural Grandeur, by the *Idea* of Religion, for to know all its Beauty.

The

The Chriſtian maintains theſe Paradoxes; he fills the prodigious Vacuum which is found in theſe Maxims. There is not one but becomes reaſonable in the Principles of our Immortality, provided it be well underſtood.

If they tell us that a wiſe Man is without Paſſion, we find that the Character agrees with the immortal Man, provided that by the Paſſion you underſtand the alteration which ordinarily follows the Paſſions, as there is appearance that the Philoſophers have ſo underſtood it: For it is difficult for a Man that is made for Eternity, if he act conformably to the juſt and true Knowledge which he ought to have of himſelf, to embaraſs himſelf much neither with Cares, nor with Paſſions, which reſpect but a time. He is like unto a Man, who being upon a high Mountain, who hears the Winds blow, the Thunder roar, and the Clouds mix'd with Fire break under his Feet, without being affrightned. That if there be but few Men who enjoy this Eternity, and who look indifferently upon

upon the Good and Evil of this Life, that proceeds from their not having a Knowledge great enough of this Immortality, which Nature confuſedly informs them of; or becauſe they could not keep themſelves in that high Seat where Religion had placed them.

All which ſhows, that there is no perfect wiſe Man; but that does not hinder us from concluding, that this is the Character of a wiſe Man to live without alteration, and that we find not this Character of a Man, more or leſs, accordingly as he remembers of what he is.

If a wiſe Man ought to be ſufficient to himſelf, have we not reaſon to apply the *Idea* to the immortal Man, who cannot perceive of himſelf in his true Condition, which is coming from God, and returning to God, without being fully perſuaded, that the Objects of the World which hinders him from knowing his Original, and his End, are very far from ſatisfying his Neceſſities: For this Maxim ought to be underſtood in a ſence which excludes God,

God, without whom we are nothing; but in a ſence which excludes the World, without which, it is true that we are, and that we are happy.

I grant, that a Man who has fix'd all his Deſires upon the Objects of the Earth cannot go from the Commerce of other Men; without that he plunges himſelf into the *Ideas* of Miſery and Vanity affix'd unto all temporal Things: He could not live, if they did not divert him from the Thoughts of Death. He could not die, without ſeeing Perſons ſtill who imploy him in the Thoughts of Life. His good Fortune becomes inſupportable to him, unleſs he divide it with the People who employ him, and who hinder him from thinking upon the fatal Neceſſity which is impos'd upon him of ſeeing it ſoon at an end. It is a weak Creature who falls into a Precipice, and which for to ſtop its fall for a moment, hangs it ſelf on whatever it meets; but it is ſurprized with falling, in ſpight of theſe vain Helps, into an inevitable Abyſs which it has before its Eyes. The immortal Man has nothing to do with

with theſe Diſguiſements, for to find Conſolation and poſſeſs himſelf. He affixes unto Death it ſelf an *Idea* of Glory and Grandeur, which makes him look with Diſcontent on that which turns away his Thought therefrom. He is never more ſatisfied, than when he conſiders the glorious Condition of his Spirit. The Heap of temporal Goods appear to him a Heap of Duſt, which they have caſt in his Eyes, for to hinder him from enjoying his Grandeur; and all that which occupies the Hearts and Spirits of other Men, gives him trouble, becauſe that it hinders him from thinking of his Felicity.

This Paradox is not then extravagant in the Mind of a Man who knows himſelf, and loves himſelf as he ought; if it want truth, it is in relation to our Weakneſs, and that is but our Wandring and our Folly which renders it inſenſible.

Let the wiſe Man command the Stars; let him be elevated above Deſtiny; let him be more happy and more perfect than *Jupiter*; theſe are expreſ-

ſions

ſions ſo much the more exceſſive, as they ſeem to contain Impiety: But they may merit a good ſence; and certainly if it ſhould be ſaid that the immortal Man is elevated above the Stars, the Chain of natural Things, and of thoſe Heroes erected into Divinities after their death, or to thoſe Gods ſo like unto weak and irregular Men, that Paganiſm had invented, there had been nothing advanced but Truth. The Stars know not us, but we know the Stars; we owe them nothing, and they owe us that bright ſhining of their Perfection. It is likewiſe, if I may dare ſay it, more natural that they ſhould be in our dependance, than that we ſhould be in theirs; and if it had pleaſed the Author of Nature, that they ſhould make any neceſſary impreſſion upon us, it is not for their Glory, but for our advantage, that he has eſtabliſh'd this Order in the Univerſe. The Sun governs over the Day, and the Moon over the Night; but God alone governs over Man; and Religion confirms excellently the Prerogatives of the latter, in inſtructing us that God has eſtabliſh'd it to govern over the

Works

Works of his Hands. If Deſtiny be a Chain of exteriour Objects and ſecond Cauſes, Deſtiny has nothing to do with Man, becauſe that theſe Objects periſh, and that Man periſheth not. If *Jupiter* be a God culpable of Ambition, Injuſtice, and Intemperance, then certainly the *Idea* of this pretended Divinity equals not that of a Man, whom the Sentiment of his Immortality, and the Grace of God elevates above the Pride, the Intereſt, and the Voluptuouſneſs of this Life.

As the Sage of the *Stoicks*, the immortal man is invincible. How ſhall they do for to caſt down the Courage of a man, in regard of whom the Dangers of this Life are no Dangers, nor the myſteries of this World any true myſteries.

The man of the World cannot avoid being weak; his Weakneſs ſhines through thoſe appearances of magnanimity and force which he affects for to dazzle the Eyes of thoſe who behold him, and for to have the miſerable Satisfaction to have it ſaid, that he has well play'd

his Part upon the Theatre of Human Life, which is all that remains of that *Maſter of the World*, who gave himſelf ſo much pains to draw himſelf out of the Rank of other men.

There is no maintain'd Conſtancy in the World; this Firmneſs of Hero's is the Virtue of a *Machine*, which deſcends by the irregularity of its Springs. He who ſo fiercely defied the Gods and Fortune, in the midſt of Dangers, at the Head of Armies, trembles with the fear of dying in his Bed. He brav'd a Death accompanied by Splendour and Tumult; but he cannot ſupport the ſight of a peaceable and quiet departure. The Philoſopher, who rejoiced to ſuffer a thouſand illuſtrious Diſgraces, a thouſand famous Diſaſters, comforted by the Approbation of thoſe who admired his Conſtancy, conceived a ſort of deſpair, when he was reduc'd to be miſerable in ſecret. But if the man of the World cannot avoid being weak, it may be ſaid that the immortal man will find it very difficult for to avoid being conſtant. The Looks of other men, and the Society which

he

he hath with them, which makes the pretended Force of an Hero of the Age, make all the Weakneſs of this. He finds himſelf afflicted by the Tears of thoſe who are about him. The ſhare which others take in his pretended Miſery lowers him, and calls him back from Heaven to Earth, if I may ſo ſpeak. But, in fine, alone, and rendred to himſelf, he finds himſelf above all the Accidents that befal him. He may ſay that which a confuſed Sentiment of the Grandeur of a Man, caus'd a Pagan Poet to ſay,

Si fractus illabatur orbis, mipavidum
Ferient ruinæ.

And he may cry out with a Man whom Religion had taught infinitely more, *What is that that ſhall ſeparate me from the Love of Chriſt? Shall Oppreſſion, or Anguiſh? O Death, where is thy Sting? O Grave, where is thy Victory?*

Man thinks to put himſelf above Diſgraces and Adverſity, in elevating himſelf above other Men: But he is miſtaken; he muſt go back for to find that

which he has ſo unprofitably ſought after hitherto.

It is not Pride, with its eternal, forced, and conſtrained Diſtinctions, which can make him firm and conſtant; but it is Humility in reducing him to that natural Equality of Perfection and Excellence, which we have with other Men, which, as well as we, come from God, and return to him again. If it be in the Sentiment of our Immortality that we muſt take that which ſhould comfort and elevate us, it is then likewiſe that we find every thing that may truly ſatisfie us. Our Heart is a ſort of Fire which conſumes all things, which is always mounting high, and which ſayeth never: It is enough; give it all which it can reaſonably deſire, it will but form new Deſires: Be he the Maſter of the Univerſe, either he would deſire other Worlds to conquer, as *Alexander*, or he would be diſguſted at his own Grandeur, as thoſe *Roman* Emperours, who having made themſelves as the Heads and Maſters of human Kind, were diſguſted at their Power, finding an extream

tream diſproportion between the Good which they had obtain'd, and the ardure with which they had deſired it. Maſters of the Fortune of other Men, they are not content with their own Deſtiny: The ſatisfaction which they ſeek, flies them. *Tiberius* had much reaſon to make himſelf Emperour, for to go and ſhut himſelf up in his Iſle of *Capres*, and to abandon himſelf to thoſe infamous Voluptuouſneſſes, whoſe Reliſh conſiſted in its Singularity, and in the exceſs of the Crime. He need not have been Emperour, he need have been but Man for that; he need not even have been a Man; he ought to have deſcended more than the very Beaſts by a monſtrous Debauch: But it is that theſe Exceſſes of Voluptuouſneſs were as the deſpair of Ambition. He muſt deſcend ſo low, becauſe he could mount no higher; for to remain ſtill, the Heart of Man is not capable.

Theſe famous Debauchees had always believed, that Felicity conſiſted in Grandeur. They diſabuſed themſelves when they poſſeſs'd the laſt degree of it; and then they believed, either that they ought

to

to have other Grandeurs for to be happy, as the Conquerour of the *Perſians* believed; or elſe fatigated with Grandeur, they torment themſelves on the ſide of Voluptuouſneſs; they endeavour to repair the loſt time, and endeavour to regain by Singularity what they loſe on the ſide of its durance. But they are ſooner diſguſted with Voluptuouſneſs than with Grandeur; and then their Ambition re-calls them to Grandeur, as was ſeen that *Tiberius*, after having abandoned the Empire to his Favourite for to Taſte the moſt quiet Pleaſures, he ſtrives to quit his Pleaſures for the Empire, of which he takes the Care upon him, after the Death of *Sejanus*, being as little content at *Rome*, as he was at *Capres*, and carrying every where an inſatiable Heart and Diſcontent. This Picture repreſents not only the Heart of *Tiberius*, but likewiſe thoſe of all men; whoſe agitation is perpetual, and as it were neceſſary, whilſt they ſtop at the Objects of the World. God has given him a Capacity proportionable to his Immortality; that is to ſay, an infinite Capacity. It is then impoſſible that he ſhould be contented with the things that periſh;

periſh; that which ends, cannot fill him, but perſuade him of his Immortality, and give him Goods eternal, as himſelf and you ſhall ſee he will be ſatisfied.

But after having endeavour'd to know the Nature, the Duties, the Perfections, and the greateſt motives which naturally determinate the Heart of man, or his moral Forces; it is good to paſs to the conſideration of his Irregularities, the Spring whereof we ſhall firſt conſider, for to know afterwards the Streams.

The End of the Firſt Part.

THE ART OF Knowing Ones Self: OR, A DILIGENT SEARCH INTO *The Springs of Morality.*

The Second Part.

Wherein is ſought,

The *Spring* of our *Corruption*, *Self-Love* is Treated of, the *Force* of its *Indearments*, the *Extent* of its *Affections*, and its *Irregularities* in General, and in Particular.

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THE

ART

OF

KNOWING ONES SELF:

OR A

DILIGENT SEARCH

INTO

The Springs of Morality.

The Second Part.

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THE

THE ART OF Knowing ones Self, &c.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

Wherein is ſought the Spring of our Corruption, in Treating of the firſt of our Faculties, which is the Underſtanding.

WE do not believe, that the common Definition of the Underſtanding and of the Will, of the Judgment and of the Heart, or of the Reaſon and of the Appetite, as they ſpeak of in the Schools, are proper to render our Notions more diſtinct; but muſt follow a

Cuſtom too much received. They call Underſtanding, Judgment or Reaſon, our *Soul*, being it knoweth; that is, it conceiveth, judgeth, reaſoneth, remembreth, reflecteth, and deſpiſeth its Knowledge in a certain Order. They call Heart, or Will, or Appetite, the *Soul*, becauſe it hath Affections of Love, of Hatred, of Deſire, of Fear, of Joy, of Sadneſs, of Hope, or of Deſpair, *&c.* They might perhaps, without too much deviating from the Truth, define the Judgment *the Soul*, *becauſe it underſtandeth*; and the Heart *the Soul*, *becauſe it loveth*; for as the Conceptions, the Judgments, the Reaſonings, are but the ſeveral manners of Knowledge, 'tis alſo certain that Deſire, Fear, Hope, and generally all our other Affections are but the ſeveral manners of Love; but it is not on that at preſent we are to ſtop.

It is neceſſary here to know, whether the Source of our Corruption is in the Judgment, or in the Heart; whether in the Knowledge of the Soul, or in its Affections, be the Spring of our Failings. They anſwer, that it is not in the Judgment, ſince if it were, we muſt allow the Judgment to be govern'd by the Heart, inſtead of the Heart being govern'd by the Judgment; for it would be unreaſonable, that this which is leaſt corruptible ſhould

be

be govern'd by that which is moſt irregular, or that we ſhould draw the Rule of our Conduct from the Source of our Corruption; for if it were ſo, a Man ought not to govern himſelf by his Reaſon, before he hath a certain Aſſurance that God in an extraordinary manner hath inlightned him, and muſt wait for an Enthuſiaſm e're he can have the right to act in quality of a reaſonable Creature.

Likewiſe the Holy Scripture always attributes the Overſhadowings of the Judgment to the Evil Affections of the Heart. *If our Goſpel is hid,* (ſaith St. *Paul,*) *it is hid to thoſe who ſhall periſh, to whom the God of this World hath blinded the Underſtanding.* It is eaſie to underſtand, that by the God of this World, he means the Devil of Concupiſcence. 'Tis ſomewhat like this that Chriſt ſaid to the Jews, *How can ye believe, ſince that ye ſeek Glory one of another?* It is certain, that if the Depravation were originally in the Judgment, it would carry its natural Darkneſs through all. It would be blind in the Study of Sciences, as it is in that of Religion, and it would ſucceed no better in the knowledge of indifferent Objects, above all when they are difficult, then of thoſe pertaining to it. When an Eye is covered with a Film, or ſhut by an Obſtruction, it

is no more in a condition of diſcerning one Object than another: But when its Darkneſs ſprings from the Obſtacle of a Cloud, a Miſt, or any other exterior Vail, it is more eaſie to perceive the Objects at diſtance; and it ſhall ſee altogether clear when the ſtrange Obſtacle ſhall be taken away, without receiving any Change in it ſelf. Let us ſay the ſame, That if the Underſtanding were naturally darken'd in it ſelf, it would wander in the Knowledges of Curioſity, as in thoſe of its Intereſt, for it would carry its Darkneſs through all: But becauſe it is covered but with Miſts, which ariſe from the Seat of Affections, we muſt not wonder if when the Paſſion ceaſes its Darkneſs is removed.

This laſt is of common Experience. A Man who ſhall have a rightneſs of Wit, and an admirable exactneſs of Reaſon, for to comprehend that which is moſt occult and intricate in the Sciences who knows to doubt of Things doubtful, to affirm the True, to deny the falſe, to have a ſimple Opinion of Probables, to demonſtrate thoſe which are Certain, who will not take the Falſe for the True, nor one degree of Truth for another; has no ſooner an Affair of Intereſt with any one, but the trueneſs of his Judgment or Spirit quits him,

him, his Reaſon leans to the Will of his Deſires, and the Evidence confounds it ſelf with his Profit. Whence comes theſe Darkneſſes? From the Objects? No; for the Objects are abundance more eaſie in this Affair, than they were in thoſe high Sciences which he ſo well penetrated. From any natural Default of his Judgment? Still leſs; he has reaſoned perfectly well upon the Matters of Speculation; cauſe him to ſpeak of Affairs, provided they be the Affairs of another, he will reaſon with the ſame juſtneſs.

But if after having brought the Judgment of this Man from the Objects of Sciences to the Affairs of Life, you ſhould call it back from theſe to the conſideration of the Truths of Religion; you will find it may be his Judgment ſtill more falls, and more ſubject to Illuſions; it is becauſe a greater Intereſt produces likewiſe a greater Deviation. A Paſſion, as Intereſt, is very ſtrong to darken Reaſon; but all the Paſſions which oppoſe Reaſon, are ſtill more capable of producing this bad effect. So that it is not as we imagine commonly, the degree of Darkneſs which is originally in the Underſtanding, which produces the number of our Paſſions; but it is the number and the vehemence of the Evil Paſſions of our Heart, which make the degree of

this Darkneſs, which is in the Underſtanding.

That if the Underſtanding were originally darken'd, it could not be heal'd, but by an infuſion of new and extraordinary Light, which is contrary to Experience; for the Underſtanding of a Sinner who comes to repent of his Sins, is not filled with other Ideas, and other Knowledge, than thoſe that he had before: I ſpeak in the ordinary courſe of Things; a Man after his Converſion has the Ideas of God, of Salvation, and Eternity; he is convinced of his Mortality, and of the Frailty of Human Things; he looks upon Piety as a Means very proper for to live in Repoſe, for to die with Conſolation, and for to live again even after Death.

But he was perſwaded of all theſe Truths before his Repentance; (for I ſuppoſe he ſinned not as an Infidel,) he has not then acquired any new Knowledge, but his Knowledge is become from Speculative, as it was to Practical. It is ſo, that which *Jeſus Chriſt* teſtifies in ſome part, when he declares to his Enemies, that they would be leſs culpable, if they had had leſs knowledge. It is certain in effect, that the want of Light excuſes a Man of the Faults which he commits, when the Fault is of Neceſſity, and Involuntary. For why ſhould

ſhould any one be Reproached for not ſeeing that which it is impoſſible for him to ſee in effect? Likewiſe a Man cannot be pardon'd whom we ſuppoſe not to be blind, but becauſe he will be ſo. He that deceives himſelf by the Heart, and not by a natural default of Light, ſees and ſees not; he has knowledge enough for to perceive, that he followeth not that which he hath. It is by that means alone it appears to us, that we can reconcile two Expreſſions of Scripture, which appear very oppoſite; for one while it accuſes the Sinner of Ignorance, of Folly, of Stupidity, of Blindneſs, of walking in Darkneſs, of not knowing what he does; and by and by it reprehends him for ſinning againſt his Light, for reſiſting the Truth which inlightens him, to be condemned by his own Thoughts, and reproved by his Conſcience, *&c.* All theſe Expreſſions are true, and are not oppoſite but in appearance; the Sinner ſeeth and ſeeth not, he ſees by the Underſtanding which God has given him, capable to perceive the Truth, and guide him: He ſees not by his Heart, which ſends into the uppermoſt parts of our Soul continual Clouds, which darken our Underſtanding.

I know very well that they diſtinguiſh in the School two ſorts of Knowledge or

Light, when they go about to ſatisfie this Difficulty; the firſt which they name *Speculative*, and the ſecond which they name *Practical*; they define them ſo by their Effects. For the *Speculative* Light is that which does but ſwim (as I may ſay) in the Underſtanding, that is to ſay, that which ſtops itſelf at the Simple Contemplation; whereas we underſtand by the *Practical* Knowledge, that which ſtops not in the Judgment, but which deſcends into the Heart, which gains the Will, which maſters the Affections, and diſpoſes into Practice what it orders us. But it muſt be granted, that we go not far in the Diſcovery of Things by the help of this Diſtinction, becauſe in effect it ſays nothing elſe, but that there are in us an effectual Knowledge, and others which remain without effect. If we look on it near, we ſhall find, that Knowledge is commonly *Speculative*, or *Practical*, according as it intereſſes, or as it intereſſes not our Heart. When we conſider the Truth in the Sciences, we have but ordinarily a *Speculative* Knowledge; but when we conſider it in Objects that intereſs us, ſuch as are the Affairs of Civil Life, or the Matters of Religion, we hate it if it be grievous, or we love it if it be agreeable, and leads us to the Action, or avoiding, according as it bears the one

or

or the other of theſe two Characters. This is that which is called *Practical* in the School, it is a Truth that has ſome ſtrength. Now Truth draws always its ſtrength out of our Hearts; in effect it is of the Light of the Underſtanding, as of that of Nature: It lights all, but it moves nothing by it ſelf; it has a ſhining, but it has no force; it can guide us, but it cannot ſuſtain us. Men look on the Deciſions of Reaſon, when none but it ſpeaks, either as Dreams, or as dry Truths, which are worth nothing but to be forgot; they conſider them as the importunate Counſels of a Pedant, who fatigues them with Remonſtrances out of ſeaſon. If Men would determine according to Reaſon, Philoſophers would perſwade ſooner than Orators; for the firſt have an exact Reaſon, and a good ſevere Senſe, which weighs and examines all Things, and then makes juſt compariſon; whereas the others often abound in Fictions, in Lies, and in Figures, which would be but pompous and magnificent Impoſtures, if neceſſity did not juſtifie theſe exceſſes of Language, and if Men had not agreed to abate of their Signification: But becauſe they determine by their Affections, it happens contrary to Reaſon, that Orators perſwade generally a great deal better than

than Philoſophers, becauſe the Soul does not weigh the Reaſons, but its Intereſt; and that it weighs not the Light, but only its Profit. The Good draws us, the Evil makes us fly; Reaſon it ſelf does neither the one nor the other; but it is only in as much as it makes us perceive the Objects. And here, in paſſing by, we may know the Error of thoſe who make the free Arbitriment of Man to conſiſt in the indifferency of his Soul, in carrying or in not carrying him towards the Good which is preſented him. In truth this indifference is but in their Imaginations, it is not in their Objects; the Good is not indifferent to be good, or the Bad indifferent to be bad. It is not in the Reaſon, for it is not free to conſent to that which appears falſe to it, or to reject the Truth: It is not indifferent to judge, that That which appears an Evil to it, is a Good; and, that That which appears a Good to it, is an Evil. The Soul is not indifferent to love or to hate that which it conceives for its Good; for if that were, it would be indifferent to the loving or hating it ſelf, which is contrary to Nature.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Wherein is continued to be ſhown, That the Spring of our Corruption is not in the Underſtanding.

WHEN we ſay, that the Corruption of the Underſtanding comes from the Will; we do not pretend to advance, that all our Ignorances, and that all our Errors, without Exceptions ſhould have their Spring in our Affections. For as for the firſt, it is certain that they are not all to be conſidered as Faults; it appertains not to Men, nor to Angels, nor in general unto Creatures, how noble ſoever they may be, to know all Things; it is the Character of the Supream Being, and of the Infinite Underſtanding, which governs the Univerſe. In general, we ought to count for nothing, all Ignorance which comes, either from that our Nature is too much bounded, or from that the Object is too much elevated, or from the brevity of our Life, which is not ſufficient for our knowledge of all Things, *&c.* for it is not a Crime to our Bodies not to be Im-

Immortal, and it is not to our Understanding not to be Infinite.

It is not the Ignorance of the Mysteries of Nature, or of the Secrets of Providence, which can be look'd upon as the Corruption of the Understanding; *Jesus Christ* was the Model of Perfection, and nevertheless he knew not all Things, as Man, because he knew not the Day of Judgment. That which causes the Corruption of our Understanding, is the Ignorance of our Duties; it is that of our Sins, it is that of Benefits which we have received; Ignorance which proceeds not from any defect of Light, and which cannot be justified in any manner. It is not likewise the Errors of Speculation, which ought to be look'd upon as the Vices of the Understanding; they are so small, that God has often left them in the Souls which he has inlighten'd with his Revelation in an immediate and extraordinary manner: For we find not that *Moses*, nor the Prophets, had any other Ideas of the Sun, the Stars, the Earth, *&c.* than those that the Vulgar may have; and it was not necessary likewise, that God should make Philosophers by Revelation, those whom he destin'd to the Instruction of the most Simple Men.

At bottom it is no great matter if the ordinary Man deceives himſelf, in repreſenting the Stars as Flambeaus: But it is a great Irregularity that the Sages, who had ſo juſt Ideas of the Grandeur of the Heavenly Bodies, ſhould look upon Eternity, God, and Religion, as if they were but Points, or rather Shadows and Appearances at a diſtance. Our Reaſon may be enlighten'd with the firſt Prejudication, but it cannot but be blinded by the ſecond.

As to the reſt, nothing is more eaſie than to juſtifie the Judgment, and to ſhew that it is not the firſt Spring of our Corruption, in examining its different ways of Knowledge. For to begin; by the ſimple Conceptions of the Underſtanding, there is not an Idea in our Soul which is Evil in that it is an Idea, that is to ſay, in that it repreſents an Object to us; the Objects of Pleaſure, of Glory, and of Sin it ſelf, have nothing Criminal in themſelves, becauſe it is permitted to know theſe Objects. The ſame thing muſt be ſaid of the Judgments of the Soul, and of its Reaſonings. The firſt Notions are not Criminal, becauſe they are even of ſo great and eaſie an Evidence, that ſo ſoon as the Mind reaſons, it perceives them. The Reaſoning is a ſort of Knowledge which

which we acquire, and which will not deceive us, if not aſſiſted by the Heart; for we are wont to ſay, that common Senſe deceives no Man; for to ſhew that Man naturally, reaſons well.

Nevertheleſs we muſt mark in paſſing by, that in the order of our Knowledge the Ideas have more force for to determine our Will, than the Judgments or the Reaſonings of the Mind, which is true generally ſpeaking. The reaſon is, becauſe that our Knowledge, as we have already remark'd, has not force of it ſelf; it borrows all the Affections of the Heart. Thence it comes that Men ſeldom perſwade, but when they cauſe to enter (as I may ſay) the Sentiment in their Reaſons, or in their Knowledge: But in the Reaſons you cannot make enter but a diſtanc'd Good; for becauſe you are obliged for to make uſe of Reaſoning for to make it know, it is evident that it is not altogether near; whereas the Idea participating of the quality of its Object, and being ſad or agreeable according as the Object is one or the other, it makes you ſenſibly know by it ſelf, that which Reaſoning makes you only expect. But it is not there the Spring of Evil; the Irregularities come from that, that the Spiritual Ideas make not near the Impreſſions upon our Souls,

Souls, which the Corporal Ideas do, which flow to us through the Canal of Senſe. Nevertheleſs it is but juſt that they ſhould make greater, becauſe that the Sentiment of the Soul ought to be more lively than that of ſtrange Objects; and that the Experience of Spiritual Things ſhould touch us nearer than the Knowledge of Senſe, which intereſſes us only in that which is about us. The Corporal Ideas which ſeem to be deſigned but for the good of the Body which they guide; whereas the Spiritual Ideas ought to direct our Souls, and conduct them to the Springs of their Happineſs: So that in as much as our Souls are more precious than our Bodies, ſo much likewiſe the Spiritual Ideas are naturally more important than the Corporeal; and as they are more neceſſary, they ought likewiſe naturally to make a ſtronger Impreſſion.

As Ideas are a ſort of Sentiment, being agreeable or grievous according to the Characters of the Things they repreſent, becauſe they participate of the Quality of their Objects; it may be ſaid without deceit, that they belong in ſome ſort to the Affections, or to the Sentiments of our Soul, which are either the Corporal Sentiments as the Senſations, or the Spiritual Sentiments as the Affections of the Heart.

Heart. So that in ſaying, that the Corruption of Man begins, becauſe that the Corporal Ideas make too lively and too ſtrong an Impreſſion on the Soul, we ſay nothing in oppoſition to our Principle, that the Corruption of our Reaſon comes from that of our Heart.

CHAP. III.

Wherein is ſought, the manner of the Minds deceiving the Heart.

THis Impoſtor of the Heart which deceives the Mind, does it by voluntary Inapplications, by affected Diſtractions, by Ignorances where it pleaſes, by Errors which ſpring from the great Deſires which we have of deceiving our ſelves, and by the bent which ſets our Mind at diſtance from all that which is Afflicting, and which ties it ſtrongly to all that which is Pleaſing.

The firſt Thing then that our Heart does, is for to fill us with unprofitable Objects, for to draw us from that the Conſideration whereof would import us; but then the Sight is afflicting for us. We find amongſt others two Ideas in our Soul, which

which we fear above all others, which are the Idea of our Miſery, and that of our Duty. The Idea of our Miſery comprehends that of the Frailty of the World, and our own Mortality; that of our Sins, and the Juſtice of God; that of our Vices, and our Weakneſſes; and of the Shame which naturally follows them. The Idea of our Duty comprehends a thouſand grievous Obligations for a voluptuous Soul as ours, ſad for a Heart which nothing touches but Pleaſure; mortifying for our Pride, and inſupportable to Self-Love. By this means Occupations the leaſt binding, the moſt inſipid Diverſions, the moſt barren Knowledge, and the moſt diſagreeable Imploys, become the Object of our Application, or of our Search, as if they could make our Happineſs. Nothing pleaſes us but what makes us live in Diſſipation; every thing which makes the Time paſs inſenſibly away, which keeps us in ignorance of our ſelves, charms us. Mind the Gameſter, who paſſes his whole Life in a continued courſe from Joy to Sadneſs, from Hope to Fear: He who ſhould take from him the turbulent Succeſſion of his Thoughts, and of his divers Agitations, would take from him aſſuredly the Pleaſure of Life. But be not ſurprized at it, this Agitation imploys him, and it is enough;

he thinks himſelf happy, provided he can but diſpence with reflecting on his Miſery. On the other ſide, Hope flatters him even in the midſt of his Loſſes; and his Soul is ſo flexible to follow always the Sights which are agreeable to it, that when he wins, he thinks that he cannot loſe; and when he loſes, it fills him with nothing but the hopes of winning. So likewiſe is it with divers other Profeſſions wherein Men are imployed. The Good and Bad follows each other in its turn, and are link'd, as Experience does but too well inform us: But our Soul is conſtant in never faſtening its Deſires but on that which flatters it; and when it meets with Evil, in ſtead of Good which it had hoped for, it frames to it ſelf an imaginary Felicity compoſed of its own Illuſions. Give unto an ambitious Man what he demands, place him in the Rank he doth wiſh for; with difficulty will he acquire any other Advantage than that of conceiving new Hopes, and framing to himſelf new Impoſtors. We love War, not as a hazardous Profeſſion, which puts us often in danger; or as an inconvenient Profeſſion, which makes us ſuffer very much; but becauſe it employs our Mind and our Heart by the extream variety of Objects which it preſents them; and that it anſwers to that

that Eternal Agitation of the Soul which ſhuns it ſelf, and ſeeks Matter for new Illuſions wherewith to feed it ſelf. It is incredible how much the Illuſions of the Heart expoſe themſelves in the Affairs of Civil Life. We begin by deceiving our ſelves; and after that, we deceive others if we can. Believe us not, neither on our Faith, neither on our Probity, neither on our Fidelity a hundred times proved. It is true, that we have the Maxims of Equity and Right in our Minds, which we are wont to reſpect; but the Corruption which is in our Heart plays with theſe General Maxims. What imports it that I reſpect the Law of Juſtice, if this be but found in that which pleaſeth me, or which agrees with me; and if it depends on my Heart to perſwade me, that a Thing is juſt, or that it is not? Truſt not your ſelf there, the Virtue and the Juſtice through all our Actions, which have gained us the Reputation, are without; they appear but to attract your Confidence: But Injuſtice is in our Hearts for to make Reaſon act as it ſhall pleaſe, and it hides it ſelf there for to ſurprize you with the more facility. That which is moſt ſad is, that one Illuſion brings forth ſeveral others; for as a Heart intereſſed for to pre-occupy the Judgment in its favour

againſt the Truth imploys I know not how many probable Reaſons, but falſe for to prop its Pretenſions, the Soul which affects its Reaſons conſidering them with Pleaſure, and often renewing them to it ſelf, and looking on their beſt ſide, comes inſenſibly to take the degree of his Application for the degree of their Evidence, and then it receives them as certain Maxims; it makes Prejudices, which being falſe, and ſuppoſed conſtantly as true, become to it an Eternal Spring of Illuſion and Error: Add thereunto, that when in an Affair we have prepoſſeſs'd our ſelves unto our Advantage againſt any one, the Hatred that we have to his Pretenſion makes us condemn all his Reaſons, and all them who have any relation with thoſe whom he has imployed to defend his Cauſe; as it is ſeen, that the Hatred which we have conceived againſt a Man who is our Enemy, will make us hate an indifferent Perſon, if he have but any Lines of Conformity with him; and I leave you to judge what Influences theſe Prejudices have afterwards upon our Actions, and upon our Conduct.

But to come back to our voluntary Diſtractions and Diſſipations. Nothing in my Opinion is more extraordinary than the Proceeding of *Democritus*, who, after having

ving judged the Affairs of the *Abdenites* for a long time with an Exactneſs and Judgment wherewith all the World was charmed, looking upon this as a baſe Occupation, and willing to live for himſelf, he abandons the Society of Men, and retires into a Deſert for to tie himſelf to the Study of Wiſdom, and to the Knowledge of Himſelf, where *Hypocrates*, who thought to come and heal him of his Madneſs which all the World thought him poſſeſs'd with, found him employ'd in mocking the Extravagancies of Human kind.

There is no Character of a Hero ſo ſurpriſing as that of a Man, who dare ſuſtain the ſight of himſelf. It is true, that the Retreat of our Philoſopher got him the Eſteem of the Sages, of whom he made more accompt than of the Vulgar: He was, it may be, ſuſtained in this Deſign by the deſire of making himſelf talk'd of; it may be, that the Approbation of the *Abderites* did not appear conſiderable enough unto his Soul paſſionated for Vain-glory: In that caſe he is not ſo much alone as we may imagine; he quits not the Society of the *Abderites*, but for to be in better Company; and he retires not into the Country, and into the Deſert, but for to be more in the ſight of Human kind.

There is hardly any thing leſs reaſonable than the Diſcourſe of *Cyneas* to *Pyrrhus*, which the Hiſtory relates as full of Wiſdom; (reſt your ſelf without going ſo far.) This Man, did he imagin that Repoſe was ſo eaſily to be uſed? *Pyrrhus* would have ſooner beaten the *Romans*, ſubjected *Italy*, *Cicily*, and *Carthage*, than he would have conquered the Repugnance which his Heart naturally had to Repoſe; let this Importune counſel him, becauſe that this Repoſe ſuffereth him not to go out of himſelf, as he wiſheth.

The greateſt part of Philoſophers having found the Study of Man ſomething too painful, have caſt themſelves on the barren Contemplations of Nature; there they have found Charms on one ſide becauſe they poſſeſs them, and on the other ſide becauſe they diſtinguiſh them from other Men: For to ſay by the by, it is an Error to ſay, that our Soul loves the Truth, in that it is Truth; there are no greater nor no more certain Truths, than the Truths which all the World knows; nevertheleſs there are none more indifferent. Whence comes that? It is becauſe the Truth doth not appear to us amiable enough for it ſelf, but only in as much as it can diſtinguiſh us.

Thus

Thus if the Sages themſelves frame an Eternal Illuſion by the Effort of their Paſſions, it may be imagined that the ordinary ſort of Men is not exempt from the voluntary Darkneſſes of their Hearts: Every Paſſion has a particular Impoſtor. The Paſſions formerly framed unto themſelves a Religion agreeable to them; it was the *Pagan* Religion. They could not do altogether the ſame thing in the Sunſhine of Chriſtianity: Nevertheleſs they do what they can for it; and if they do not intirely ſucceed, they want but little of obtaining their Ends, they do ſo prodigiouſly diſguiſe the Holy Religion which *Jeſus Chriſt* has brought into the World, and which declares War againſt all the Paſſions. It is certain, that all the Vices have each its Moral; there is one Moral of Intereſt, one Moral of Pride, one Moral of Voluptuouſneſs, one Moral of Vengeance *&c.* according as theſe Sights point their Maxims in our Underſtanding. We muſt not be then ſurpriſed, becauſe that when the Truth appears to light us, the Heart rejects it, and ſends it back, telling it almoſt the ſame thing which *Felix* ſaid to *Saul*; (*For this time get thee gone, and when I ſhall have an opportunity I will call thee back:*) Nevertheleſs the Heart takes great care, that this Truth ſhall not come to

repreſent it ſelf ſo eaſily; for that it may not hear its Voice, it fills it ſelf with the Noiſe of the World; and that it may not be obliged to conſider that which it ſo ſoverainly imports it to know, it fills it ſelf with a thouſand Objects, the knowledge whereof is unprofitable to it.

Sometimes it is forced to make a compariſon between two Objects, one whereof is the Object of a Legitimate and Reaſonable Deſire, and another an Object of Temptation and Irregularily; it muſt take one part, Reaſon is called for to judge, and to decide. But with what Partiality does it acquit it ſelf of its Duty? If there be ten degrees of Evidence in the Object of Duty, the Soul perceives ſcarce two; the others are hid from it, becauſe that they manifeſt not themſelves but in a particular Examination which the Soul is apprehenſive of, and which it never makes but againſt its own Will. On the contrary, the Object of Temptation appears to it in a full Light, it turns it on all Sides, it ſets it ſelf againſt all its Faces, becauſe that this Conſideration ties it more agreeably; the Soul is inventive in finding favourable Reaſons unto its Deſire, becauſe that every one of theſe Reaſons gives it a ſenſible Pleaſure; it is on the contrary very ſlow to perceive thoſe which are contrary, although

although they were never ſo plain, becauſe that it is ſorry to find that which it looks not for, and that it conceives ill that which it receives not, but with Regret. So the Heart breaking the Reflexions of the Mind when it pleaſes, turning away its Thought to the ſide that favours its Paſſion, comparing Things in the ſenſe that it pleaſes, voluntarily forgetting that which oppoſes it ſelf to its Deſires, having but cold and languiſhing Perceptions of its Duty; conceiving on the contrary with Indearment, with Pleaſure, with Ardor, and, as often as it is poſſible, all that which favours its Bents, it is not to be wondred at if it play with the Lights of its Underſtanding; and if it finds that, we judge of Things, not according to Truth, but according to our Inclinations.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Wherein is conſidered, the Commerce of Illuſion which is between the Heart and the Judgment, and how God alone deſtroys it by his Grace.

IT might be thought, That if the Heart corrupted this Judgment, the Judgment filled with falſe Prejudices ſhould in its turn corrupt the Heart, in returning its Darkneſs, and nouriſhing it with Errors which it hath received.

In this State it is eaſie to conceive, that the Corruption of Man cannot be cured by Natural Remedies: For in this Eternal Circle of Illuſions and Wandrings, which makes the Judgment deceive the Heart, and the Heart deceive the Judgment; from whence can come the Light, and the Truth? If you would inlighten the Reaſon of Man, the Affections reject that Evidence which you preſent them; if you undertake to correct the Irregularity of theſe Affections, you find that you cannot but in making the Soul ſee in what Wandrings and what Precipices it is ingaged, which it cannot do unleſs it be in-

inlightned. So that the Heart cannot be corrected but by the Reaſon, the Reaſon cannot be inlightned but by the Commerce which it hath with the Heart. What is it that ſhall remedy this Diſorder. Invent, ſet your Judgment and Imagination at work? You ſhall find no other Cauſe capable to produce the Effect, than God himſelf acting by his Grace.

Then in that it is reaſonable to think, that God, who knows ſo perfectly the Spring of our Evil, begins our Cure by correcting the Default from whence all the other proceed. We have already ſaid, that the firſt Root of this Diſorder conſiſts in that, That the Imagination acts more lively in us than Reaſon; that is to ſay, that the Corporal Ideas make a ſtrong and lively Impreſſion in our Soul, while the Spiritual Ideas make them but faint and languiſhing. It is eaſie to conceive, to the end that God may reeſtabliſh our Soul in the right State where it ought to be in that regard, he muſt cauſe by his Grace, that the Spiritual Ideas of our Duty, of Virtue, of Eternity, *&c.* do make a more lively and ſtrong Impreſſion than they were accuſtomed to make; and that on the contrary, the Images of the World, of Pleaſure, of Voluptuouſneſs, and in general of all ſenſible

ſible Goods, ſhould make an Impreſſion leſs lively and ſtrong.

God does the firſt in fixing the Spiritual Ideas in the Judgment, in the ſecond place in rendring them agreeable, and in the third in extending them. Grace fixes good Ideas in our Judgment, as Melancholy fixes Melancholy Ideas in the Soul. A melancholy Man cannot drive from his Judgment all the grievous Ideas which afflict it; they return; they follow him every where. So the wholſome Ideas, of which we ſpeak, being fix'd by Grace, we cannot put them from us by the Effort of our Corruption; they return: they repreſent themſelves anew; they reprimand Cupidity, and ſtop its Overflowings; they prevent even ſometimes the Reflexions of our Judgment; for a Man is ſeen to do good Actions, as by Inſtinct and without Reflexion, becauſe he follows without perceiving the Ideas which Grace has fix'd in his Underſtanding. God extends the Spiritual Ideas in fixing them in our Judgment by his Grace; that is to ſay, that he makes us conſider the Spiritual Objects in their juſt Grandeur, and under their natural Form. Upon which is to be remarked, that the Ideas of Piety having a ſort of oppoſition to the Ideas of the World, the one cannot be extended without contracting the

the other. The Idea of Time hides that of Eternity; that of Eternity contracts that of Time.

As it is the Pleaſure that Self-Love makes us, takes to conſider the Ideas of the World, which extends them, and fixes them in our Imagination, the Soul making bigger, and Eternizing, as much as it can poſſibly, that which is agreeable to it; ſo it may be ſuppoſed, that Grace cauſes the good Impreſſions which the Spiritual Ideas make upon us; that is to ſay, that it affixes and extends them, in accompanying them with certain Sentiments of ineffable Joy and Conſolation, which the Scripture calls one while, *The joy of the Holy Ghoſt*; and another while, *The Peace of God which paſſeth all Underſtanding:* As the Judgment applied by our Paſſions unto Corporal Ideas may be called in ſome ſort the Underſtanding of the Man that periſhes, the Judgment applied by the Grace of God unto Spiritual Ideas may be called with juſt reaſon, the Underſtanding of the Immortal Man. The difference which is between one and the other, is extream; the one deceives it ſelf almoſt ever, the other hardly ever deceives it ſelf at all; for as our Errors, at leaſt our dangerous Errors, have their Spring in the violence of our Paſſions, and that theſe Paſſions cannot

but

but be very moderate in a Man who guides himſelf by the ſight of Eternity, and not by that of Temporal Things; one may judge, that this Man is not ſubject to the Illuſions which generally deceive us.

The Immortal Man finding himſelf Glorious in his Nature, Bleſſed in the State which Religion propoſes to him, and elevated above Time, and the World by Nature and by Religion, has nothing to do to fly the ſight of himſelf, nor to fear being afflicted by the conſideration of his End.

Diverſions are not for his uſe, at leaſt ſuch Diverſions as the Man of the World wiſheth for: For he does not only ſeek after the Refreſhment of his Body, and the Recreation of his Mind; there would be nothing but what were reaſonable in this Deſign; but he ſeeks after every thing that may imploy him, and hinder him from ſeeing himſelf. That which ſhews it is, that after the Repoſe and the Refreſhment he ſeeks ſtill for Diverſion, and finds therein Charms ſo much the greater, that he cannot be one moment given up to himſelf without a moſt frightful Trouble, which comes from this, That the Weight of what is paſt, which is no more for him but an Object of Regret, and what's to come he looks upon as an Object of Doubt

and

and Incertitude, joyn'd together for to load his Heart with all their Weights, and to plunge it in the ſad Reflexions of an inevitable Miſery. But the Immortal Man looks upon, as a matter of Trouble, every thing that can make him go out of himſelf, and is angry with the importunate Vails which hide him from his Grandeur, and with the Objects which ſuſpend the Joy which he finds in knowing himſelf well.

The Immortal Man deceives not himſelf by Sentiment, his Paſſions are moderated, becauſe he cannot take but a ſmall part of Things, which have ſo little relation to the extent of his Durance; and he ſees all with clearneſs, becauſe he conſiders all Things with indifference. Pride poſſeſſes him not; Men do not value being eſteemed in a Place where they abide but an inſtant; he ſuffers not himſelf to be prepoſſeſs'd by Intereſt; his Reaſon is not Partial for his Avarice, becauſe he hath found an infinite Intereſt to prepoſſeſs himſelf withall.

And certainly it may be ſaid, that it appertains not but to him for to have good Senſe and Prudence. Let a Man be able to gain Riches, to conquer or to govern Provinces: If he knows no more than that, he is void of Senſe; he has form'd an Edifice with a great deal of Reaſon,

Reaſon, but he has laid the Foundation on the Sand.

The Men of the World are wiſe enough in the choice of the Means which they uſe for to ſucceed in their Deſigns; but they are the moſt ſenſeleſs in the choice of the End which they propoſe to themſelves. It appertains not but to the Immortal Man to be equally wiſe in the choice of the End, and that of the Means; and by conſequence there is no juſtneſs of Judgment, of Right, of Reaſon, of good Senſe and Prudence, but in the latter.

The Goſpel furniſhes us with an illuſtrious Example of this Elevation in the Perſon of *Jeſus Chriſt*, in whom we find not only an Immortal Man, but likewiſe the Prince of Immortality. One is almoſt equally ſurpriſed to find him a God, who creeps upon the Earth, and converſes among Men; and a Man, who is always in Heaven, and elevated above all Temporal Things. Conſider the pure and lively manner with which his Diſciples relate to you his Doctrine, his Actions, and the divers Circumſtances of his Life, and you will be perſwaded, that they had not a deſign to make a Picture of their Divine Maſter that ſhould flatter; for certainly it may be ſaid, that thoſe poor People did not know even well enough the height

of

of Manners, for to ſucceed in making a counterfeit Picture of him. Nevertheleſs we muſt agree, that *Jeſus Chriſt*, of whom they make us the Hiſtory without Study, and without Art, makes appear an Elevation till then unknown: For ſee here the firſt who acts and ſpeaks as an Immortal Man, and who teaches Men to govern themſelves by the proſpect of Eternity; he ſeeks not that which may draw him from the Duties of his Charge, or to divert him from thinking of Himſelf; he ſpends the Days in Inſtructing the Flocks, and the Nights in Praying to God. That which makes the ordinary Object of the Envy of Men, makes that of his Diſdain; he is not ambitious of the Eſteem of any Man; he does not thruſt himſelf nigh unto thoſe who are able to do him good; he has no baſe Indulgence, nor falſe Complaiſance for any Man whatever. One would ſay, That he knew not Nature, but for to take the Emblems, which he made uſe of for to lead Men unto God. His Friends are not thoſe who have any Temporal Proximity with him, but thoſe with whom he has relation in God; that is to ſay, thoſe who are truly his Diſciples, and who do the Will of his Heavenly Father. He defines the Fooliſh and the Wiſe Man, not by an Hability that is included

in this Life, but by an Hability which tends to an infinite and incorruptible Good. His Deſires, his Fears, his Angers, his Thoughts, his Diſcourſes, his Works, his Occupations, his Indearments, go to Eternity, and ſtop not at Time, but ſo much as is neceſſary for to ſet at liberty other Men.

So likewiſe may we ſay, That when the intimate Commerce that he had with his Eternal Father ſhould not fill his Spirit with Supernatural Lights, his Holineſs, which diſingaged him from the Commerce of Creatures, would ſuffice for to hinder him from being ſubject to the Illuſions which deceive ordinary Men.

But having conſidered the firſt of our Faculties, and ſeen that it is not in our Judgment, that is, the firſt Spring of our Corruption, we muſt conſider the Heart, which is the Soul in as much as it loves, that is to ſay, the Seat of our Affections.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Wherein is continued, the Search after the Springs of our Corruptions, in conſidering the Motions and the Bents of our Hearts.

AS there are in our Mind the firſt Notions which are of an infallible Truth, and which makes this bottom of natural Light, which not only doth never deceive us, but which puts us in a State of coming back from our Errors: There are likewiſe in our Hearts primary Affections which are neceſſarily lawful, Sentiments, without which the Nature of Man could not be, and which not only do not contain Corruption in themſelves, but which ſerve us when they are well guided to make us come back from our Vices. Such is the Natural Love of Eſteem, the Love of our Selves, the Care of our Preſervation, the Deſire of our Happineſs. In themſelves theſe Paſſions are good, becauſe that they relate naturally to the Good of Man. There are two ſorts, the one which the Scholaſticks call *Proſequutivæ*, becauſe they carry us towards Good; the

other which they call *Averſativæ*, becauſe they ſet us at diſtance from Evil. But as they tend to our Advantage by the intention of Nature, it is very certain that they relate to our Loſs by an effect of our Corruption, and that arrives then when falſe Goods cauſe to ſpring in our Hearts true Affections; then when we go but ſlowly towards that which merits all the Ties of our Soul, and that on the contrary we deſire, with all the Ardor that we are capable of, the Goods which merit but an indifferent Tie; for then we overthrow all Things, for we change the End into Means, and the Means into End; we precipitate our ſelves in our Actions; we wander in our Conduct; and it is found, that the ſhadow of Good makes us loſe the Spring, and for to run after Appearances we loſe the Truth. From thence ſpring all our Vices, to the ſearch whereof we ought to apply our ſelves, becauſe it is they that do make the corruption of our Heart.

Then when we ſeek for the Spring of our Irregularities, it is certain that we muſt not ſtop at any one of them in particular, unleſs it influences over all the others. It is evident, that the Root of our natural Evil doth not conſiſt in any particular diſpoſition of Temperament, becauſe

becauſe that they who have a Temperament oppoſite unto that, ceaſe not being corrupted. It is not Intereſt which is the Principle of our Evil, becauſe that ordinarily it hath ſomething that is incompatible with Pride. It is not Pride, becauſe that is in ſome ſort oppoſite to Intereſt.

Nevertheleſs it is certain, that there are ſome Things in which the Vices are oppoſite, and ſome Things in which they agree: They are oppoſite in ſome Things, becauſe that the one is in ſome ſort the Remedy of the other; they agree in ſome Things, becauſe that the Soul that is fallen into one, has ſtill a Bent for the other, which ſeems ſo oppoſite to it.

It is a Truth which will appear to us yet more clear, if we ſet our ſelves to make here (if I may ſo ſay) the Anatomy of the Heart, in entring upon the dividing of its Paſſions. Theft ſprings from Injuſtice, Injuſtice from Intereſt, and Intereſt from the Irregular Love that we have for our ſelves. Conceitedneſs is but a Lie which Self-love makes us have for our own Imaginations. Pride is but the Drunkenneſs of Self-love, which repreſents us to our own Imaginations greater and more perfect than we are. Vengeance is but a deſire to defend ones ſelf againſt thoſe who hate us, or to ſatisfie

ones ſelf in puniſhing thoſe who have offended us. In a word, conſider well all the Vices, and all the Paſſions of Man, you will find in the end Self-love; it is that which gives them their Birth, becauſe that all the Motives of Vice are taken from that, that we ſeek that which flatters us, and relates to This Self, which holds the firſt Place amongſt the Objects of our Knowledge and our Affections: It is that which makes them live, and which makes them die; for when two Paſſions oppoſe with violence each other, Fear, for Example, on one ſide, and Vengeance on the other, the Soul retires into it ſelf, and it conſults but Self-love for to know unto which of the two it ſhould abandon it ſelf; and then according as Self-love judges, or judges not, that Vengeance is neceſſary, it pronounces in favour of Reſentment, or of Moderation: So that as it is Self-love that has given Birth to theſe two Paſſions, it is Self-love which makes the one live to the prejudice of the other. Then what can be ſaid of a Paſſion unto which all our irregular Inclinations relate, where all our Vices terminate, which gives them all Birth, which makes them all Die, which ſtops and ſuſpends them all, but that it ought to be without difficulty the general Irregularity which is the Spring of

others,

others, and which we have ſaid to be the firſt Root of our Evil, and of our Corruption.

That which confirms us in this Opinion is, That at the ſame time that it is perceived that all the Vices flatter Self-love, it is found that all the Vices agree to oppoſe the ſame. Humility abuſes it; Temperance mortifies it; Liberality ſtrips it; Moderation diſcontents it; Valor expoſes it; Magnanimity, Zeal, and Piety, ſacrifice it.

It may be ſaid likewiſe, that Self-love enters ſo Eſſentially into the definition of Vices and Virtues, that without it one could not conceive either the one or the other.

In general, Vice is a preference of ones ſelf before others; and Virtue ſeems to be a preference of others before ones ſelf: I ſay, that it ſeems to be, becauſe that in effect it is certain, that Virtue is but a manner of loving ones ſelf, a great deal more noble and more ſenſible than all others.

Then here we ſeem to find a contradiction in our Syſtem; for on one ſide Self-love appears to us to be the Principle of all our Irregularities; and on the other it is certain, that it is by the love of our ſelves, that we acquit our ſelves of our

Duty. Corruption draws all its force from Self-love: God on the other ſide draws from the Love of our Selves all the Motives, which he makes uſe of for to carry us to the Study of Sanctification. For what would his Promiſes and his Threatnings ſerve for, if God had not a deſign to intereſs the Love of our Selves?

This Difficulty vaniſhes ſo ſoon as you ſhall ſuppoſe of the Love of our Selves that which we have already ſaid of the Affections of our Heart in general; that is, that they have ſomething innocent and lawful which belongs unto Nature, and likewiſe ſomething that is vitious and irregular which belongs to our Corruption. The uſe of our Tongue is happy in this, for it makes us diſtinguiſh between Self-Love, and the Love of our Selves; the Love of our Selves is that Love, in that is lawful and natural; Self love is this ſame Love, in that it is vitious and corrupted.

Then as we ſearch here the Spring of our Evil, our Deſign ingages us at preſent to examine, in what conſiſts the Irregularity of Self-love. This Queſtion is quite ſingular, but it is not leſs conſiderable for that; and I dare ſay, that few Queſtions in Morality and Religion are of more importance than this, as I hope it will ap-

pear

pear by the Diſcuſſion we are now entring into.

CHAP. VI.

Wherein are examined the Faults of the Love of our Selves.

THE Love of our Selves cannot Sin but in exceſs or in direction; its Irregularity muſt conſiſt in this, that we love our Selves too much; or in this, that we love Ill; or in the one and in the other of theſe two Faults joyned together.

The Love of our Selves ſins not in exceſs, that appears from that it is permitted to love ones Self as much as ones Will, when one loves ones Self well. In effect what is this loving ones Self? 'Tis to deſire ones Good, 'tis to fear ones Harm, tis to ſeek ones Happineſs. Then I grant that it often happens, that one deſires too much, that one fears too much, that one affixes ones ſelf to ones Pleaſure, or to that which one looks on as ones chief Happineſs with too much Ardor: But take notice, that the Exceſs comes from the Fault which is in the Object of your Paſſions, and not from the too great meaſure of

of Love of your Self; that which ſhews it, is that you can; and that you ought likewiſe to deſire without bounds the Supream Felicity; to fear without bounds the Sovereign Miſery; and that there would likewiſe be an Irregularity to have but bounded Deſires for an infinite Good.

In effect, if Man ought not to love himſelf but in a limited Meaſure, the *Vacuum* of his Heart ought not to be infinite; and if the *Vacuum* of his Heart ought not to be infinite, it would follow that he ſhould not have been made for the Poſſeſſion of God, but for the Poſſeſſions of finite and bounded Objects.

Nevertheleſs Religion and Experience equally teaches us the contrary. Nothing is more lawful and more juſt than this inſatiable Decree, which, after the poſſeſſion of the Advantages of the World, makes us ſtill ſeek the Sovereign Good; of all thoſe who have ſought it in the Objects of this Life, not one has found it.

Brutus, who made a particular profeſſion of Wiſdom, thought that he had not deceived himſelf in ſeeking for it in Virtue, but as he loved Virtue for it ſelf, whereas it has nothing Amiable and Praiſe-worthy but by relation unto God; culpable of a fine and ſpiritual Idolatry he was no leſs groſly deceived; and was obliged

ged to acknowledge his Error in dying, then when he cried out, *O Virtue! I know that thou art nothing but a miſerable Fantaſm*, &c.

This inſatiable Deſire then of the Heart of Man is not an Evil; it is neceſſary that it ſhould be, that Men might thereby find themſelves diſpoſed to ſeek after God.

Then, that which in a Figurative and Metaphorical Idea we call a Heart, which has an infinite Capacity, a *Vacuum* which cannot be filled by the Creatures, ſignifies in a proper and literal Idea, a Soul which naturally deſires an infinite Good, and which deſires it without Bounds, which cannot be contented but with obtaining it; if then it be neceſſary, that the *Vacuum* of our Heart ſhould not be filled by the Creatures, it is neceſſary that we ſhould deſire infinitely; that is to ſay, that we ſhould love our Selves without meaſure; for to love ones Self, is for to deſire ones Happineſs.

And certainly as one may without deceiving ones ſelf ſay, That a Man loves not the Creature when he loves it without bounds, becauſe then he puts the Creature upon the Throne of the Creator, which is the Idolatry of the Spirit, and is the moſt dangerous of all; ſo likewiſe may it be ſaid, That he loves not God

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as his Sovereign Good, then when he conceives not for him but moderate Desires; for then he makes God descend to the State of the Creatures by the Impiety of his Heart, which is not less Criminal than his Idolatry.

Whether it be that we look upon God as our Sovereign Good, or that we represent him as a Being infinitely perfect, always it is certain, that the Ties which we have for him ought not to be limited; and it is, to the end that Man might be capable in some sort of the possession of this infinite Good, that the Creator has put a kind of Infinity in his Knowledge, and in his Affections.

I know very well that our Nature being limited, it is not capable (to speak exactly) of forming infinite Desires with vehemence; but if these Desires be not infinite in this sense, they are in another; for it is certain, that our Soul desires according to all the extent of its Forces, that if the number of Spirits necessary to the Organ could increase to infinity, the vehemency of its Desires would likewise increase to Infinity; and that, in fine, if Infinity be not in the Act, it is in the disposition of the Heart naturally insatiable.

I grant, that if we love our Selves by Reason, we might conceive, that the love of

of our Selves ſhould be in a limited meaſure in our Heart; for we do not find an Infinity of Reaſons in our Minds for to love our Selves: But the Author of Nature, whoſe Wiſdom has found, that he ſhould not ſend away Man to take care of his Preſervation until that he was a Philoſopher, would that we ſhould love our Selves by ſentient; which is ſo true, that it is not even conceivable that we can feel any Pleaſure and any Joy without neceſſarily loving this Self, which is the Subject; ſo that as there is an infinite variety and infinity of different Degrees in the Joys which we may taſte, there is no meaſure in the deſire of Happineſs in the which this Joy eſſentially enters, nor by conſequence in the love of our Selves, who are the Principle of this Deſire.

I agree likewiſe, that if Man had been made for to be a Rival of the Divinity, he ſhould not love himſelf without meaſure, for then the love of himſelf would enter in concurrence with the Divine Love; but Man loves not himſelf naturally with ſo much vehemence, but for to be able to love God.

The Meaſure without meaſure of the love of himſelf, and the Deſires which are as infinite, are the only Ties which bind him unto God, becauſe (as I have already

ſaid)

ſaid) moderate Deſires cannot bind the Heart of Man but with the Creatures; and that it is not God that they love, but a Fantaſm which they frame to themſelves in the Place of God, when they love him indifferently.

Likewiſe it is a very great miſtake for to oppoſe the Love of our Selves to the Divine Love, when it is well regulated. For what is this loving ones Self as one ought? It is to love God. And what is this to love God? It is to love ones Self as one ought. The Love of God is the good ſenſe of the Love of our Selves, it is the Spirit and the Perfection. When the Love of our Selves turns towards other Objects, it deſerves not the Name of Love, it is more dangerous than the moſt cruel Hatred; but when the Love of our Selves turns towards God, it confounds it ſelf with the Divine Love.

And certainly nothing is ſo eaſie as to demonſtrate invincibly that which our Searches have bought us in this regard: For to take, for Example, the Bleſſed, who without doubt love not Themſelves too much nor too little, becauſe they are in a State of Perfection; I demand, If they can love God without Bounds? Without feeling the Joy of his Poſſeſſion? And I ask afterwards, If they can feel Joy, without

out loving themſelves proportionably to the Sentiments that they have thereof?

Let us not then ſtop at theſe vain and contradictory Queſtions. The Saints, Do they love God more than themſelves? I had as live you ſhould ask me, If they love Themſelves more than they love Themſelves? For theſe two Expreſſions have at bottom the ſame Senſe; becauſe we have made appear, that to love God, is to love with good Senſe; and that not to love God, it is in ſome manner to hate ones Self.

For to ſhew that all this is but a Play of Words, it muſt be ſuppoſed, that there are two ſorts of Love which one may have of God, a Love of Intereſt, and a Love of pure Amity, as the *Theologians* call it. I grant, that the latter has nothing to do to mix with the Love of our Selves, as they commonly hold; but I demand, Of which of theſe two Loves do you ſpeak, when you ask me, if the Love which we have for our Selves be as great, as that which we ought to have for God? If you underſtand by this latter the Love of pure Amity, which has for its Object the known Perfection, and nothing elſe, I anſwer, That that Love cannot compare with the Love of our Selves, which is of another Nature, becauſe (as I have already

ready ſaid) we love not our Selves by Reaſon, but by Sentiment; and that the Corporal or Spiritual Pleaſure naturally intereſſes us to the Love of our Selves, before even that we are capable of Reflexion.

That if by the Love which we ought to have for God, you underſtand the Love of Intereſt, which ties it ſelf unto it as our Sovereign Good, you perceive not that you oppoſe a Thing againſt it ſelf, becauſe that to love ones Self, and to love ones Sovereign Good, confounds themſelves together; that there are not there two Loves, but one only Love conſidered in two manners, to wit, by relation unto its Principle, and unto its Object.

It appears then, that the Evil is not in that we love our Selves too much, becauſe we may love our Selves as much as we pleaſe, whilſt we ſhall love our ſelves by relation to the Sovereign Good; but that the Irregularity conſiſts in that, that we love our ſelves ill, that is to ſay, by relation unto falſe Objects.

The Love of our Selves is innocent in it ſelf; it is Corrupted when it turns it ſelf towards the Creatures, and Holy when it turns it ſelf towards God. Following this Proſpect, we may diſtinguiſh three Hearts in Man; the Heart of the

Man,

Man, the Heart of the Sinner, and the Heart of the Faithful. The Heart of the Man is the Soul, in as much as it naturally loves; the Heart of the Sinner is the Soul, in as much as it loves the World; and the Heart of the Faithful is the Soul, in as much as it loves God. The Natural Heart enters Eſſential into the two others; and the Natural Love of our ſelves, which is the Principle of all our Affections, is the *Mobile*, which puts in motion Grace or Corruption, and which receives the Love of God, or the Love of the World; the Heart of the Man loves; the Heart of the Worldly Man loves Vanity; the Heart of the Faithful loves the Infinite and Eternal Good: The firſt is the Heart of Man, the ſecond is the Heart of Man that periſhes, and the third is the Heart of the Immortal Man.

CHAP. VII.

Wherein is shown, That the Love of our Selves lights all our other Affections, and is the general Principle of our Movements.

I Have said, That the Love of our Selves is the Principle of all our Natural Affections; for if we desire, if we fear, if we hope, it is always for the Love of our Selves.

I grant, that the Affection which we have for others, sometimes makes our Desires spring, our Fears, and our Hopes: But what is the Principle of that Affection, unless it be the Love of our Selves? Consider well all the Springs of our Friendships, and you will find that they are all reduced to Interest, Acknowledgment and Proximity, Sympathy, and a delicate Accord, which Virtue hath with the Love of our Selves; which makes us believe, that we love it for the Love of it self, although we love it in effect for the Love of Us; all which is reduced to the Love of our Selves.

Proxi-

Proximity draws from thence all the Force which it has for to light our Affections; we love our Children, becauſe they are our Children; if they were the Children of another, they would be indifferent to us: It is not Them then that we love, but the Proximity that binds us with them. It is true, that the Children love not their Fathers ſo much as the Fathers love their Children, although theſe two Affections appear to be grounded upon the ſame Reaſon of Proximity: But this Difference comes from another Cauſe; the Children ſee themſelves dying in the Perſon of their Fathers, and the Fathers on the contrary ſee themſelves reviving in the Perſon of their Children; then Nature inſpires in us the Love of Life, and the Hate of Death; otherways the Fathers ſee in their Children their other Selves ſubmited and dependant; they felicitate themſelves, in having brought them into the World; they conſider them with Pleaſure, becauſe they conſider them as their own Work; they are rejoyced in having Sacred and Inviolable Rights over them; there is their Magiſtracy, their Royalty, their Empire: But the ſame Pride which makes the Fathers love the Superiority, make Children hate the Dependance; nothing overwhelms us ſo much as a Benefit

when it is too great, becauſe that it ſubjects us too much.

We look upon it as a delicate Chain, but ſtrong, which binds our Heart, and which conſtrains our Liberty; it is the Myſtery hid in the known Maxim, *The Blood never remounts*; to the reſt as there is Proximity of Blood, Proximity of Profeſſion, Proximity of Religion, Proximity of Country, *&c.* It is certain likewiſe, that the Affections diverſify themſelves in this regard in an infinite number of ways; but Proximity muſt not be oppoſed by Intereſt, for then certainly the latter will carry it; Intereſt goes directly to us, Proximity goes but by Reflexion; that makes that Intereſt always acts with more force than Proximity; but in that, as in all other Things, the particular Circumſtances change very much the general Propoſition.

One muſt impute almoſt unto the ſame Spring that which is ordinarily ſeen, that there is no Hatred more violent, than that which is kindled between Perſons who have loved each other extreamly; it is becauſe theſe Perſons did find Utility or Pleaſure in loving each other; that intereſſed Self-love. When then they come to change Sentiment, the Motives of Love joyn themſelves to the Motives of Hatred; they

they riſe, and by an Idea of Hurt which they do them, and by that of Pleaſure and Friendſhip which they renounce and ſuffer by the Hatred which is kindled, and by the Affection which is extinguiſhed; the which confirms excellently our Syſtem, and which ſhews us, that there is not an Affection in our Hearts which is kindled independently from the Love of our Selves.

This is a Thought in the which we confirm our Selves, in conſidering that not only Proximity is a Spring of Friendſhip, but more, that our Affections vary according to the Degree of Proximity which we have with the Perſons who are the Object. The Quality of Man which we all bear, makes this general Benevolence which we call Humanity; *Homo ſum, humani a me nihil alienum puto:* It is certain, that were there but two Perſons in the World, they would love with Tenderneſs. But this general Proximity confounding it ſelf with this infinite number of different Relations which we have one with another, it happens ſo, that this Natural Affection which it had cauſed to ſpring, loves it ſelf in the croud of Paſſions, which ſo many other Objects produce in our Hearts.

We ſee not in our Neighbour the Quality of Man by the which he reſembles us, whilſt we ſee in him a Rival, an envious Man, a Man who is an Enemy to our Proſperity, as we are to his; a proud Man, who eſteems none but himſelf; a Man, who by his good Qualities draws the Eſteem and Attention of others, and throws us into Forgetfulneſs, and into Obſcurity; or who by his Paſſion is always imployed in making Snares for us, or invading our Rights; but when Death hath robbed him of theſe odious Relations, then we find in him that general Proximity which made us love him; remembring our ſelves, that he was a Man only then when he ceaſed to be, and would place him in the number of our Friends, when Death had cut him off from the Society of the Living.

The Proximity of a Nation ordinarily inſpires in Men a Benevolence, which is not felt by them who dwell in their own Country, becauſe that this Proximity weakens according to the number of thoſe who leave it, but which becomes ſenſible, when two or three Perſons originally of the ſame Country meet in a ſtrange Climate; then the Love of our Selves, which has want of Props and Conſolations, and which finds in the Perſon of them, that a like Intereſt, and a like Proximity, ſhould put in the

the ſame diſpoſition, never fails of making a perpetual attention unto that Proximity, unleſs a ſtronger motive taken from his intereſt, ſhould hinder him.

The Proximity of Profeſſion produces generally more averſion than friendſhip, by the jealouſie which it inſpires in Men, of one another: But that of Conditions, is generally accompanied with Benevolence. It is ſurprizing that the great ſhould be without compaſſion for the Men of common Rank, it is becauſe they ſee them at a diſtance, conſidering them by the Eyes of Self-love. They take them in no manner for their Neighbours. They are far from perceiving this Proximity, or this Neighborhood, they whoſe Mind and Heart is imployed with nothing but the diſtance which ſepartes them from other men, who make this Object the delight of their Vanity.

Nevertheleſs, it muſt be granted, that the Proximity of Blood carries it ordinarily, before all the others, although it is commonly ſaid, that *a good Friend is better than ſeveral Relations*, and if that be true in it ſelfe, it is nevertheleſs certain, that Men prefer their Relations before their Friends, and above all, in important occaſions; which comes from that they conſider their Relations as neceſſary Friends,

who cannot forbear being tyed to them, and their Friends as voluntary Relations, who affect them not, but as much as they pleaſe; then although free Friendſhip obliges more than neceſſary Friendſhip; it is certain that it is not ſo conſider'd by the love of our ſelves, it may inſpire us to more acknowledgment, but it cannot ſo much touch our Intereſt. The barbarous conſtancy which *Brutus* ſhewed in ſeeing his own Children dye, which he cauſed to be executed in his Preſence, is not ſo diſintereſſed as it appears; the moſt excellent of the *Latin* Poets diſcovers the motives in theſe terms.

Vincet amor Patriæ, laudumq; immenſa cupido.

But he has not ſo diſintangl'd all the Reaſon of Intereſt, which make the apparent inhumanity of this *Roman*. *Brutus* was as other Men, he loved himſelf more than all things; his Children are culpable of a crime, which tended to deſtroy *Rome*; but a great deal more ſtill to deſtroy *Brutus*: if the paternal Affection excuſe the faults, Self-love aggravates them when it is directly wounded; without doubt *Rome* had the Honour of that which *Brutus* did for the love of himſelf, that his Country accepted the Sacrifice which he offered to his

his Self-love; and that he was cruel by Weakneſs rather than by Magnanimity.

Intereſt can do any thing upon the Soul, it ſeeks it in the object of all its indearments; and as there are divers ſorts of Intereſt, one may diſtinguiſh likewiſe divers ſorts of affecting, which Intereſt brings forth amongſt Men. An Intereſt of Voluptuouſneſs, produces gallant Friendſhip; An Intereſt of Ambition, produces politick Friendſhip; An Intereſt of Pride, produces illuſtrious Friendſhip; An Intereſt of Avarice, produces profitable Friendſhip: Generally ſpeaking, we love People but as much as they are agreeable or profitable to us. That if it ſhould happen that all theſe different Intereſts united, for to form the Sentiments which we have for a Perſon, nothing would be comparable to that endearment which we ſhould have for him. The Vulgar who declaim againſt intereſſed Friendſhip, know not what they ſay, they deceive themſelves in that they know, not generally ſpeaking but one ſort of intereſſed Friendſhip, which is that of Avarice, whereas there are as many ſorts of intereſſed Affections, as there are of objects of Cupidity. On the other hand, they deny that they love Men for Intereſt, when they love them more ſtrongly by that Principle than all others; not compre-

comprehending, that loving for Intereſt, is for to love directly ones ſelf, whereas to love them by other Principles, is to love ones ſelf out of the way, and by reflexion; they perceive not that we take ill intereſſed Friendſhip, when it is in the Hearts of others; but not when it is in our Hearts. In fine, they imagine that it is criminal to be intereſſed; not conſidering, that it is the diſintereſsment, and not the Intereſt that deſtroys us. If Man ſhould offer us Riches great enough for to ſatisfie our Souls, we ſhould do well to love him with a love of Intereſt, and no body ought to take it ill, that we ſhould prefer the motives of that Intereſt unto thoſe of Proximity, and of all other things. Gratitude it ſelf ſo eſteem'd in the World, and ſo recommended in Morality; and Religion is not more exempt from this commerce of the Love of our ſelves, for what difference is there at the bottom, between Intereſt and Gratitude; it is that the firſt has for its Object, a Good to come, whereas the latter has for its Object a Good that is paſt. Gratitude is but a delicate return of the love of our ſelves, which finds its ſelf obliged; it is in ſome ſort an elevation of Intereſt; we love not our Benefactor, becauſe he is lovely. Gratitude, at leaſt alone, goes not

not ſo far, we love him, becauſe he hath loved us.

If you require that we ſhould explain our ſelves more particularly in the compariſon which may be made of Gratitude, and Intereſt, in that regard, we will ſay, that the Affection which Gratitude produces, is more noble, and that which Intereſt produces, is more ſtrong; the Firſt tends towards the part which is loſt; whereas, Intereſt has for its Object that which is to come, which it will make profit of. Gratitude loves, even without hopes; but Intereſt hopes, and expects. Gratitude loves the Good for the love of the Intention; but Intereſt loves the Intention for the love of the Good. In fine, the Ideas of what's paſt, which are thoſe of Gratitude, are ranged ordinarily amongſt worn-out Ideas, abſtracted, and which draw but weak Attention from our Souls; whereas the Ideas of the preſent, which are thoſe of Intereſt, are the moſt lively Ideas, and which intereſts us moſt particularly. It is certain likewiſe, that there is by this Reaſon, ſome ſort of oppoſition between the one and the other, that which makes that, as all Men are naturally intereſſed, they are likewiſe naturally ungrateful. The meaſure of Intereſt, makes the meaſure of Ingratitude; becauſe, that the more the

Soul

Soul applies it ſelf to the preſent Ideas, the more it loſes of the tye and application which it ought to have for what is paſt: and in that regard it muſt be ſaid of Gratitude, what was ſaid of diſ-intereſsment, that is, that it conſiſts very often outwardly; and that rarely it ſprings in the Heart of Man, unleſs Intereſt it ſelf gives it Birth, or make us not ſeek apearances, which happens ſometimes.

CHAP. VIII.

Wherein is continued to be ſhewn, that the Love of our ſelves, gives Birth to all our Movements.

THE lively and real Sentiment of a Good, which is granted us in the moment which we acquire it, never fails to produce a ſort of acknowledgment in our Heart, which wears away, by little and little, with the remembrance of the Favour which we have received, becauſe that the Heart has ſome repugnance to think often of things which puts us in a dependency; it is not ſo with the love of Favours we have done unto others, as it gives us ſome right over their Zeal, their Amity, and

and their Acknowledgment, that it ſubjects others to us; in a word, we think thereof with pleaſure, which makes us a great deal more bent to love them who are debtors to us, than thoſe to whom we are ſo our ſelves. Thoſe who likewiſe find the means of inſinuating themſelves into the favour of Great Men, in obliging them, deceive themſelves often enough in the thoughts which they have thereon.; for it is certain, that the way to be beloved, is not for to act ſo, that they ſhould have an obligation to you; but for to act ſo, that you ſhould have one for them: Their Pride, which increaſes by the complaiſance which other Men have for their Grandeur, applauds it ſelf for having done them good; it thinks with pleaſure, upon the obligations which you have for it, and diſpoſes thereby the Heart to love you: but it is dangerous to render too great ſervices, when one has no other deſign, but to inſinuate ones ſelf into the good Graces of thoſe we would oblige. I tremble, for the great Service, ſaid a Courtier to an Illuſtrious Man, to whom it was told, that he would never forget the obligation which he had for him. It often happens, that great Obligations hold the place of great Offences, and at leaſt that always happens, or then when they cannot,

not, or then when they will not acknowledge them.

Te le diray je Araſpe? il m'a trop bien ſervi
Augmentant mon pouvoir, il me la tout ravi.

Shall I tell the Araſp? He is kind to exceſs,
In augmenting my Power, he ſtill makes it leſs.

But althô the Heart hath its reaſons for to forget the Favours which it hath received, it has often others, for to make appear that it remembers. Gratitude is a Virtue very much eſteem'd. The appearances are fine, and attract the Conſideration; and a Heart accuſtomed to traffick in appearances of Virtue, to make a commerce of Vain Glory, at the expence of Sincerity, in ſeeking, not that which is eſtimable in it ſelf, but that which Men ordinarily eſteem, takes care not to fail of affecting acknowledgment, when it can ſurprize the eſteem of Men by that means. On the other ſide, Acknowledgments ſerve admirably to the ends of Intereſt, becauſe it draws new Favours; there is a pleaſure, ſay they, in obliging that Man, he is ſenſible of the good one does him; beſides that, by acknowledgment, we place our ſelves in ſome ſort above the Favour which we have received, when it is ready, active, and that it loves to make it ſelf highly known;

known; and it is a fine and delicate policy of a Self-Love enlightned, to ſhun the ſuſpicion of Ingratitude, becauſe that this Vice denotes Baſeneſs; and that it is like a homage forced, which we make unto our Benefactor: Ingratitude, which hath trouble to think of it, confeſſing in ſpight of it ſelf, that we are in its dependance, and that we owe it more than we are willing to owe it: It is again, a Sentiment, natural enough to Man, to ſhew that he merits the Favour that has been done him, by his deportment to his Benefactor. In fine, one is eaſie to be delivered of the remorſe which Ingratitude breeds in our Heart, Remorſe, greater, and more natural, than that which we have, for having failed of Juſtice; for let it be more againſt Reaſon not to be Juſt, as it is againſt Reaſon not to be Grateful; it is true, nevertheleſs, that it is more againſt the love of our ſelves, not to be Grateful, than not to be Juſt; and the reaſon is, without doubt, greater when it ſprings, not only from Reaſon, but likewiſe from the love of our ſelves, which hath been wounded.

Sympathy, which is the Fourth Spring which we have markt of our Affections, is of two Orders; there is one Sympathy of the Body, and another Sympathy of the

the Soul; we muſt look for the cauſe of the Firſt in the Conſtitution, and that of the Second, amongſt the ſecret Springs, which actuate our Heart. It is likewiſe certain, that that which we believe to be a Sympathy of Conſtitution, hath ſometimes its ſpring in the hidden Principles of our Heart; Why, think you, that I hate a Man at the firſt ſight, although he be unknown to me? it is becauſe he has ſome lines of a Man who has offended me, that thoſe Lines ſtrike my Soul, and awaken an Idea of hatred, without my making reflexion thereon? Why, on the contrary, Do I love a Perſon unknown to me, ſo ſoon as I ſee him, without informing my ſelf, if he have Merit, or if he have not; it is becauſe he hath either a conformity with me, or with my Children, or with my Friends, or, in a word, with ſome perſon whom I have loved, and that without my reflecting; this conformity awakes in my Heart an affection that was hidden there; you ſee then what part the love of our ſelves has in their myſterious and hidden inclinations, which one of our Poets deſcribes in this manner.

Il eſt de neuds ſecrets, il eſt des Simpaties.
Dont par le doux accord, les ames aſſorties, &c.

It is the ſecret knot of Sympathy,
That binds our Souls in friendly harmony.

But if after having ſpoken of corporal Sympathies, we ſhould enter into the deſcription of the Spiritual Sympathies, we ſhall know, that to love People by Sympathy, is but properly to cheriſh the reſemblance which they have with us; it is for to have the pleaſure of loving our ſelves in their Perſons; it is a charm to our Hearts, to be able to ſpeak good of our Selves, without wounding of Modeſty; it is an advantage which we obtained, when we appear to eſteem theſe People ſo much whom we lov'd, principally, becauſe they reſemble us; we love not only thoſe unto whom Nature hath given conformity with us, but more, thoſe who reſemble us by Art, and who endeavour to imitate us. *Favonius* imitates *Cato*, without *Cato*'s being angry, as Wiſe, and as auſtere as he is; and it may be, the Man in the World, the moſt celebrated for ſtiffneſs, and in complaiſance is weak enough, not to hate that miſguided manner, of flattering his Self-love and careſſing it. It is not, but that it may happen, that they

may hate thoſe who imitate them ill; no body would be ridiculous, they had rather be hateful; ſo that they never wiſh well to the Copies, which ridicule the Original.

That if it be askt here, why a brave Man does not always love a brave Man, and whence it comes, that a knowing Man renders not Juſtice always to another knowing Man; the anſwer is eaſie. It is, That a Reaſon of Conformity does not hold againſt a Reaſon of Jealouſie, and Intereſt, and that the Rivals hate each other proportionably, as they find good qualities. The Heart, as we have already ſaid, weighs the Utility, not the Light, and it is not reaſon, but love of our ſelves, which determines us in our Affections. We muſt not except out of this Rule, the love which we have for a Man of Virtue, of whom one may ſay, that thoſe who do not reſemble him nevertheleſs love him; for Vice renders in this reſpect forced homages to Virtue. They eſteem it. They reſpect it.

Qui pectore magno
Spem, metumque domas, vitio ſublimior omni
Exempus fatis, indignantemque refellis
Fortunam, dubio quem non in turbine rerum
Deprehendet ſuprema dies, ſed abire paratum
At plenum vita, &c.
Tu cujus placido poſuere in pectore ſedem
Blandus honos, hilariſq; tamen cum pondere virtus,
Stat. lib. 3. Sylv. *Cui nec pigra quies, nec iniqua potentia, nec ſpes*
Improba; ſed medius per honeſta & dulcia limes,
Incorrupte fidem, nullosq; experte tumultus
Et ſecrete palàm qui digeris ordine vitam,
Idem auri facilis contemptor & optimus idem
Condere divitias, opibusq; immittere lucem.
Hac longum florens animi, morumq; juventa
Iliacos æquare ſenes & vincere præſta.

Let Men examine themſelves by this Picture, I am ſure they cannot forbear loving and eſteeming the Original; and upon what Principles of Self-love can that Affection be grounded, which Men naturally have for thoſe whom they care not to reſemble?

I am ſure in the firſt place, that there are very few perſons who have renounced Virtue for ever; and who do not imagine to themſelves, that if they are not virtuous at one time, that they may become ſo at another. I add, that Virtue is eſſentially amiable unto the love of our ſelves; as Vice is eſſentially hateful to it; The reaſon is, That Vice is a Sacrifice which

we make of others to our ſelves, and Virtue a Sacrifice which we make of ſome pleaſure, or of ſome advantage which flatters us, or others. On the other hand, it is good to remark, that the Objects which act upon our Soul, have two ſorts of agreement with the Love of our ſelves, particular agreement, which do intereſs it, and lively affect it; ſuch is the agreement of Intereſt, or of reciprocal Amity; for as this reaſon of loving regards us, and regards none but us, that it is I that find the advantage in loving this Man, that it is I that love him, and not another; no one muſt wonder if this particular agreement obliges me to have a particular tye to him: but there are beſides that, general agreements, which an Object may have with our Heart, which happens, either when it doth us good, becauſe it doth to the ſociety of which we make part, or then when we feel our ſelves obliged by the general bent which a Man ſhews to do good, becauſe, that it is not impoſſible but that we may be the Object; or then when being accuſtomed to love a certain beneficence, which is that which doth us good in particular; we come likewiſe to love beneficence in general, and all thoſe unto whom we apply the Idea: We muſt only remark, that as the particular agree-

ments

ments do produce lively and ſtrong Affections, the general Agreements, as not intereſſing our Souls, but afar off produce but lukewarm and languiſhing Friendſhips, which hold a great deal more of the purity of Eſteem, than of the ardour of Affection. All the Virtues favour the love of our ſelves, at leaſt in this general manner. The fineſt Pictures that we can make of Virtue, are taken from the ſecret agreements which it hath with us: See, for example, theſe fine expreſſions in the Painter of Virtue, which we have here ſet down.

Cui nec pigra quies, nec iniqua potentia,
Nec ſpes improba———

Theſe lines of Virtue are amiable, becauſe they flatter the love of our ſelves. Behold here, what rather brings forth our Eſteem, than our Love, becauſe they are more diſintereſſed.

——Qui pectore magno,
Spem metumq; domas, vitio ſublimior omni.

Virtue, when it hath not that delicate agreement with the love of our ſelves, is eſtimable: but we make it more amiable, when we repreſent it, as intereſſing our

How ſhould we not love clemency? it is always ready to pardon us our faults. Liberality ſtrips it ſelf to do us good, Humility diſputes nothing with us, it gives way to our pretenſions; Temperance reſpects our Honour, and would not rob us of our pleaſures; Juſtice defends our Rights, and gives us that, which appertains to us; Courage defends us; Prudence guides us; Moderation ſpares us; Charity does us good, &c.

But if theſe Virtues do good, it is not to me that they do it. I grant it; but if you were in other circumſtances, they would do it to you: but they do ſuppoſe a diſpoſition of doing you good, if that ſhould happen Have you never found it thus, that although you have expected neither aſſiſtance nor protection from a rich perſon, you could not forbear having a ſecret Conſideration for him? which ſprings not from your Judgment, which deſpiſes often the qualities of that Man; but from the love of your ſelf, which makes you reſpect in him, even the ſingle power of doing you good? That if the love of your ſelf makes you conſider a Man, of whom you are aſſured you ſhall never receive good, only becauſe you conſider in him, the power he has to do it; is it to be wondred at,

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that this ſame Principle ſhould make you love a Man, who by his Virtue is diſpoſed to do you good, although you know very well, that he has not the power?

Let us ſay then, that the Heart has its Abſtractions as well as the Judgment, and as the latter knows how to define good in general, although it forms more lively in our imagination a particular good; the Heart loves likewiſe theſe general agreements, which the Objects have with it, although it be infinitely more toucht by particular agreements, and that it cannot but have a liking to a Man's being virtuous, becauſe of thoſe delicate Relations, which Virtue hath with the love of our ſelves. That which makes it plain, is, that you find that you love the Virtues more, proportionably as you find therein more relation and agreement with your Self: we love Clemency naturally more than Severity, Liberality more than œconomy, although all this be Virtue: that could not happen, unleſs it were from this, that our Affection is not entirely diſintereſſed, and that we love in it, the ſecret Relations which it hath with us.

Beſides, we muſt not except out of the number of thoſe who ſo love the Virtues People that are vicious and irregular. On the contrary, it is certain, that for that

very reaſon that they are vicious, they ought to find Virtue the more amiable. Humility levels the way to our Pride, it is then beloved of a proud Man. Liberality gives, then it cannot diſpleaſe an intereſſed Man. Temperance leaves you in poſſeſſion of your pleaſures, it cannot be diſagreeable then to one who is voluptuous, who would have no Competitor or Rival. Would one have believed, that the Affection which the Men of the World ſeem to have for virtuous People, ſhould have ſo bad a ſpring, and would they pardon me this Paradox, if I affirm that it happens often, that the Vices which are within us, cauſe the love which we have for the Virtues of others?

I go yet much further, and I dare ſay, that the love of our Selves, has a great part in the moſt purified Sentiments which Morality and Religion gives us of God. They diſtinguiſh three ſorts of Divine Love, a Love of Intereſt, a Love of Acknowledgment, and a Love of pure Amity: The Love of Intereſt is confounded with the Love of our Selves, according to the Rules which all the World has thereof; The Love of Acknowledgment has ſtill the ſame ſpring as that of Intereſt, accordingly as we have mention'd before; The Love of pure Amity ſeems to ſpring inde-

independently from all Intereſt, and from all love of our Selves. Nevertheleſs, if you look upon it near, you will find, that there is in the bottom the ſame Principle as in the others, for Firſt, it is remarkable, that the love of pure Amity doth not ſpring all of a ſuddain in a Man acquainted with Religion. The Firſt Degree of our Sanctification, is to diſingage ones ſelf from the World. The Second is, to love God with a love of Intereſt, in giving unto him all our endearments, becauſe we conſider him as the Soveraign good. The Third is, to have for his Benefits the acknowledgment which is due to them; and the laſt, in fine, is to love his Perfections. It is certain, that the Firſt of theſe Sentiments diſpoſe to the Second; the Second to the Third; the Third to the Fourth. One can hardly conſider as one ought, the horrid miſery which there is in abandoning God, without deſiring his Communion, by the motives taken from our own Intereſt: A Man cannot love God as the principle of his Joy, and of his Felicity, without being ſenſible of acknowledgment for the Good which he has received from him. It is natural, and as it were neceſſary, that he that loves God as his Soveraign Good, and as his Great and Eternal Benefactor, ſhould apply

apply himſelf with pleaſure, to conſider his adorable perfections, that this Meditation ſhould afford him Joy; and that thereby he ſhould come for to love God in reſpect of his Virtues. Then, as all that which diſpoſes unto this laſt movement, which is the moſt Noble of all, is taken from the love of our Selves; it follows, that the pure Amity, of which God himſelf is the object, ſprings not altogether independently of this latter. On the other hand, experience informs us, that amongſt the Virtues of God, we love particularly thoſe which have the moſt agreement with us; we love his Clemency more than his Juſtice; his Bounty than his Jealouſie; his Beneficence than his Immenſity; Whence comes this? unleſs it be that this pure Amity, which ſeems to have for its Objects, but the perfections of God, draws its principal force from the relations which thoſe perfections have with us.

If there were a pure Amity in our Heart, in reſpect of God, which were entirely exempt from the commerce of the love of our ſelves; this pure Amity would ſpring neceſſarily from the known Perfection, and would not riſe from our other Affections. As it ſhould not be the love of our Selves which ſhould make it ſpring,

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it ſhould not be the Love of our Selves which ſhould make it die.

Nevertheleſs the Devil knows the Perfections of God without loving him, Men know the Virtues of God before their Converſion; and no one dare ſay in this ſtate, that he has this Affection for him, which is called Pure Amity: It follows then, that there muſt be ſomething elſe beſide the known Perfection for to produce this Love; that if there were required any thing elſe than Light, there muſt be then ſome Affection of our Heart, becauſe that in our Souls there is nothing but Affections and Knowledges.

They will ſay, perhaps, that to the end a Soul may be capable of conceiving this Love of pure Amity, it need not be that Self-love ſhould produce it, but that Self-love ſhould not oppoſe it; but if pure Amity do ſpring from the known Perfection, and if there want nothing elſe abſolutely but that to produce it, the oppoſition of the Love of our Selves is uſeleſs, as the Love of our Selves cannot hinder God from having Perfections, and thoſe Perfections from being known to our Soul, it can likewiſe do nothing for to hinder the Birth of that pure Affection.

Whilſt we look upon God as our Judge, and as a terrible Judge, who expects us

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with Thunder in his hand, we can admire his infinite Perfections, but we cannot conceive an Affection for them. It is very certain, that if we could refuſe God this Admiration, we ſhould take care not to give it him; for in this State wherein we look upon him as our Enemy, we give him but that which we cannot refuſe him. And whence comes this neceſſity of admiring God? It is that this Admiration ſprings only from the known Perfection. If then you conceive that pure Amity has preciſely the ſame Spring as Admiration; that is to ſay, that it is the known Perfection, and nothing but that which produces it; it follows that, as Admiration, pure Amity will ſpring in our Soul, without the Love of our Selves being able to hinder it.

It would ſerve for nothing to anſwer at random, that it is the Corruption of our Heart which makes us not capable of loving God, purely for the Love of Himſelf, when we ſuppoſe that he loves not us; it is to throw ones Self into Generalities for to avoid diſtinct Ideas of Things; for as Corruption hinders not the Admiration of our Soul, it being certain that the Devils, who are more wicked than we, admire God ſtill, though they know themſelves the Objects of his Hate;

Hate; this Corruption ought not to hinder the pure Amity, if, as the Admiration, the pure Amity ſprings from the known Perfection.

Nothing more confirms this Truth, than to ſee of what uſe Faith is in Religion, whilſt Men live in Ignorance, which makes them imagine, that God looks upon them indifferently, and that he cares not for them; they ſeem likewiſe to have but indifferent Sentiments for the Divinity, ſuch were the Philoſophers of *Paganiſm*; whilſt Men did believe themſelves the Object of the Hatred of God, they hated horribly the Divinity: The *Romans*, who had already lighted the Fire of their Sacrifices for to render Thanks unto their Gods upon the falſe News of the recovery of *Germanicus*, run with fury into their Temples; ſo ſoon as they have the too true News of his Death, they drag their Idols in the Dirt, they caſt them into *Tiber*, and ſignalize their Mourning by their Impiety. All Men ſeem to be of a diſpoſition; that which the *Romans* were outwardly, and the Violence which theſe committed upon their Idols, is an Expreſſion of that which Man would exerciſe againſt God, then when he thinks him his Enemy. When the Goſpel ſounded in the World for the Conſolation thereof, through which do

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ſhine the Teſtimonies of the Love which God has for Human Kind, then likewiſe was ſeen the ardent Love which Men have for God ſparkling in all places; the Faith which perſwades the Hearts of this immenſe Charity of God, is for that reaſon look'd upon as the Key of our Heart, and the firſt Degree of our Sanctification; it is unto that which the Scripture attributes our Salvation, becauſe we need only be perſwaded by Faith of the Love which God has for us, for to feel ones ſelf diſ. diſpoſed to love God.

Beſides, one may ſay, that as our Affections eſſentially riſe from the Love of our Selves; our Hatred depends likewiſe thereon. We hate others by Intereſt, when they are our Competitors in the ſearch after the Goods of this World. We hate the Intemperate, who diſputes with us our Pleaſures; the Ambitious, who would get before us in the way of Advancement; the Proud, who deſpiſes us, and tramples us under his Feet; the Covetous, who locks up the Riches which might come to our hands; the Unjuſt, who oppreſs us. We do not only hate thoſe who thus actually wrong us, but likewiſe thoſe who have an inclination thereunto, although the want of Occaſion, or other Reaſons, may hinder them from exerciſing it; we hate even the

the Power that they have of doing us any. This is that which makes Power and Authority generally attract Sentiments of Averſion; and as there are very few People who do not meet on their way, either thoſe who prejudice them in effect, or thoſe who have the deſign to do it, or others, who would do it if they were able, or that it might be for their Profit; it muſt be granted, that there enters perpetually ſecret Motives of Envy into our Hearts, and that nothing is more dangerous, than the Temptations unto which we are expoſed in this reſpect. So likewiſe may it be ſaid, that we are very often Enemies one of another, without knowing any thing thereof. We hate ſometimes, and love one and the ſame Perſon, becauſe that the Love of our Selves conſiders him in different reſpects. It happens likewiſe, that we hate thoſe of whom we think our ſelves the beſt beloved, and ſometimes thoſe whom we ſhould have all the reaſon in the World for to love. That which makes this appear, is, that there is always in the Diſgraces which befalls them, ſomething which does not diſpleaſe us. This unjuſt and unnatural Sentiment which we hide from our Selves by Pride, comes from theſe two Principles; from that we are not the Object of

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this Diſgrace, a Reflexion which the Love of our Selves makes in an inſtant; and becauſe that we ſee thereby a Man abaſed, who being a Man, cannot fail of being our Rival, and our Competitor, in ſome reſpect or other; a Sentiment which changes it ſelf into Compaſſion, then when Death or ſome Diſgrace without return excludes this Man for ever the Rank of thoſe, who pretend to rival us in our Indearments

As to the reſt, Hatred is a turbulent Paſſion, which agitates the Soul violently, and all whoſe Effects are ſo ſenſible, that that there is not a more faithful Looking-glaſs than it, for to know the degree of Vehemence which is in our Affections. Would you know how much you love Vain-Glory, (for it may be your Heart deceives you in that reſpect) you need only conſider the violence of the Hatred that you have conceived for a Man, who has offended you in your Honour; therein is the Degree, and the Meaſure. You ſhall never find any thing ſo faithful as this Looking-glaſs, for to diſcover the bottom of your Heart.

We hate by Intereſt, Perſons, Things, and Words; if we tremble with Horror and Fear, in ſeeing an Abyſs under our Feet, it is the Image of our Loſs which ſhews it

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ſelf, which cauſes this Apprehenſion; and Reaſon is too weak for to correct a Fright, which a too lively Idea of our Deſtruction forms in us.

There are many People who cannot ſee Human Blood ſpilt without ſwooning; that is rather a Weakneſs of Conſtitution, than a Weakneſs of Heart. Every thing that ſhews them the Ruines of Human Nature, threatens their Self-love; and it is that in bloodying their Imagination, makes Death enter lively in their Soul, and admits it by Sentiment there, where they refuſed to receive it by Reflexion.

CHAP. IX.

Wherein are conſidered, the moſt general Inclinations of the Love of our Selves, and firſt of the deſire of Happineſs.

THE firſt inclination of this Love of our Selves, is the deſiring to be happy. I do not know likewiſe, whether thoſe two Expreſſions don't ſignifie at the bottom the ſame thing under two Ideas; for what is it to love ones Self, if it be not to wiſh to be happy? And what is it to wiſh to be happy; if it be not to love

ones Self? In truth, a Man muſt love very much to ſubtilize Things for to find any difference therein. As then the deſire of Man to be happy cannot be too great, and that it has always been imputed as a Crime to Man to ſeek a falſe Felicity, and not for to love with too much Ardour the true Happineſs; it follows, that we are to blame in loving our Selves ill, and not in loving our Selves with exceſs.

Men, whatever they ſay, agree in the Idea, in the Deſire, and in the Sentiment of Felicity, when they conſider it in general.

The diverſity of Sentiments of Philoſophers upon the Nature of Happineſs, is not at the bottom ſo great as it at firſt appeared; their Opinion is reduced to that of *Epicurus*, who made Felicity eſſentially conſiſt in Pleaſure; which will appear very reaſonable to you, provided you ſeparate a pure, noble, delicate, durable, and ſecured Pleaſure, from the Voluptuouſneſs of Senſe, which has Characters quite oppoſite to thoſe; and that you diſtinguiſh between Happineſs, and its Foundations, which Men have been pleaſed to confound, to have the Pleaſure of contradicting Themſelves under the favour of a Miſtake. For when *Boëtius* defines Felicity, the Abſence of all the Evils, and the Poſ-

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ſeſſion of all the Goods, you muſt remark, that he defines intire and perfect Felicity, and not an incompleat and defectuous Happineſs; and that beſides, it is the defining of Felicity by its Foundations. The abſence of Evils is neceſſary for to hinder us from being miſerable, but it is not it which makes us happy; the Poſſeſſion of Goods is the Foundation of our Happineſs, but it is not the Happineſs it ſelf; for what would this be, if having them in our power we had not the ſenſe thereof? The Fool of *Athens*, who thought, that all the Ships that arrived in the Haven belonged unto him, taſted the Happineſs of Riches without poſſeſſing them; and it may be they, to whom thoſe Ships did really belong, poſſeſſed them without having Pleaſure, poiſoned by their inſatiable Vitiouſneſs, or afflicted by the Inquietudes which infallibly accompany the poſſeſſion of Temporal Goods; it is not then to ſpeak generally the Poſſeſſion, but the Sentiment of the Goods which we poſſeſs, which makes our Happineſs.

Thus when *Ariſtotle* makes Felicity to conſiſt in the Knowledge and in the Love of the Sovereign Good, he apparently underſtood the defining of Happineſs by its Foundations; otherwiſe he would have been groſly deceived, becauſe if you ſepa-

rate the pleaſure from this knowledge, and this love, you will find that you muſt have ſomething elſe to be happy; that on the contrary, if by Thought you joyn a lively and durable grief unto that knowledge, and unto that love; you conceive that we ſhall not ceaſe being miſerable.

The Stoicks, who thought that Happineſs conſiſted in the poſſeſſion of Wiſdom, have not been ſo ſenſleſs as to imagine that they ſhould ſeparate from the Idea of Happineſs the ſatisfaction which that Wiſdom inſpired in them: their Joy came from the intoxication of their Soul, which applauded it ſelf for a conſtancy, which it had not.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoſcere cauſas,
Atq; metus omnes & inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, ſtrepitumq; Achercutis avari.

All Men in general neceſſarily agree on this Principle, and I know not why the School ſhould make them differ on this accompt. The Covetous Man feeds himſelf but with the hopes of enjoying his Riches; that is to ſay, to be ſenſible of the pleaſure, which there is in poſſeſſing them; it is true, he doth not uſe them: but 'tis his pleaſure to lock them up, this is to him the poſſeſſing of them. The Ambitious ſeeks

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not Dignities, but for the pleaſure of being elevated above others: and the revengeful would not avenge himſelf, if he did not hope for to find his ſatisfaction therein. This Maxim muſt not be oppoſed, which is certainly, the Morality, and the Religion of *Jeſus Chriſt*; for *Jeſus Chriſt* is not come for to annihilate Nature, but for to perfect it: He does not make us renounce the love of Pleaſure, but he propoſes more pure Pleaſures to us, more Noble, more Spiritual, more Aſſured, more Durable, than thoſe which the World promiſed us: and when he defines Happineſs; (*This is Life Eternal, to know thee the only true God, and him whom thou haſt ſent* Jeſus Chriſt.) He defines Happineſs by its ſprings; for otherwiſe he knows very well, that Happineſs eſſentially conſiſts in ineffable Joy and Pleaſures; for it is a Feaſt, a new Wine, a river of Delights, torrents of Peace and Joy, *&c.* Expreſſions which under the Emblems of Temporal Pleaſures, makes us comprehend the Eternal Pleaſures of Paradiſe.

The Idea which Men have of Happineſs, comes aſſuredly from the Sentiment which Men have of Pleaſure; the vitious ſeek the Pleaſures of Intemperance, thoſe of Vain-glory, thoſe of Revenge, and thoſe of Ambition: A virtuous Man on

the contrary, ſeeks the pleaſures of Virtue, as the pleaſures of Moderation, thoſe of Beneficence, thoſe of Temperance, thoſe of Conſcience, and of Piety.

A Man who ſhould pretend ſo to dry up Virtue, that he ſhould have there in no ſentiment of Joy and Pleaſure, would certainly do nothing but diſcourage our Hearts; and Virtue would have our Eſteem, without having our Affection.

I grant, that one and the ſame pleaſure does not pleaſe all, ſome are for groſs Pleaſures, others for delicate Pleaſures; ſome are for a lively Pleaſure, others are for a durable Pleaſure; Some for the pleaſure of Sence, and others for the pleaſures of the Mind; Some for the pleaſure of Sentiment, and others for the pleaſure of Reflexion: but all without exception are for pleaſure.

Let us ſay likewiſe, that all Men agree in the general Deſire, which they have of being happy; they may renounce all their Affections: but they will never renounce this Inclination, which is the ſpring of the others. It is Happineſs which the Poor and the Rich aim at, the Young and the Old, the Covetous and the Liberal, the Temperate and the Voluptuous; and this Happineſs is the pleaſure which is in their Idea; pleaſure which diverſifies in an infi-

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nite number of ways; cauſes likewiſe the prodigious variety of our Paſſions, and of our Affections. The irregularity conſiſts in this, That Men would be ſenſible of the Happineſs before they acquire it; they wait not for Reaſon, who ſhould direct them to be happy; they begin by *they Will* to poſſeſs; that is to ſay, that nothing contents but the pleaſure which they actually feel.

Non eſt, crede mihi, ſapientis dicere vivam:
Sera nimis vita eſt craſtina, vive hodie.
Martial. lib 1. Epig.

It is not to be wondred at, that Men elevated in Paganiſm, ſhould not have known any other good than the preſent; and that they ſhould have counſell'd Men to haſten to taſte the pleaſure which preſents it ſelf, for fear of looſing it, by differing it: but it is ſomething aſtoniſhing, that thoſe who know Eternity, ſhould be capable of the ſame irregularity.

Pleaſure for to compoſe our Happineſs ought to have other Characters, it ought firſt to be Spiritual; a Man who taſts pleaſure in the Body, can he be happy, if his Soul be fill'd in the ſame moment with remorſe, with fear, and with ſadneſs? In the Second place, it ought to be durable: the

momentary pleaſures are more proper to make us miſerable, than to make us happy, becauſe, that the ſenſe thereof indures but a ſhort time, and that it leaves us a durable regret.

And certainly durance is ſo eſſential to the Happineſs of Man, that I dare ſay, that the felicity of Paradiſe it ſelf would be but a ſmall thing, if it ſhould be poſſible that it ſhould laſt but an inſtant, and that the felicity of the World ſhould be ſomething, if it were poſſible that it ſhould endure always: For the Firſt, as great as it is, would be all drunk up by the gaſtly Thought that we are going about to loſe that which gives us an infinite Joy. The Second would be ſuſtain'd by a hope which heaping an infinite number of Ages, would make us find in the durance of the Goods, that which they could not find in their Quality.

Mart. 10. lib. Epig.

Res non parta labore, ſed relicta,
Non ingratus ager, focus perennis,
Lis nunquam, toga rara, mens quieta,
Vires ingenuæ, ſalubre corpus,
Prudens ſimplicitas, pares amici,
Convictus facilis, ſine arte menſa,
Nox non ebria ſed ſoluta curis,
Non triſtis torus attamen pudicus,
Somnus qui faciat breves tenebras,

Quod

Quod ſis, eſſe velis, nihilq; malis,
Summum nec metuas diem, nec optes.

But although this definition of Felicity appear ſo reaſonable, that it ſeems to be dictated by the mouth of Wiſdom it ſelf, nevertheleſs, there needs but an indifferent knowledge of the Heart of Man, and of the natural ſtate of his condition, for to ſee that it ſins in very many reſpects.

Firſt, it is compoſed of Goods, which for the greateſt part are not in our power, ſuch are, (*res non parta labore, ſed relicta; non ingratus ager, focus perennis, lis nunquam, vires ingenuæ, ſalubre corpus, ſomnus qui faciat breues umbras.*) for no body can give Good to himſelf, and make that Good come to him from Father to Son, nor make his Fields fertile, nor avoid having ſome difference with unjuſt Perſons; and it depends not upon us to ſleep well, nor to have a Body healthful and vigorous; and nevertheleſs, it ſeems that Nature it ſelf inſtructs us, that it depends in ſome manner on us to render our ſelves happy: for why ſhould it ingrave in the Soul of all Men the deſire of Happineſs, if it were not capable of arriving at the end? But in that Men deceive themſelves, by not underſtanding a double Language which Nature ſpeaks to them in that reſpect;

reſpect; for on the one ſide, in making them ſee that they are deprived of ſo many Goods which they naturally deſire, which are not in their power; it tells them very clearly, that Happineſs is not in themſelves: And on the other ſide, in inſpiring them with the deſire of Happineſs ſo naturally, that they never quit it, in whatſoever eſtate they find themſelves, it teaches them that they may nevertheleſs obtain it. But for to come back to our Poet, I will add, that this deſcription of Felicity, is not compoſed of Objects Noble enough. Certainly it wants but little of agreeing with Beaſts, of whom may be ſaid, without miſtake, that their Goods are the Goods of Succeſſion, and not of Riches, acquired by a great deal of pains; that the Earth is very fruitful for them, that they want not Cloaths which are convenient for them, and made by the hand of Nature; that Strength, Health and Sleep, doth not fail them, that their Simplicity is Prudent, and that more they appear not capable of Reflexions, they are ſeen very ready, and very wiſe in the ſphere of Objects, which they ought to know for their Intereſt, that is to ſay, for their Propagation, or for their Conſervation, that their Life is ſweet and quiet, that they live without jangling and inquietude; that their

Pleaſures

Pleaſures are not mixt with Suſpitions and Jealouſies, that Law-Suits never torment them; and that which is moſt conſiderable, that they are content with their State, and that they neither deſire, or fear Death. Beaſts then enjoy, very near, the Felicity which they repreſent us as the moſt perfect of all; and what then is it for us, ſo great a miſery, to be born capable of Reaſon, that the Quality of reaſonable, hinders us from pretending to that of Happy; that the degree of our Perfection ſhould make the degree of our Miſery, that the Beaſts ſhould be happy not to be Men, and that the Men ſhould be miſerable not to be Beaſts? Certainly there is no likelyhood it ſhould be ſo; Nature is too wiſe in all other things, to be ſo little in this, and unleſs that Men will degrade themſelves, and undertake to brand the excellency of their Nature, they muſt agree that there is a Sovereign Good, which may be found, and which deceives not our Deſires: but which is not found in the objects of this Life, which always deceive our Deſires.

We muſt add ſtill, that the fineſt Lines of this Deſcription, which the Poets make of the Felicity of Men, are contradictory. For if a Man be happy even unto the point of being ſatisfied with his State

State, and not desire a better, how can he not bear Death, which is the fatal Term of that Felicity? And if that which he quits by his Death is so small a Thing, that he neither desires or fears to die, how is it that he can be satisfied with his Condition? That Man spoke very much at his ease. He seems to say nothing neither in these Verses:

Quod sis esse velis, nihilque malis,
Summum nec metuas diem, nec optes.

That is, the Philosopher's Stone in morality, which is a Man that is content with his Condition, and who fears not Death. Besides, that these Ideas destroy themselves, they annihilate the Nature of Man, who loves himself necessariiy, and who loves himself without bounds, as we have already seen. He loves not Happiness with mediocrity, and by consequence he cannot be contented until he has obtained the infinite Good. He fears Misery most sovereignly, and by consequence he cannot cease fearing until he shall be assured of his Immortality.

It is certain besides, that one of the greatest Defects of the Felicity that Man seeks after, or of that Pleasure after which he runs with so much Ardour, is, that it is

is certain in its Foundations; it depends on a thouſand Cauſes which are not in your power to procure, or to take from it. What Reliance can you have upon the health of a Body, which every thing threatens with ruin; and what tranquillity can you have in that regard, if its death is every where found, in the nouriſhments which makes it live, in the Air, which it breaths; in the breath of one ſick which it beholdeth, in an Inſect which pricks it, in an infinity of ſecret Cauſes, which we can neither prevent nor ſhun? Who ſhall aſſure me of the poſſeſſions of my Riches? Who ſhall be anſwerable to me for the Conſervations of the Perſons who are agreeable to me? Who is it that ſhall cover me and mine, from the accidents ſo ordinary in Society?

The Fourth fault of this Human Felicity, is, that not only it is corruptible, but likewiſe momentary; it laſts not ſo long as our lives, it wants a great deal; Sleep, during which we are without Sentiment, carries away a good part; it doth not ſubſiſt ſo long a time as this halfe of our life, which we paſs in waking and in reflexion; for we are not always employed in taſting of Pleaſure: I will ſay much more, it endures not ſo long as the preſence of the Object, which gave it breath.

Pleaſure

Pleaſure endures not but in this paſſage, which laſts ſo little from Privation to Enjoyment. There is ſome joy in acquiring, but this Pleaſure is loſt, ſo ſoon as it is acquired. The greateſt Goods in the World, when they have been poſſeſt two Days, do hardly affect us; it ſeems that Felicity in this regard, conſiſts not but in the ſatisfaction of Deſire, which neither renders you happy when it lives, or when it dies: But in the inſtant that it expires, Nature ſo wiſe in all things, would inſtruct us, that this Good ought not to be neglected, becauſe that ſhe has affixt Joy to the Acquiſition; but it would inſtruct us, that this Good ought not to ſatisfie our Soul, becauſe that theſe pleaſures vaniſh, almoſt as ſoon as we begin to be ſenſible of them. The Fifth defect of the Felicity Men reach after, conſiſts in this, that their Happineſs is always mixt with miſery; they have no Good which is not accompanied with Bitterneſs.

Impia ſub dulci melle venena latent.
Ovid. lib. 7. metam.

I know not likewiſe how it happens, that the proportion of Goods, which are annext to a condition, is the proportion of Evils which will follow it.

Ut

Ut rebus latis par ſit menſura malorum.
Idem. Lib. 1. Eleg.

In fine, the laſt is, that this Felicity fills not our Soul; it anſwers not the Affection with which we have deſired the Temporal Goods; So that finding an extream diſproportion between the good which we have acquired, and the ardour with which we have deſired it; we find our ſelves in ſome ſort famiſht in the middle of Plenty.

Although the Love of our Selves, loves not to conſider all the things, which may ſhew it the vanity of its ties; it is certain, nevertheleſs that it interviews all the defaults in the Felicity which it purſues: it feels that the pleaſure of Sence is rather the Felicity of Beaſts than of Men; it agrees that Happineſs to be ſolid muſt be durable, it does not deny that an aſſured Happineſs is not preferable to a Felicity, which is uncertain in its foundation. It is ſenſible that to be happy, Man muſt be able to fix this tranſitory Pleaſure, which is not found but in the inſtant of the Acquiſition. It agrees that true Felicity ought to fill our Souls.

Right Reaſon requires, that it ſhould ſeek other ſprings of Felicity; but preſent

Pleaſure

pleaſure which intereſſeth it, and which ſeduceth the Underſtanding, and fixing it unto that which is agreeable, rather than that which is true, ſuffers it not to take this way; his own illuſions ſerve him here at their Table, they come and take the place of Qualities which the Object wants, not being able to make in the World a Felicity which might ſatisfie his Reaſon: Man makes himſelf in this reſpect a Reaſon which ſatisfies his pleaſure. The Judgment pre-poſſeſt gives unto them falſe Goods, a character which they have not in themſelves; and it is here above all, that we muſt admire the prodigious aſcendant which the Heart has over the Judgment; for it is nothing to diſguiſe the abſtracted and ſpeculative troubles: But to diſguiſe the troubles of Sentiment and Experience: it is that which ſhews us better than all other things, the force of our corruption; and it is that we ſhall ſee, in unfolding the moſt hidden Myſteries of this Self Love.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Wherein are conſider'd the Illuſions which Self-Love frames, for to correct the defects which it finds in the Happineſs it ſeeks after.

SElf-Love being ſenſible that the Worldly Felicity is too groſs for to ſatisfie our Judgment, and in effect a Happineſs which none but the Body feels, ought not to ſatisfie our Soul; it ſeeks for to Spiritualize the corporal Pleaſures for to deceive us, in ſhowing us, that they ſatisfie equally the Soul and the Body. Therefore Self-Love has affixt unto this groſs and carnal Felicity the delicateneſs of Sentiment, the eſteem of the Judgment, and ſometimes the Duties themſelves of Religion, in conceiving them Spiritual, Glorious and Sacred.

For the Firſt, who would not be aſtoniſh'd to ſee the prodigious number of Thoughts, of Sentiments, of Fictions, of Writings, of Hiſtories, which the voluptuouſneſs of Senſe has invented. Gather together all the Books which were ever

made upon Morality, which is the Science of Well-living, and compare them with thoſe which have been made upon the pleaſures of Intemperance, and the Actions which depend thereon. You will find that there is no compariſon to be made between the one and the other. To conſider theſe Actions under their natural form, they have a baſeneſs which rebukes our Pride, which conſiſts in the Abject and vile Conformity which they give us with other Animals. What muſt be done for to elevate them, and to render them worthy of Man? One muſt Spiritualize them, to make them an object for the nicety of the Judgment, to make them a matter of fine Sentiments, to invent thereupon the Plays of Imagination, to turn them agreeably by Eloquence and Poetry; and in fine to employ Eternally all the Faculties and all the Lights of the reaſonable Soul, to make the pleaſures agreeable unto a proud Soul, which a voluptuous Body has taſted. I ſpeak here according to the prejudice of the Vulgar; for the Body in it ſelf has no Sentiment. It is for that, that Self-Love has ſtill fixt eſteem to the moſt ſhameful abaſements of Human Nature. Pride and Voluptuouſneſs are two Paſſions which notwithſtanding they come from the ſame Spring, which is Self-Love, nevertheleſs, have

have ſomething of oppoſition. Voluptuouſneſs makes us deſcend, whereas Pride would elevate us. The Firſt makes us bear the Image of Beaſts, and the Second the Image of the Devil; ſo theſe two Paſſions oppoſe each other often in our Heart; but this combat cannot be agreeable to a Heart which would preſerve the one and the other, and which is almoſt equally ſenſible of Pleaſure and of Glory; it muſt make them agree, and for that it makes of two things one, either it tranſports the Voluptuouſneſs into the Pride, or it tranſports the Pride into the Voluptuouſneſs, if I may expreſs my ſelf in that manner. Renouncing the pleaſure of Senſe, it will ſeek a greater pleaſure in acquiring Eſteem; ſo that we find here voluptuouſneſs indemnified; or taking the reſolution to ſatisfie it ſelf by the pleaſure of Sence, it affixes Eſteem unto Voluptuouſneſs; ſo that therein we ſee Pride comforted for its loſſes.

If there was but one only Man of this diſpoſition, he would not eaſily ſucceed in his deſign: but the miſery is, Men are alike, and they underſtand one another; and as they have alike inclination, they agree without difficulty to conſecrate it.

It is a Ragoo for Pleaſure, which makes it a great deal more exquiſite than Glory, that the irregular imagination of Men has faſten'd to it: but the reaſoning is ſtill much better, than when this pleaſure is lookt on as a pleaſure which Religion ordains. A debaucht Woman who could perſwade in the time of Paganiſm, that ſhe fulfill'd the inclination of a God, found the pleaſures of Intemperance much more ſenſible; and a Religious Man who diverts himſelf, or who avengeth himſelf under Sacred pretences, finds in the voluptuouſneſs a Salt more pricking and more agreeable than Voluptuouſneſs it ſelf.

So one may diſtinguiſh Two Parts in the Human Felicity of which we ſpeak, a groſs and ſenſible part which is as the Body; and a part more free and delicate, which we will call its Spirit. It is certain, that as all the Sentiments of Pleaſure and Joy which we have in the World, increaſes the Body of this Felicity; all the illuſions which Self-Love frames upon this Subject, for to make it appear either Reaſonable or Glorious, or Sacred; all the falſe diſcourſes of Men, who ſpeak Eternally of the Objects of their Deſires, all the bad Ideas of Education, which in this reſpect deceive us, after an infinite number of manners; all the bad Lectures, all the

Studies

Studies which go out of the way of Piety, a thouſand Prejudices, a thouſand Maxims falſly eſtabliſht, ſerve for to augment it to the Judgment, and to make this vain Felicity enter into the higheſt part of our Soul by Eſteem, as it had already enter'd into the loweſt by Sentiment.

It is thus, that Self-Love takes its meaſures againſt the firſt Defect which it interviews in its pretended Felicity. But it is not in that alone that it finds it defective; it is ſtill ſo mixt, that it renders us rather miſerable than happy, and it is in this that Self-Love delights to delude it ſelf. For aprehending that the ſtrong attention which we make upon the defects of the Goods of the World, upon the Incommodities and Miſeries which accompany them, may diſabuſe us in that reſpect, it turns away our Conſideration from all that which is the moſt capable of making us ſenſible of this Miſery, which accompanies the Goods of the World, the thing is a little difficult; For how ſhall we place our ſelves above the proof of Sentiment? but that hinders us not from ſucceeding by the extream deſire we have of deceiving our Selves agreeably.

For to comprehend that well, one muſt know, that at the preſent how ſweet ſoever it may appear to us, and whatever inclinations we may have to ſacrifice all for it, it appears nevertheleſs too ſhort, and too much bounded to a Soul, which loves to extend and agrandize it ſelf by imagination, it almoſt cauſes *the Paſt* and *to Come* to enter into the Idea of our condition; not *the Paſt* and *to Come*, ſuch as they are in Truth; but *the Paſt* and *to Come*, ſuch as our Soul would wiſh them. Our State appears to us then a maſs of Goods, which follow us, and goes before us. By remembrance of the pleaſures that we have had, we render the *Paſt preſent* to us, and by the Idea of the Goods which we hope to have in the World, we anticipate what's *To come*. If we ſhould carry a right view upon all their differences of time, we ſhould find in the *Paſt*, that which we find in the *Preſent*, that is to ſay, Goods mixt with a great deal of bitterneſs; for the Good which we have poſſeſſed, has not been more pure than that which we poſſeſs, and that which we ſhall poſſeſs, is not different from that which we have poſſeſt: But as the Soul loves not to think but on that which pleaſeth it, it happens that it retains the Ideas of Good which it has poſſeſt, becauſe theſe Ideas are agreeable, and

that

that it loſes the Idea's of Evil, which hath been mixt with that Good, becauſe that thoſe Idea's have ſomething grievous, unleſs that the Evil Paſt be to us yet as a Good, becauſe that we are deliver'd from it; it forms likewiſe an agreeable Idea in our Judgment, in regard of what's to come; we know it not but by Hope, then Hope has the Good for its Object, and not at all the Evil. The *Paſt* and to *Come*, one whereof is no more, and the other is not yet, holding a great ſpace in our imagination, and preſenting themſelves always with that they have agreeable, and never with that which they have of grievous; one muſt not wonder, if a ſhining Idea of our Happineſs form it ſelf little by little, which is very difficult to be deſtroyed by the Sentiment of our Miſery. Our paſt Joys ſubſiſt ſtill. The applauſes wherewith our Merit has been recompenc'd, appear to us really Preſent, becauſe that Pride hath livelyly painted them in our imagination. And what would this be, if we could add ſuch advantages as we have not yet, unto thoſe we already poſſeſs; and if we ſhould obtain the fortune of thoſe who are the object of our Envy? So by a Second irregularity of our imagination, which hath the ſame ſpring as the firſt, we form to our ſelves an Idea of thoſe

Goods, which being in the power of another Man, are become the objects of our Deſires, an agreeable and flattering Idea, becauſe we ſee that which they have of gliſtering, and that we cannot ſee all the pains that accompany them. So that the Idea of our State, and the Idea of the State of other Men; the agreeable Images of what is paſt; a thouſand hopes which have for their certain Object the Incertitudes of what is to come, ſtriking our Minds inceſſantly; whereas the Evils which are to come, are not felt but from time to time; it is no wonder if the Soul grows intoxicated, and if a thouſand experiences cannot bring it back from its illuſions. This blindneſs goes ſo far as to dare ſometimes to look upon this Felicity of Fleſh and Blood, as having ſecured Foundations. We have a proof of this Truth in the Language of that Man, whom the Son of God repreſented, as feeding himſelf with the certain Ideas of a Happineſs, which was ſuddainly to be raviſh'd from him. (*My Soul*, ſaid he, *eat and drink, make good cheer, we have goods heapt up for many years.*) Thus he ſpake when he heard a terrible voice which told him, (*Thou fool thy Soul ſhall be required of thee this night; and then the goods which thou haſt heaped up, unto whom ſhall they belong?*)

But

But in fine, Man is not ſo blind, that he interviews not the end of this Felicity, wherewith he is as it were inchanted; he knows that the World ſhall not always make his Happineſs, becauſe that it is compoſed of corruptible Objects, and he is not ignorant, that he ſhall not be always in a condition of taſting the pleaſures of the World, becauſe he is not immortal. So that becauſe of the defect of this perpetuity of Sentiment which he cannot obtain, he ſeeks to perpetuate his memory. Thus he ſaves what he can from the Shipwrack; but that which he ſaves is not worth the care that he takes. For what is the Glory of Man after his death? It is ſaid an Antient, a good Wind after a Shipwrack; and certainly nothing is more vain than all the means which Self-love has invented for to perpetuate its Glory. The Urns, the Tombs, the Pyramids, the Mauſoleums, the Theatres, the Temples, the Cities built to the memory of illuſtrious Men, Poetry and Eloquence, the Art of Painters and Gravers imployed to preſerve ſome Ideas of their Virtue, or ſome Lines of their Faces, cannot avoid the deſtiny of corruptible things; and as theſe things cannot perpetuate themſelves, they are incapable of Eternizing thoſe whom they have

have for thrir Object: that would be to perpetuate the Shadows, and how ſhould they perpetuate the Sentiment?

Nos quoque floruimus, ſed flos fuit ille caducus

I know not whether a Man ſhould be more unreaſonable, when by the efforts of his Deſire he ſhould doubt of his Mortality, than he is then, when by the ſeduction of his Heart he ſhall ſeek a vain immortality.

I know very well, that no body ſeriouſly denies but that he muſt Dye; but I know not likewiſe, whether any Man tells himſelf ſeriouſly that he ſhall dye: for thô theſe two terms have a too true Relation, no body will unite them; and if they look on them, it is certainly with an Eye which unties them one from another. We conſider Death without conſidering our Selves, we conſider our Selves without conſidering Death: but we love not to repreſent our Selves by the Idea of Death; and nothing in the World, let them believe what they pleaſe, is more rare or more grievous to our Hearts, than the joyning theſe two Ideas is in our imagination.

This is not all yet Self-love undertakes in ſome ſort, to fix the pleaſure which the acquiſition of Temporal Goods gives us. It is with this deſign, that it ſeeks to enjoy

joy often the Good which it poſſeſſes, be it by Thought, in repreſenting it the oftneſt and moſt lively that is poſſible, be they the advantages which it hath acquired thereby, be it in ſeeking new methods of taſting the pleaſure unto which it is accuſtomed. It was a very great extravagancy of *Caligula*, to propoſe the making of his Horſe Conſul, and cauſing him to be brought before the Senate, clothed with Conſulary Ornaments, and the bundles of Rods marching before him: but this extravagance, which ſo much wounds the Judgment, had its pleaſures for a Heart, which being accuſtomed unto Sovereign Power, and hardly being longer ſenſible of it, found the means to give it an Air of novelty, by the irregularity of its reliſh, and the fantaſticalneſs of its humour. *Caligula* in his Folly had the pleaſure to ſee therein, how much other men were inferior to him. In fine, Self-love which ſeems to be diſabuſed from the exceſſive Idea which it hath conceived of Temporal things, then when it ſees the void which they leave in our Heart, frames to it ſelf an illuſion ſtill in this regard. For ſeeing that it cannot be happy by this manner of temporal Goods which it hath acquired, it prepoſſeſſes it ſelf with the Thought that it ſhall find in the quantity the Happineſs

pineſs which it finds not in the quality of their advantages. Thus the rich Man, who ought to diſabuſe himſelf from the vanity of Riches, by the experience which he makes of them, perſwades himſelf he ſhall be happy, when he ſhall be Richer than he is at preſent; and as the degrees of temporal Proſperity are not limited, it is not to be wondred at, in whatſoever State he ſhall find himſelf in, there be formed ſtill in him new Deſires.

And becauſe that our Soul interviews that the advantages of the World are leſs conſiderable by their being real, than by their being imaginary, it has that addreſſe to deceive it ſelf ſtill upon this ſubject; it ſeeks the eſteem of others, and to paſs for happy in the judgment of the multitude, for to make uſe afterwards of this eſteem for to deceive it ſelf, and to perſwade it ſelf of its own Happineſs, upon the Faith of them who know us not. It is an agreeable Object to a great Man, to ſee himſelf follow'd by a greedy and intereſſed croud of People, who ſhow enough by their preſſing the accompt they make of Grandeur, that perſwades him that he is not deceiv'd in the Thought that he had that he ſhould be happy, by that which ſhould elevate him above other Men; and it the interior experience which he makes

of

of his State, agree not with this Thought, he ſuſpends theſe ſad reflexions of his Mind, and he ſays to himſelf, that ſo many People who eſteem him happy may deceive themſelves, and he reſolves to be ſatisfied with his condition, in deſpight of all the Sentiments, and all the experiences of his miſery.

I know very well, nevertheleſs that it often happens, that Men repulſed by ſome danger, or preſent diſgrace, which makes a lively and profound impreſſion in their Hearts, are diſguſted at their condition, and bear an envy unto that of other Men: but this diſguſt endures not long, it is diſſipated with the Object it hath brought forth; and as the agreeable Ideas take place next after the ſad Ideas which had ſtruck our Souls, and had in a manner wounded them, in entring impetuouſly into our Judgment, then we ſee nothing but what's fine of our condition; and we reprehend our ſelves for our firſt deſigns. It is this which one of the moſt agreeable Wits of the Age of *Auguſtus* has expreſt with a great deal of Livelyneſs and Grace in one of his Odes.

Qui fit Mæcenas, ut nemo quam ſibi ſortem,
Seu ratio dederit, ſeu ſors objecerit, illa
Contentus vivat, laudet diverſa ſequentes?
O fortunati mercatores, gravis annis
Miles ait, multo jam fractus membra labore.
Contra mercator, navem jactantibus auſtris:
Militia eſt potior: quid enim? concurritur: horæ
Momento cita mors venit, aut victoria læta.
Agricolam laudat juris, legumq; peritus
Sub galli cantu Conſultor ubi oſtia pulſat.
Ille datis vadibus, qui rure extractus in urbem eſt
Solos felices viventes clamat in urbe.

And certainly it is no great wonder, that the conditions of others appear ordinarily more happy than our own unto our Self-love, becauſe that we feel our own Ills, and feel not theirs; and that their Goods ſhew themſelves to us without mixture, becauſe that we ſee but the outſide of their condition. But in fine, let it be the Idea of Temporal advantages we poſſeſs, or the image of Goods which others poſſeſs, which prepoſſeſſes us ſo advantageouſly in favour of the Goods of the World; it is certain that we have an exceſſive Idea of them; and it is that which Men look upon ordinarily as their Sovereign Good. For to that end, it is not neceſſary that our Judgment judge expreſly

preſly and diſtinctly, that the World is the Sovereign Good; nor that our Mouth pronounce theſe ſame words. Man is naturally too Glorious for to affect thinking, or ſaying abſurdities that are too ſenſible, but he loves the World enough for to ſay it in his Heart, if he ſay it not with his Judgment.

But it will be good to continue the conſideration of the moſt general inclinations of our Heart, which flow from the love which we have for our ſelves. For it will be eaſie to us to know their Streams, when we ſhall have well diſcovered their Springs.

CHAP. XI.

Wherein are conſidered the general Inclinations of the love of our Selves, and the deſire of perfections.

THE Two general Goods which Man naturally wiſhes for, are Happineſs and Perfection: but he wiſhes not for them, but with ſome ſubordination, and ſome dependance. For he wiſhes not for Happineſs for Perfection: but he wiſhes for Perfection for Happineſs.

Man

Man cannot be well ſatisfied whilſt he conſerves the Ideas of his defects. It is that which obliges him to diſguiſe them to himſelf, as much as he can poſſible, and to rid himſelf of them, unleſs that in renouncing his defects, he ſhould renounce ſome ſort of Pleaſure, in the which he makes his Happineſs to conſiſt.

It is true, that as the Judgment judges always in favour of the Affections of the Heart; it deceives us often in confounding Vices with Virtues, Defects with Perfections. In *Æthiopia* the handſomeſt People are the blackeſt; in *Europe*, and in the reſt of the World they are the whiteſt; it is not, it may be, ſo eaſie as is imagin'd to decide, who are in the wrong. It is ſo of the qualities of the Soul. Vivacity, which makes a great part of the moſt ſhining Merit in certain Countries, paſſes in others for an eſſential defect.

And certainly, nothing is more difficult than to make this juſt diſcernment of Defects from the Perfections in the midſt of theſe darkneſſes and prejudices which follow our corruption. It is not ſufficient for that to conſult the publick Opinion; for Men often agree to conſecrate the weakneſſes which are common to them, and when they agree in an affection, they generally judge it worthy of an eſteem,

or at leaſt of ſupport. There are Countries, where Drunkenneſs paſſes for the Vice of a diſhoneſt Man; and others, where it is lookt upon as a fault a-la-mode; and which does no eſſential harm.

There will be then no harm, if Men ſuſpend their Judgments upon that which they call Vice and Virtue, Perfection and Imperfection, until they ſhall have time to conſult the diſtinct proſpects of their Judgments, or Religion, which is ſtill a ſhorter way for to know their true Duties.

Now to help us to diſcern this, we muſt remark that there is this difference between God and the Creature, that there is none but God that poſſeſſes all the Perfections; ſo that it may be affirm'd, that he has all that which can be known as a Good, or which merits any eſteem, that if he hath it not expreſly, he hath it eminently, that is to ſay, that he has theſe Qualities, or Perfections yet greater, which anſwer to theſe Qualities. But for the Creature, it cannot pretend but to poſſeſs the Perfections which are due to its Species. It is not neceſſary that a Stag ſhould have wings, it is enough that it has ſwiftneſs for its ſhare. The Birds have nothing to do to ſwim, it is ſufficient that they have wings to flye.

Then, in this Men fail doubly, in that they pretend to have the perfections, which are no ways due to their Species, and in that they renounce thoſe which belong to them, and which matches their eſſential Perfections; for they give to their Body that which belongs not to it, and take from the Soul that which doth belong to it.

They will perpetuate and ſpread the firſt, they endeavour to prove it a Species of Eternity, of which it is not capable, and a Species of Grandeur, or if you you pleaſe of Immenſity, which cannot agree with it.

But Men fail more yet, in that they will not enter into themſelves, nor conſider that which they are naturally. As they imagine falſly, that the quality of Man contains but baſeneſs and miſery, they ſeek not the Perfections which are due unto this general Quality: but they aſpire to get out of this common condition, by the help of ſtrange Goods, and exterior Relations which diſtinguiſh them.

They ſeek no longer the Perfections due to Man: but the Perfections due to a Magiſtrate, to a Handicrafts-man, to a Learned Man, to a Citizen, to a Gentleman, to a great Lord; they make their Honour conſiſt no longer in that which might

might perfect human Nature, and enrich the Mind, that immortal Eſſence, the lively expreſſion of the Divinity: but in that which may make us ſucceed in our profeſſion, however low it be in it ſelf, or make us fill worthily the place in ſociety, wherein we find our ſelves by the circumſtances of our Life.

From thence it follows, that Men conſider not the qualities, and call them not Perfections or Defects, but according to the relation which they have with the ſtate wherein they ſuppoſe themſelves, and in the which Self-love and Pride fixes them for to make themſelves eſteemed. A Learned Man by profeſſion, nettles not himſelf with Bravery. A brave Man troubles himſelf rarely with Learning. Tell the firſt that he wants Courage, he will but laugh. Make this reproach to the Second, you will fill him with fury: becauſe that Learning is not due to a Man of War, nor Courage to a learned Man. This ought to be underſtood when Self love fixes one in the place of the Learned, and the other in that of Brave; for it happens often enough, that a Man affected by Pride, to appear that which they call (*Omnis homo*,) and then the Maxim changes with the ſuppoſition.

It cannot be ſaid how many falſe prejudices ariſe from this Spring. Injuſtice, Debauchery, Rage finds thereby means to conſecrate themſelves. Ordinary Robbery unites not it ſelf with Fortune, and the ſtate of a particular Man, who ſees himſelf hang'd, or broken upon the Wheel for having committed it; it is then a fault, and likewiſe a baſe and ſhameful fault; but the great Robberies, as the conqueſt of Towns and Provinces do mark exteriorly the grandeur of a Potentate, theſe are then heroick enterpizes. There is a Horror and Infamy affixt to common Murder, which is ſubject to the rigor of the Laws, and which by conſequence unites not it ſelf with the intereſt of particular Men, whom theſe Laws retain in their Duty: But an unjuſt War, which includes an infinite of Murders, and of Robberies is not, if it be happy, but an object of eſteem and admiration.

We muſt not ſay here as ſome, that Injuſtices conſecrate themſelves by their Grandeur, and that the exceſs of the Crime makes the Glory. There would be exceſs in this Thought: But we may ſay, that this fantaſtical inequality of our prejudices upon the ſame thing, comes from the habit which we have fram'd to our ſelves of judging Qualities, only by the relation which

which they have with the ſtate of thoſe who poſſeſs them. A Woman is diſhonoured for being ſeduced, and he who is the Author of that ſeducement, makes it a motive of his Vanity. There is certainly a great deal of extravagance in this prejudice: nevertheleſs this diſorder of our Judgment, is founded upon the Maxim which we have eſtabliſht. It is conceived in this World that Men have a thouſand ways to make themſelves worthy. All the ſprings of Glory are open to them. A Woman is bounded in that reſpect, ſhe can neither Govern States nor Command Armies, nor ſucceed in the Arts, and in the Sciences, at leaſt ordinarily, and the examples of the contrary are too rare for to draw to a conſequence: but ſhe may be an honeſt Woman; it is for that reaſon that nothing is more honourable in a Woman than Chaſtity. The Empire of Beauty likewiſe, which makes the Honor of Women in the World, cannot make that of Man, who is naturally deſtin'd to ſomething elſe than to make himſelf belov'd. It happens even ſometimes, that a Vice well-plac'ed paſſes for a great Virtue, and that a Virtue ill-placed paſſes for the greateſt fault. Prodigality ſits well upon *Alexander*, who being Maſter of the World poſſeſſes the Treaſure thereof. Oeconomy

agrees with *Hanibal*, who makes not his Armies ſubſiſt but by a Miracle, ſhut in as he is on all ſides in *Italy*. Cruelty it ſelf, which would ill become him at another time, agrees with him in the condition that he is in. To the reſt as it happens, that good Sence, Prudence, Probity, Exactneſs in keeping ones Word, *&c.* are qualities which agree with all ſorts of States and Conditions; it is not to be wondred at that almoſt all Men nettle themſelves equally thereat. They ſeek not after their Virtues as being worthy of Man: but as matching very well the State wherein they are, and convenient to their Intereſts. They ſeek to have effectively judgment and prudence, becauſe it is the reality and not the ſimple appearances of theſe Virtues which are profitable to them, but they content themſelves ordinarily in appearing People of probity, becauſe that the appearances of good Faith are more profitable to them, as they do imagine, than the true poſſeſſion of that Virtue. We have reaſon to hate Hypocriſie, and to be angry with this impoſture of Vice, who ſeems to have a mind to impoſe upon God and Men, by an execrable traffick of appearances and outward ſtudies: but we muſt affirm things as they are; Hypocriſie is a Vice which appears common unto all

all Men. They all ſtudy to ppear in the Light, which may be moſt advantagious to them. It is an error to imagine, that there are none but Hypocrits of Devotion, there are Hypocrites of Honor, of Reſolution, of Bravery, of Liberality; and we ſee more counterfeits in the World, than thoſe who would impoſe upon the Church. It is ſomething curious to ſee two Perſons who create an acquaintance, or who enter into commerce, take themſelves mutually for the Cullies one of another, and ſay nothing, nor do nothing, but what comes from the deſign of Cheating. They do affect Politeneſs, Complaiſance, Integrity and Honor, inſomuch that they believe they have them. All that certainly comes from a too bounded ſight of Self-love; and to get out of Error, he muſt (as I may ſay) tread the ſame ſteps back again, ſeek the Man whom he would have ſhunn'd, and take for Perfection, not that which diſtinguiſhes us: but that which matches this natural equality of Perfection and Excellence, which we have with other Men, to conſider our ſelves, not in our ſelves, but in God.

The Perfections due unto the mortal Man are a ſmall matter, but thoſe of the immortal Man are all worthy of admiration. He has nothing to do with Hypocriſie, for

to counterfeit himſelf to the eyes of Men: he has nothing to do but to renounce the deluſions of his Pride, the vain prejudices of the World and its vails, which rob him of the ſight of himſelf, for to find himſelf above even admiration.

There is not even to the very paſſion of Man, that which changeth not it ſelf into Perfections, when they have their juſt extent in the immortal Man; and if you mind, you will find that the buſineſs which is conceived in the Sentiments of our Soul, comes from the too ſtrait bounds which Cupidity and Self love had given them. Give unto the Soul all its flight, let it act in its own extent, and you ſhall find that it is a Divine Sphere which always augments it ſelf proportionably as it draws nigh unto God.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Wherein the general Vices are treated of, which flow from Self-love; and First of Voluptuouſneſs.

THere are Three Goods, which principally bind Self-love. The Firſt, which makes it ſelf felt and deſired for the love of it ſelf: but which makes not it ſelf felt by it ſelf; it is eſteem, and the laſt which makes not it ſelf felt or deſir'd by it ſelf, and has but one goodneſs of means, for to ſpeak at the School, which is Riches. All that is contain'd in the known diviſion of a good, agreeable, honeſt, and profitable: unto which muſt be added a Fourth Good, which ſeems to contain all thoſe, to wit Dignities, the which according to the Ideas that Men have of them, are a compoſition of Pleaſure, and Glory, and Help for to paſs the Life commodiouſly.

The love of Pleaſure is natural, that of Eſteem is legitimate, the deſire of acquiring Riches, hath in it ſelf nothing criminal: but all theſe Affections begin to bear the

the name of Vices, ſo ſoon as they ceaſe to be guided by Reaſon.

Self-love binding it ſelf to pleaſure againſt Reaſon, is call'd voluptuouſneſs. Self-love conſider'd in an irregular Love of eſteem, bears the name of Pride. Self-love having Riches for its Object, and deſiring them with an exceſſive Paſſion, is call'd Avarice. In fine, Self-love tending towards Dignities with a paſſion which offends Reaſon and Juſtice, is call'd Ambition: but as the Goods of the World reduce themſelves to Pleaſure and Glory, the moſt general irregularities of Self-love, reduce themſelves likewiſe unto Voluptuouſneſs and Pride, the examination whereof will terminate our ſearching for the preſent.

Pleaſure may be conſidered in relation unto Man, who has this Sentiment, by relation unto Society, and by relation unto God. For it is certainly neceſſary in theſe three reſpects. It is by pleaſure that the Author of Nature has intereſted our Soul in the preſervation of our Body. We ſhould forget to reiterate the uſe of Aliments, if it had not an agreeable Gouſt. It is pleaſure that makes us enter into commerce one with another, whether it be in the Æconomic Society, or whether it be in the Civil Society, becauſe it is to

this

this Sentiment that is owing the union of Men, and likewiſe the propagation of Human kind. In fine, it is this pleaſure that we find to love God, and to be belov'd of him, to hope for his Bleſſing, and to receive his Graces, and to have Sentiments of his Peace, and of his Love, which makes us have commerce with him.

From thence it follows that Pleaſure is criminal, when it is oppoſed to the Good of Man, who has the Sentiment of it, or to that of Society, or to the Commerce which we ought to have with God.

That poiſoned Voluptuouſneſs ought to be plac'd in the Firſt rank, which makes Men purchaſe long Miſery by momentary Pleaſures. As the bounty of God appears manifeſtly, in that he hath affixt Sentiments of Pleaſure to Aliment, and unto other things which naturally relate to the preſervation of our Bodies; his Injuſtice alſo renders it ſelf very ſenſible in the rigorous ſcourge of Incontinency. But it is not only Voluptuouſneſs that afflicts the Body, which we ought to look upon as contrary to Man. We ought to make the ſame judgment of that which weakens, or which troubles the Mind.

We ought again to look upon Pleaſure as criminal then, when it tends either to deſtroy Society, or to trouble the order thereof. Such are the voluptuouſneſſes which are founded upon bad Faith and Infidelity, which eſtabliſhes in ſociety, the confuſion of Race and of Children, and which are followed with jealouſies and miſtruſts, and very often with murders, and with wicked attempts upon the moſt Sacred and inviolable Laws of Nature. In fine, we ought to look upon it as a criminal Pleaſure, the Pleaſure which God forbids, whether It be by his natural Law which he has given to all Men, or whether it be by a poſitive Law, as likewiſe Pleaſure which weakens, ſuſpends or deſtroys the commerce we have with him, in binding us too much to the Creatures.

Upon this principle it is not difficult to ſee, what judgments we ought to make of all the different ſpecies of voluptuouſneſs; or to examine all its characters. In general, as Nature has eſtabliſht that the corruption of the beſt things is always the worſt; it is certain likewiſe, that the more one ſort of pleaſure is neceſſary and important to Man in its natural and well govern'd uſe, the more likewiſe the ill uſe of that pleaſure is dangerous and criminal. The voluptuouſneſs of the Sight, of the Smell, and

and of the Hearing, it may be is the leaſt of all; becauſe it deſtroys not its Being, becauſe it does harm to no body, and it offends not God generally ſpeaking, then when one ſees agreeable Objects, or when one ſmells exquiſite Odors, or when one hears melodious Conſorts, I ſay generally ſpeaking; becauſe there is an infinity of circumſtances which may render theſe pleaſures criminal, how innocent ſoever they may appear in themſelves, A Man is criminal in having a paſſion for Shows, for Scents or Muſick, then when he neglects thereby his Affairs, or that he forgets to fulfil the Duties of Society, or in fine, then when the continual uſe of theſe pleaſures turn him away from the ſpiritual Commerce which he ought to have with God, without reck'ning that there are ſeveral ſpecies of voluptuouſneſs very dangerous, which are all hid in the firſt. Men often believe they ſeek only the pleaſure of the Sight in their fine Gardens, and in their magnificent Houſes: and they ſeek therein the pleaſure of Pride and Ambition, telling themſelves almoſt the ſame that the King of the *Aſſyrians* ſaid in his proud Heart: *Is not this here Babylon, the great City which I have built by the power of my ſtrength.*

It

It is eaſie to conceive that the voluptuouſneſs which conſiſts in the exceſs of good cheer, is much more criminal than that of which we have been ſpeaking of, it ruins the health of a Man, it abaſes the Mind in the recalling it from the high and ſublime contemplations, for the which it is naturally made, unto Sentiments which affix it baſely to Tables, as unto the ſource of its Happineſs.

Atque affigit humi divinæ particulam auræ.

But the pleaſures of good Cheer conſider'd in general, is not by much near ſo criminal as that of Drunkenneſs, which not only ruins the Health and abaſes the Mind: but which troubles our Reaſon and deprives us for a certain time of the Glorious character of reaſonable Creatures. By this dangerous voluptuouſneſs Man pawns his Reaſon, and makes himſelf reſponſible for all the faults which the loſs thereof may make him commit; ſo that as there is no miſchief but what may attend this loſs, ſo there is no Vice likewiſe which is not in ſome ſort comprehended in Drunkenneſs.

The voluptuouſneſs of Love produces not altogether ſo ſenſible diſorders: but nevertheleſs one cannot ſay that it is of leſs

leſs dangerous conſequence. Love is a ſpecies of Drunkenneſs for the Mind and the Heart of a Perſon, who abandons himſelf to this paſſion; it is the Drunkenneſs of the Soul, as the other is the Drunkenneſs of the Body.

The firſt falls into an extravagancy which ſtrikes the Eyes of all the World, and the other wanders wide, thô he ſeems to have the uſe of Reaſon. Beſides, the firſt renounces only the uſe of Reaſon; whereas this renounces his Judgment and Heart at the ſame time. I grant nevertheleſs that hitherto the irregularity of Drunkenneſs is more ſenſible, and it may be more great in effect.

But when you come to conſider theſe two Paſſions in the oppoſition which they have to the good of Society and Commerce, which we ought to have with God, you will find that irregular Love is in ſome ſort more criminal than Drunkenneſs, becauſe that this cauſes but a tranſitory diſorder, whereas that is followed by a durable irregularity. Love is beſide oftner the ſpring of Murder than Wine. Drunkenneſs is ſincere: but Love is eſſentially compoſed of Artifice and of Infidelity. In fine, Drunkenneſs is a ſhort fury which takes us from God, to ſubject us to our Paſſions: but illicitous Love is a perpetual Idolatry.

Self-

Self-love ſeeks not only corporal voluptuouſneſs: but it mixes it in an infinite manner of ways, which inhaunces the Gouſt and augments the Sentiment. The greateſt part of Arts are the Miniſters of voluptuouſneſs, imployed for to mix colours for the pleaſure of the Sight; the Odors and the Eſſences for to pleaſe the Smell; the Inſtruments, the Tones, and the agreeable and harmonious ſounds for to flatter the ear. They make voluptuous mixtures of Colours, of Sounds, of Odors; they make uſe thereof for to heighten the pleaſure of the good Cheer, and they imploy this with all the other agreeable objects for to accompany the pleaſures ſtill more criminal, And this pleaſure of Senſe is ſo conſiderable unto Men, that then when they would be conſider'd and eſteem'd one of another, they ſearch for means to flatter the ſenſe of thoſe who approach them. They have rich and ſhining Appearances for to pleaſe the Eyes, Eſſences for to flatter the Smell, to have a fine Voice, or for to know to play upon Inſtruments for to pleaſe the Ears. All that enters into eſteem which Men have one for another. They confound Voluptuouſneſs with Perfections, and Exellence is not found but in that which diverts us.

Although this voluptuouſneſs appears ſo much the more criminal as it poſſeſſes more our Soul, and ſo much the more dangerous as it is more common amongſt Men; I grant nevertheleſs, that I am not of the opinion of thoſe, who by ſubtilties and refin'd ſpeculations, would ſeem to conteſt with us the legitimate and natural uſe of the Creatures; and who do imagine, that either all pleaſures are criminal, or that they cannot taſte any one without crime, unleſs they ſhould have the expreſs intention in the ſame moment, to relate it to the Glory of God. There is an exceſs in this Thought, there being an infinity of occaſions, wherein we may take honeſt diverſions, without our finding therein any relation with the Glory of God. It ſuffices then, that we uſe them with acknowledgment, and giving thanks for the Creature, without endeavouring to Spiritualize and conſecrate things which are not ſuſceptible of that refinement.

CHAP. XIII.

Wherein are conſidered divers characters of Voluptuouſneſs.

THE greateſt part of Men acknowledge but one part of Voluptuouſneſs, which is that of Sence. They reduce all things to corporal intemperance, and they perceive not that there are in the Heart of Man, as many diferent ſorts of Voluptuouſneſs, as there are ſpecies's of pleaſure, that it may abuſe, and as many different ſpecies's of pleaſure, as there ars paſſions which actuate his Soul.

Avarice, which ſeems as if it would deprive him of the moſt innocent pleaſures, and adopt in their place but work, fatigue, fear and inquietude, unto his voluptuouſneſs, which indemnifie it for the delights which it hath renounced. (*Populus me ſibilat*) ſays the Miſer, whom *Horace* deſcribes, (*ut ego mihi plaudo ipſe domi, dum contem-*

contemplor nummos in arca.) That which is actually in the enjoyment of Temporal Goods in regard of other Men, that very thing is the power of enjoying them in this.

But as there are Paſſions more criminal ſome than others, there is likewiſe a ſort of Spiritual voluptuouſneſs which is particularly dangerous. It may be reduced to three ſorts; which are the voluptuouſneſs of Hatred and Vengeance, that of Pride and Ambition, that of incredulity and impiety.

It is a voluptuouſneſs of Pride to delight one ſelf in appropriating to our ſelves, either the Goods which belong not to us, or the qualities which are in us, but are not ours, or a Glory which we ought to attribute to God and not to our ſelves. As the Soul finds a ſort of Grief in ſtripping it ſelf of its Honour for to cloath another, which makes the ſecret repugnances which it hath for Humility, it finds likewiſe a ſort of very ſenſible pleaſure in ſtripping of others of that Glory for to cloath it ſelf.

Men wonder with reaſon that the People of *Rome* ſhould find any ſort of pleaſure in the bloody diverſions of the Circle,

when they ſaw the Gladiators cut each others Throats in their Preſence for their recreation : this barbarous pleaſure may be lookt upon as a voluptuouſneſs of Ambition and Vain glory. The *Romans* forgot theſe Combatants were Men for to remember only that they were their Slaves. It was to flatter their Ambition, to ſee that Men were not made but for their diverſions.

There is a voluptuouſneſs of Hatred and of Vengeance, which conſiſt in the joy which the diſgraces of other Men give us. It is a horrid pleaſure that nouriſhes it ſelf with the tears that others ſhed. Nevertheleſs you ſhall find if you mind it narrowly, that this pleaſure makes not the leaſt part of that which takes with the Men of the World. The degree of this pleaſure follows the degree of the hatred which gave it birth. Wherefore a Poet of our time, who knew well enough the heart of Man, expreſſes the exceſs of Hatred, by the exceſs of Pleaſure.

Puiſſay je de me jeux y voir tomber le foudre,
Voir ces maiſons en cendres & tes lauriers en poudre.
Voir le dernier Romain à ſon dernier ſoûpir
Moy ſeule en être cauſe & mourir de plaiſir.

If for my ſport I could bring Thunder down
Blaſt all your Laurels, and conſume your Town.
See the laſt *Roman* ſigh out his laſt Breath,
I ſhould with pleaſure yield my ſelf to death.

Incredulity fortifies it ſelf with the pleaſure of all the other Paſſions which attack Religion, and places it ſelf in nouriſhing favourable Doubts for their irregularities; an impiety which ſeems to commit the evil even for the evil ſake, and without finding any advantage, ceaſes not to have its ſecret pleaſures, ſo much the more dangerous as the Soul hides them from it ſelf in the inſtant that it taſts them the beſt.

It happens often that an intereſt of vanity makes us fail of reverence for the Supreme Being. We would ſhew our ſelves formidable unto Men, in appearing not to fear God. We Blaſpheme againſt Heaven for to threaten the Earth.

But nevertheleſs therein is not the Salt that principally ſeaſons Impiety. Man hates God naturally, becauſe that he hates the dependance that ſubmits him to his Empire, and the Law which bounds his deſires. This hatred of the Divinity abides

hid in the Heart of Man, where weakneſs and fear keep it cover'd very often, without even reaſon perceiving it. This hidden hatred creates a ſecret pleaſure in that which braves the Divinity. Men love the elevation of Wit, which abaſes that which they look upon as their gods.

Victrix cauſa Diis placuit, ſed victa Catoni.
Il dédaigne de voir le Ciel qui le trahit.

He diſdains to ſee Heaven that betraied him. All that appear'd brave, becauſe it was impious

I will not oppoſe ſo much the Sentiment of thoſe who ſaid, that Fear was the firſt ſpring of Superſtition, provided that they joyn Hatred to the Fear, as they are very often in the Heart of Man; it being difficult for Men not to hate a little, that which they fear very much. It is certain that Superſtition would not be ſo common in the World, for ordinarily it is fill'd with an extravagancy which is not human, if Men did not get a by-pleaſure therein, which they could not receive by reaſon, and this pleaſure conſiſts in a ſecret ſatisfaction which they have in ſeeing the Divinity abaſed. The Pagans found not only a

pleaſure

pleaſure of Pride in elevating of Men up to the rank of Gods; they found likewiſe a pleaſure of Hatred and Impiety in abaſing the Gods unto the rank of Men; and it may be likewiſe that they read not the Fables of their Poets with ſo much pleaſure, which inſtructed them that Men had been made immortal, as thoſe which feign'd that the Gods had been wounded or defeated by the Arms of Men.

So that he who ſhall ſound well the Heart of Man, ſhall find that Superſtition and Impiety are not ſo oppoſite as is imagin'd, and that they are found united in this ſecret hatred of God, which follows the ſtate of our corruption, and of which we are not healed but by Grace.

As Pride and Hatred of God unite themſelves for to form this vaſt voluptuouſneſs which we ſeek in Superſtition, and that horrid voluptuouſneſs which we find in Impiety; Pride and Hatred unite themſelves likewiſe for to form the pleaſure of Malignity of ſlandring and calumny.

We find therein a pleaſure of Vain Glory, for Men ſpeak evil often of others, for to praiſe themſelves indirectly. There is not a Man in the World who would not praiſe himſelf openly if he durſt; but as he fears to prejudice himſelf by the want

of modeſty, he is obliged to have recourſe to dextrous and ingenious ways, and to make his merit be taken notice of, without attracting the reproach of too great a vanity, he dares not praiſe himſelf openly: but he hopes that in ſpeaking of others, he ſhall paint himſelf by an indirect manner; that in teſtifying of horror for a baſe action, he will teſtifie how much his Virtue renders him incapable of committing it; and the more he ſhall blame the Vices of others, the more he will ſhew himſelf exempt, and will gain attentions to the oppoſite Virtues he poſſeſſes.

A groſs Self-love, and without policy, draws to it ſelf this conſequence in ſaying, for me, although I have great faults, I may boaſt that I have not that: but an active and prudent Self-love is a better manager of its modeſty, and hides often its thundering, but much more the deſign which it hath in ſlandering.

But beſide this intereſt of Pride which makes us find pleaſure in ſlandering, there is likewiſe an intereſt of Hatred which puts us in this diſpoſition. We look upon other Men as our Enemies, becauſe that we conſider them as our competitors in the ſearch of Temporal Goods, You will always find a pleaſure in ſeeing them

abaſed,

abaſed, whilſt we conſider them as capable of diſputing any thing with you: but ſo ſoon as this oppoſition ceaſes, the pleaſure which you found in their abaſement ceaſes likewiſe; from thence it comes, that ſlander has for its object the living, and rarely the dead.

It is eaſie to judge after this that the pleaſure of converſation is not a pleaſure ſo innocent as the vulgar imagine. Indifferent things vex us; thoſe which intereſs us give us either a pleaſure of Pride, or a pleaſure of Hatred, or a pleaſure of Impiety, or a pleaſure of Ambition, or a pleaſure of ſome other Paſſion, which will be little leſs criminal.

As there is a voluptuouſneſs of Converſation, there is likewiſe a voluptuouſneſs of Thoughts, which has the ſame ſpring as the firſt. It ſprings from that our Heart prepoſſeſt by certain Paſſions, has no pleaſure but in thinking upon certain objects, and for that effect ſuſpends all our other Reflexions, and all our other Thoughts. Such is the pleaſure of a Lover who forgets all things for to think upon the object of his Love. He finds in his amorous contemplations a ſort of voluptuouſneſs that deſtroys it ſelf by the paſſion, be-

cauſe

cauſe that the pleaſure of Thought gives way unto that of Sentiment.

It is commonly imagin'd, that the diſtractions which are ſo ordinary to them that pray to God, or who acquit themſelves of other duties of Religion, are the leaſt that they can commit: but they would change their Opinion, if they would throughly examine the Spring. For in fine, theſe diſtractions are not but from too great a pleaſure, which the Ideas of temporal things give us, and from that, as I may ſo ſay, we will retain by the voluptuouſneſs of Thought, the objects of the World, which eſcape us by the ſuſpenſion of our voluptiouſneſs of Sentiment.

We ſeek every where pleaſure as the Bees ſeek the Flowers which are their nouriture; and as they find ſometimes, that which they ſeek for in places dirty and marſhy, it falls out often enough with us that we find a ſort of voluptuouſneſs in lazineſs, in perils, in labour, and ſometimes even in affliction, provided it be not extreme. There is a voluptuouſneſs which might very juſtly be called the voluptuouſneſs of Complaints and Tears. Men pleaſe themſelves in bewailing illuſtrious Perſons, the glory of them whom they regret, ſignalize in ſome ſort thoſe who afflict themſelves for

their

their loſs. They find a pleaſure in eternalizing their Grief. They think to give marks of the conſtancy of their Souls by an inconſolable affiction. In fine, they are glad to make the greatneſs of their loſs remarkt, thinking to intereſſe the paſſion of others to make reflexion upon their worth.

In fine, we find a ſort of voluptuouſneſs even in lazineſs, which likewiſe often enough makes us renounce all others. It ſprings from a certain ſoftneſs, which makes us hate the leaſt pain, and the leaſt incommodity. For ſeeking for pleaſure every where, we accuſtom our ſelves to think with pleaſure. To love and deſire with pleaſure, to ſpeak with pleaſure, to act with pleaſure, to ſeek the ſociety which gives us pleaſure, and to ſhun, in fine, all the occupations which afford us not pleaſure. From whence it happens, that the leaſt incommodity makes us deſpair, being againſt this ſtrong cuſtom, and ſuſpending the Sentiment of ſo many different ſorts of voluptuouſneſs, whoſe Idea is always preſent to our remembrance.

Seek not then for firmneſs and conſtancy in voluptuous Souls. They may affect by Pride, ſtrength for to ſupport diſgraces: but it is certain that they never get rid of

their

their weakneſs but in getting rid of their voluptuouſneſs. Beſide, corporal voluptuouſneſs is more ſenſible than ſpiritual voluptuouſneſs: but the latter appears more criminal than the other. For the voluptuouſneſs of Pride is a ſacrilegious voluptuouſneſs, which robs God of the Honour which appertains to him, and appropriating it all to it ſelf; The voluptuouſneſs of Hatred is a barbarous and murthering voluptuouſnes, which is pleaſed with nothing but deſolation and tears, and the voluptuouſneſs of incredulity, and of ſuperſtition is as we have already ſhown, an impious voluptuouſneſs which nouriſheth it ſelf with every thing that ſeems to abaſe or annihilate the Divinity.

This makes us ſee firſt that voluptuouſneſs is as general as our corruption, it being certain that Men who abandon not themſelves to one ſort of voluptuouſneſs, ſcarce fails of being ſlaves unto another. It is a ſmall matter, for example, to defend ones ſelf againſt the voluptuouſneſs of Sence, than when one abandons one ſelf to that of the Mind, which is more criminal and more dangerous than the other.

It may be concluded in the Second place with a great deal of reaſon, that it is impoſſible for one to cure ones ſelf of this vice, purely by temporal motives. For when you ſhall alledge unto a voluptuous Man the conſideration of honor, decency; of his Intereſt, and his eſtabliſhment in the World, you may perhaps oblige him to prefer the pleaſures of Pride and of Ambition before the pleaſures of Senſe: But you ſhall thereby make him paſs from one vice to another.

For to find motives capable to make him abandon voluptuouſneſs in all ſences and in all ways, you muſt put him in a condition of paſſing, if it be neceſſary, from all the pleaſures which he finds in the World; and for that end you muſt make him make this reflexion, that theſe pleaſures paſs away, and that he endures Eternally.

It is certain that voluptuouſneſs has ſomthing reaſonable enough in the principles of a Man who periſheth For is it not natural to a Man who ſhall not be a long time in a ſtate of taſting pleaſure, to ſeek for it whilſt he has time. It is the Morality which *Horace* expreſſes very agreeably.

Vitæ ſummæ brevis ſpem vetat inchoare longam.

If Man ſhould incloſe all his hopes and all his pretenſions in this life, he ſhould have truth and reaſon in thoſe maxims: But ſince Man muſt be after his death, the light of nature teaches us, that he ought to aſpire unto Eternal pleaſures, which Religion makes him ſo happily know.

So likewiſe may one ſay, that the immortal Man, that is to ſay, as we have already elſewhere explain'd him, the Man who believes himſelf Eternal, and who acts by this Principle, renounces Voluptuouſneſs without pain. By the deſire which he hath of making himſelf a Happineſs which ſhall never ceaſe. It is impoſſible that he ſhould become a ſlave to the pleaſures of Senſe, which he knows very well that the Author of Nature employs, as a principle motive for to intereſſe us in the preſervation, or in the propagation of our Body. He makes not his Soveraign good conſiſt in the pleaſure of being applauded by a ſociety of Mortal men, no more than a reaſonable Man would make his Glory conſiſt in the praiſe of a Man whom he is to ſee but a moment. Revenge has no charms for him. With difficulty doth he look upon as his Enemies, the Perſons who do him only a temporal prejudice. He ſupports not impatiently the ſhort dependancies of this life; and ſo finds not likewiſe

wiſe by conſequence, a criminal voluptuouſneſs in all that which ſubjects others thereto; looking upon his condition as proviſional and little durable, which merits little his Care and his Attention. In a word the immortal Man has but very moderate Paſſions for the objects of this Life, and as the pleaſure which he hath in the World is proportioned to the degree of the tye which he hath for theſe objects; it is eaſy to conceive, that the ſituation wherein he is, places him above Voluptuouſneſs.

In which it may certainly be ſaid that he loſes nothing, being indemnified advantageouſly by the commerce of Love, of Acknowledgment, of Zeal, of Joy and Conſolation which he has with God, who by the Sentiment of his Holy and ineffable Delights, raiſes us above our ſad and empoiſon'd Voluptuouſneſs.

A Man clears not himſelf then of Voluptuouſneſs, neither by Pride, neither by Intereſt, neither by Revenge, neither by Ambition, as is commonly imagin'd. The Man who ſhuts himſelf in the ſhort limits of this Life, ſhall be voluptuous, do what he can. Let the Pagan Philoſophers exhibit as many fine Precepts of Virtue as they pleaſe; let them give us as many remedies as they ſhall ſee good againſt Intemperance,

temperance, their maxims ſhall be admir'd by the ſecret relation which they have with our natural dignity, of which they have a confuted knowledge: but Men ſhall not find themſelves diſpoſed to practiſe them, but in as much as they ſhall be convinced of their Eternity.

CHAP. XIV.

Wherein are conſidered the general irregularities of Self-love, and particularly of Pride.

PLeaſure and Glory are the two general Goods which ſeaſon all others, they act then as the Spirit and Salt; differing in that as we have already remarkt, that Pleaſure cauſes it ſelf to be belov'd for the love of it ſelf, whereas Glory makes it ſelf felt but by the Pleaſure which accompanies it.

But though we are not ſenſible of Glory, but by the Pleaſure which accompanies it, know not whether it may not be ſaid, that we deſire it for it ſelf. At leaſt it is certain that it is not eaſy to find the firſt and moſt antient Reaſon for the which we love to be eſteem'd.

One

One is not ſatisfy'd therein, in ſaying that we deſire the eſteem of others, becauſe of the pleaſure which is affixt to it: for as the pleaſure is a pleaſure of reflexion, the difficulty ſubſiſts, becauſe it remains ſtill to know why this eſteem, which is ſomething of a ſtranger, and at a diſtance from us, makes our ſatisfaction.

We ſucceed no better in alledging the utility of Glory, for although the eſteem which we acquire is uſeful to ſucceed in our deſigns, and to procure us divers advantages in ſociety; there are circumſtances wherein this ſuppoſition cannot take place. What profit could advantage *Mutius*, *Leonidas*, *Codrus*, *Curtius*, and all thoſe other Heroes, who have given their lives for to acquire Honor? What could it profit them, the ſacrifice which they made unto their Pride of all their Goods, and of Themſelves, and by what Intereſt do thoſe *Indian* Women, who cauſe themſelves to be burnt after the death of their Husbands, ſeek in deſpight even of the Laws and Remonſtrances, an eſteem which they do not ſurvive?

Some have ſaid upon this ſubject, that Self-love nouriſhes with complaiſance an Idea of our Perfections, which is as its Idol, not being able to ſuffer that which

oppoſes this Idea, as diſdain and injuries, and ſeeking on the contrary with paſſion, all that which flatters it and makes it big, as eſteem and praiſe. Upon this Principle, the utility of Glory ſhould conſiſt in this, that the eſteem which other People have of us, confirms the good opinion which we have of our ſelves:

But that which ſhews us, that therein doth not conſiſt the only or the principal ſpring of Love or Eſteem, is, that it happens generally that Men make more account of apparent Merit which acquires them the eſteem of others, than of real Merit which draws their own eſteem, or if you pleaſe, that they love better to have faults that are eſteemed, than good qualities which are not eſteemed in this World, and that beſides an infinite number of Perſons who ſeek to make themſelves conſider'd by qualities which they know very well they have not, that which deſtroys the Opinion, that they ſhould have recourſe to a ſtrange eſteem for to confirm the good Sentiments which they have of themſelves.

There would be no more reaſon to imagine that they deſire not eſteem, but becauſe they would diſtinguiſh and elevate themſelves above others. It is to explain the cauſe by the effect. It is not becauſe they

they would diſtinguiſh themſelves that they ſeek eſteem: but it is becauſe they would be eſteemed, that they ſeek to diſtinguiſh themſelves in getting out of the croud and obſcurity wherein they were before. In fine, it cannot be ſaid that the love of eſteem in its general Idea, comes from that Idolatry of Self-love, which makes us to ſeek to be Eternal and immenſe as God, framing to our ſelves an imaginary Eternity in the remembrance of Men, for to ſave us from the ſhipwrack of Time, and to perpetuate our ſelves in ſpight thereof, and endeavouring to extend our ſelves to fill the World, in poſſeſſing the minds of Men, of our Actions, and of our Grandeur. If it were the only ſpring of the love of eſteem, it would follow that one could not deſire the eſteem of others innocently, nor by conſequence have for infamy but a criminal horror, which is againſt Reaſon. Let them ſeek as much as they will the ſprings of this inclination, I am perſwaded that they will not find the reaſon but in the wiſdom of the Creator. For as God makes uſe of the love of pleaſure for to preſerve our Bodies, for to cauſe propagation, for to unite us one with the other, for to make us ſenſible of good, and to the preſervation of Society wherein we are; there is no doubt likewiſe, but that his wiſ-

dom makes uſe of the love of eſteem for to defend us from the baſeneſs of Voluptuouſneſs, and to make us tend to honeſt and commendable actions, which agree ſo well with the dignity of our Nature, and at the ſame time the better to unite us one with another.

This precaution had not been neceſſary, if the reaſon of Man had acted alone in him and independent of Sentiment; for this reaſon could have ſhown him the honeſt, and likewiſe made him have preferr'd it to the agreeable: but becauſe this Reaſon is partial and judges often in favour of pleaſure, affixing Honour and Decency unto that which pleaſeth it; it hath pleaſed the Wiſdom of the Creator, to give us for judge of our actions, not only our Reaſon, which ſuffers it ſelf to be corrupted by voluptuouſneſs; but likeſo wiſe the reaſon of other Men, which is not eaſily ſeduced.

It is then, becauſe the Author of Nature would that the Reaſon of other Men ſhould be our Law, and our Judge in ſome ſort, in reſpect of Moral honeſty, and the Decencies of reaſonable Nature, which God has form'd to us with a natural deſire of making our ſelves eſteem'd of others, which aſſuredly proceeds thrô the reflexions of our Mind.

For

For although Utility, Pleaſure, the deſire of finding confirmations of the good opinion of our ſelves, *&c.* may ſatisfy the love of Eſteem, we have made it appear that it produces it not.

And here we may diſtinguiſh Three Worlds, which the Wiſdom of the Creator has founded upon Three natural Inclinations. The Animal World, the Reaſonable World, and the Religious World. The firſt is a ſociety of Perſons united by Sentiment; The ſecond is a ſociety of Perſons united by Eſteem; And the Third, a ſociety of Perſons united by natural Religion. The firſt hath for Principle the love of Pleaſure, the ſecond the love of Eſteem, and the third Conſcience. All theſe three Principles are natural, and the reaſon is not to be ſought for but in the Wiſdom of the Creator.

The firſt of theſe three Worlds relate to the ſecond, the ſecond to the third, and the third to the firſt. There is then this ſubordination in theſe things, that Eſteem regulates the love of Pleaſure, and that Religion ought to regulate the love of Eſteem; and this Subordination is not leſs natural than there Inclinations.

One might in effect attribute unto Nature the love of Pleaſure: one ought not to ſet upon its ſcore the overflowings of

Voluptuouſneſs. One may ſay that the love of Eſteem is natural; but one muſt not believe that the extravagancies and the furies of Pride ſpring out of the boſom of Nature. One might attribute to it the fear of God and the love of Virtue: but one muſt not give it for a younger Brother's portion, all the Superſtition, which it hath pleaſed Men to charge upon the principles of Nature; and by conſequence it is neceſſary; that the love of Pleaſure, that of Eſteem, Conſcience, ſhould have their Law, their Rules and their Limits. And it will be good to ſtop at the love of Eſteem.

CHAP. XV.

Wherein are examined all the irregularities which enter into the compoſition of Pride.

IT ſeems that hitherto we have not too well known Pride, and that without doubt for not having well diſtinguiſht all the parts, and in not having carefully enough examin'd all its characters.

Pride

Pride in general may be reduced into five principal Branches, which are the love of Eſteem, Preſumption, Vanity, Ambition and Fierceneſs. For although Men are accuſtomed to confound theſe terms, and to make uſe of them indifferently for to ſignify the ſame thing; it is certain that theſe expreſſions have ſignifications a little different.

The love of Eſteem is legitimate and natural in it ſelf, as we have already remarkt: but it is vicious and irregular when it goes to exceſs It is here is the moſt general irregularity of Pride. For when one deſires Eſteem with Exceſs, it is natural that one ſhould ſeek in ones Self eſtimable qualities, and that then when one has none, that one ſhould give it by complaiſance, which the imagination has for the bents of the Heart. From whence ſprings Preſumption. Beſides, this immoderate love of Eſteem makes a Man endeavor to render himſelf worthy by all ſorts of means, and in default of true ſprings of Glory, he makes himſelf eſteemed by things which are not eſtimable, or which are not but in our imagination, ſee here what our own vanity does; for this expreſſion originally ſignifies the vacuum of Objects, where we ſeek Eſteem falſly, and which are ill ſprings of Glory. From this

exceſſive love of Eſteem ſprings in the Third place the deſire which we have of elevating our ſelves above others, being perſwaded that we cannot attract the conſideration of *Men* with a little luſtre, whilſt we are confounded with the croud. It is this which produces ambition. In fine, the deſire which we have to appear in diſtinguiſhing our ſelves from others, makes us deſpiſe them, ſeeking to abaſe them, for to draw our ſelves out of the equality with them. It is from thence ſprings fierceneſs. All the irregularities of Pride reduce themſelves to the exceſſive love of Eſteem, as to their firſt Principle, we cannot conſider the laſt with too much care. The two general faults of this inclination are exceſs and irregularity; the firſt conſiſts in this, that we love Eſteem too much: and the ſecond is this, that we love falſe Eſteem as true Eſteem.

For to comprehend what is exceſs of Love of Eſteem, we muſt conſider the deſign which God had then, when he put this bent in our Heart, he gave it us for the preſervation of our Bodies, for the good of Society, and for the exerciſe of Virtue. I ſay, for the preſervation of our Bodies; becauſe that the love of Eſteem forbids us the overflowings of corporal Voluptuouſneſs, which would cauſe very ſuddainly

ſuddainly our death. For who doubts that the deſire which we have of making our ſelves eſteem'd one of another, is not a powerful motive to ſecure us from abandoning our ſelves to debauchery and ſenſuality, towards which the love of pleaſure draws us, and which is ſo fatal even to our Bodies. He has put this Bent in us even for the good of Society; for it is this deſire of making our ſelves eſteem'd one of another, which renders us civil and complaiſant, obliging and honeſt, which makes us love decency and ſweetneſs of commerce; and who knows not on the other hand, that it is unto this natural deſire of Glory, that we owe the fine Arts, the moſt ſublime Sciences, the moſt wiſe Governments, and the moſt juſt eſtabliſhments; and in general, almoſt whatever is admirable in Society? Let them not imagin that it is our corruption and cupidity, which have done this great good to Men. The wiſe inſtructions of the Author of Nature, have without doubt therein their great ſhare.

In fine, it is certain that the deſign of God has been to carry us to honeſt and commendable actions, in giving us for judge of our conduct, not only our Reaſon, which often ſuffers it ſelf to be corrupted by Voluptuouſneſs: but more, the

Reaſon

Reaſon of other Men, who are not ſo partial for us as we are for our ſelves. In effect we may conſider God as the Author of Society, or as the Author of Religion. As the Author of Society, he would have Men enter into commerce one with another for ſome time; and in this regard, he has given them inclinations which were neceſſary for the good and preſervation of that ſociety. The love of Pleaſure and that of Eſteem are of the number. This later makes the human Virtues, which ought not to be cry'd down ſo much as they ordinarily are. For if they ſerve not to Eternal Salvation, they are deſtin'd to the good of temporal Society; they come from the deſign of the Author of Nature; they make part of his Model; the love of Eſteem being the means which he uſes for to perfect Society, as the love of pleaſure is deſtin'd to form it. For Religion it has its ends more ſublime; for it undertakes to direct Man toward the eternal and infinite Good.

From thence it follows, that the love of Eſteem is exceſſive, when it tends to deſtroy the Body inſtead of preſerving it; in the ſecond place, when it goes to trouble the good and order of Society, inſtead of maintaining it, and in fine, when it makes us violate the Laws of Virtue inſtead of making us practiſe them.

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There is a pretty example of the firſt found in Duels. It is in my opinion a very extravagant point of Honor that, which would have a Man love Glory and deſpiſe Life, which is the foundation, and in ſome ſenſe the end as we have already ſeen.

What would Eſteem ſignify to a Man, when he ſhall be no more in a ſtate of enjoying his reputation? This Honor is nothing but by life. Life is ſomething, even without this Honor; and God himſelf has found it good to make us know by his conduct, that that is more to be eſteem'd than this, for he makes us not love Honor, but by a way, which is that of Glory, and he makes us love Life by Pleaſure, and by Glory at the ſame time.

That if it be anſwer'd here, that it is not ſo much the love of Eſteem as the fear of Contempt, which makes them expoſe themſelves to death for to revenge themſelves of an outrage which they have receiv'd, and that it is natural to a Man of Honor, not to be able to live over-loaded with Infamy; that anſwer doth not ſatisfy, becauſe that as it is a weakneſs not to be able to ſupport grief, it is one then, and not leſs, not to be able to ſuffer contempt, above all unjuſt contempt, and what one has not merited.

At bottom we find that the love of Eſteem appears irregular in all reſpects in this example. For it is to love Eſteem too much, it is to love falſe Eſteem, and it is to love more than ones Life, and by conſequence more than the preſervation of ones Body, more than the ſociety from which one takes a member, or very many members by the fury of theſe infamous combats, and in fine mor than Virtue; becauſe that it is to love it more than Humanity, then Juſtice, then Charity, and then Moderation.

I know that when it is required of a Man to give his Life for the good of Societies, as for the ſervice of a Prince, who repreſents the latter and has the right in his hands, he muſt not ballance a moment the expoſing of his Life: but it is not then Eſteem, it is Virtue which he prefers to his Life, he follows the deſign of the Author of Nature, he conforms himſelf unto his Model, and to his Will, becauſe that he who hath made us, hath made us in ſubordination and in dependance. All the evil comes from this, that Men know not Honour well, and love it without knowing it. They have nothing but a confuſed Idea, which education, the examples and judgments of others change inceſſantly. Honour contains three things

things in its ordinary Idea, that is a ſentiment of its excellence, a love of its Duty, and a deſire of being eſteemed. A Man of Honour, muſt be ſenſible of Virtue and Merit, and that by conſequence he finds himſelf offended at the contempt which is had of him. He muſt love his Duties, even to expoſe himſelf to the greateſt dangers for to fulfil them, and he muſt love the eſteem of the reaſonable World, and he muſt ſtrive to merit it.

This general Idea is juſt: but the application which Men make thereof is ordinarily falſe, for they fail in not giving attention to their true merit, which is much greater than they imagine, in not having an Idea of their Duties, which goes further than they imagine, and in not knowing to diſcern falſe Eſteem from the Eſteem that is true, which is that unto which they ought to aſpire.

I know not nevertheleſs, if in their irregularities Men have not, I know not what confus'd Sentiment of their natural Dignity, which joyning it ſelf to their falſe prejudices of Eſteem and worldly Glory, makes the impatience, or rather the fury with which they receive the outrages which are done them. A Man of ſo low a Merit, and ſo deſpiſable as is that of the Man who periſhes, who ever he be, would he find

find ſo great a horror in the abaſement? and would he be angry with ſo much exceſs to be turn'd to nothing, which follows him on all ſides? no, there is in Man an inſtinct, which perpetually tells him of what he is, and which renders him ſenſible of every thing which offends the Idea, which he has of his perfections.

Beſides, it is certain that this Glory unto which we aſpire, contains ſeveral different Sentiments which compoſe it, they are diſtinguiſht into four, which are Eſteem, Conſideration, Reſpect, and Admiration. Eſteem is the tribute which is render'd to proper qualities and to perſonal merit. Conſideration has for object not only the merit of the perſon, but likewiſe the exterior qualities, as Birth, Riches, Reputation, Power, Credit, and generally all the advantages which makes the difference of conditions, and the diſtinction of perſons in ſociety. Reſpect is but a great Conſideration, and Admiration but a great Eſteem. The fineſt Glory, or at leaſt the propereſt conſiſts in Eſteem and Admiration: but the moſt ſenſible and the moſt noted Glory, is that which conſiſts in Conſideration and Reſpect. The reaſon of it is, that all the World is not in a ſtate of diſcerning a Man, who has Merit from another who has none; whereas every one

one may diſtinguiſh a great Lord from a common Perſon.

It is certain that there is not a Man in the world unto whom theſe Sentiments are not due, when his natural Excellency and Dignity is conſidered. There is Eſteem and Admiration due to the Perfections which it hath pleaſed God to grant unto Man. There is Conſideration and Reſpect due to the rank which God makes him hold in the Univerſe: But this original Glory of Man has been darken'd, and as it were effaced by ſin; and here we cannot but conſider with ſurprize the prodigious irregularities of Man corrupted, when we ſee that his Pride begins, as I may ſo ſay, where his Glory ended, that his humility ended there where his true baſeneſs began.

It is ſomething admirable to ſee Men imployed in doing civilities to one another, and cenſing each other, whilſt they are equally worthy of Eternal reproach.

It is not to be wondred at, that God who would preſerve Society, even after the corruption of Men, ſhould not have taken away from us this natural inclination, which we have of being eſteemed of others, and which makes, as we have already ſaid, the perfection of commerce which we have with them.

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You muſt reckon for nothing the example of thoſe Philoſophers, who have been ſeen to deſpiſe the Eſteem of other Men ſo far, as to eſteem themſelves miſerable, when they hapned to attract it. It may be that theſe Heroes in Humility, did not deſpiſe ſo much the Glory in effect, as they appear'd to deſpiſe it in the Eyes of Men. *Cicero* ſays that of all thoſe who had wrote Books upon the contempt of Glory, not one had forgot to inſert his name. It is a policy of pride to go retrograde to Glory. When a Man makes profeſſion that he would be eſteemed, he finds in his way an infinite number of envious and Rivals, who giving attention unto his deſign, diſpute vexatiouſly with him ſo much the more, to take from him the eſteem of others, as he wiſhes it with more ardour: but when a Man appears to contemn the Eſteem of the World, which is affected by ſo many perſons, then as he goes willingly out of the rank of thoſe which aſpire thereto, they conſider him with complaiſance, they love his diſintereſment, and they would make him accept by force, that which he makes a ſemblance of refuſing.

Gloria, ſays *St. Auguſtin*, *ſequitur fugientem.*

Beſides,

Beſides there has been at all times a ſort of conteſtation between Merit and Fortune, for to know which of the two ſhould take place in the path of Glory. The Great ones of the World are in poſſeſſion of the moſt ſhining Honours by the priviledge of Fortune, which attracts ordinarily the officiouſneſs of the multitude.

The Philoſophers maintaining the rights of Virtue and Wiſdom againſt Fortune, have made a party of Men confederated, as I may ſay, againſt Grandeur; not being able to obtain it, they have taken part with thoſe who contemn it. They have appear'd to reverence Cupidity which makes us run after them who diſtribute the goods of Fortune, for fear that their officiouſneſs might be a tacit confeſſion of their inferiority; and becauſe that the great number did condemn them by their intereſſed conduct, they have choſen rather to contemn the eſteem of the vulgar; but let them change conditions and they will change ſentiments.

Beſides, the irregularity comes principally from this, that we think ſo much to make our ſelves eſteemed of Men, that we think not of making our ſelves approved of God; It is not that the approbation of God doth not appear to us at the bottom, more precious than the eſteem of Men:

but becauſe for to acquire the eſteem of Men, it is not neceſſary that our Heart be changed, it is ſufficient that we diſguiſe our ſelves to the eyes of others, whereas we cannot make our ſelves approv'd of God, but in changing the foundation of our Heart, then it is a little enterpriſe of our Self-love to counterfeit: but it is an extream difficult one to reſolve ſeriouſly to be other than what one is.

CHAP. XVI.

Wherein is conſidered the Second irregularity of Pride.

THE exceſſive deſire we have of making our ſelves eſteem'd of other Men, makes us deſire with paſſion to have eſtimable qualities, and fear extreamly having of faults, which wrongs us in the judgment of Men, or to betray our ſelves in not giving an opinion advantageous enough of our ſelves. Then when we perſwade our ſelves that we have the qualities which we deſire, or fear, too ſtrongly, it happens that we conceive too good an opinion of our ſelves, or fall into an exceſſive diffidence. The firſt of theſe two faults is called Preſump-

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tion. The ſecond Timidity. Theſe two faults which ſeem oppoſite, come both from the ſame ſpring, or rather they are but one and the ſame fault under two different forms. Preſumption is a confident Pride; and Timidity a Pride which fears to betray it ſelf. We have a bent both to one and the other, according to the diverſity of our conſtitution. The Blood makes a Man ordinarily perſwade himſelf what is advantageous. It is the principle of confidence. Melancholy makes a Man believe all that he is apprehenſive of, that brings forth our diffidencies: but both diffidence and confidence are all grafted upon Pride, becauſe that all comes from the exceſſive love of Eſteem, which is the moſt antient of its irregularities.

All the World believes that a preſumptuous Man eſteems himſelf too much: but we think that we may ſay againſt the ſentiment of the World, that he eſteems not himſelf enough; and that he fails by an exceſs of baſeneſs, and not by an exceſs of elevation diſproportion'd unto that which he is. He perceives himſelf not in effect, that there is in him a greater excellence, than that which makes the attention of his vanity, and that the merit of the Man that periſhes is a ſmall matter, compar'd to the merit of the immortal Man.

It muſt not be wondred at nevertheleſs that he had rather conſider himſelf by relation unto Time, than by relation unto Eternity, becauſe that in the firſt of theſe two proſpects, he uſurps the Glory of God, in attributing all to himſelf, and nothing to the Supreme Being, whereas in the proſpect of Eternity, he is obliged to uncloath himſelf of all his Glory for to give it unto God; a ſtrange blindneſs which permits him not to acknowledge that there is no other true happineſs, than that which is mixt with the Glory of God.

I grant nevertheleſs, that he may eſteem himſelf too much in one ſenſe; and that it is common to ſee perſons who have immoderate pretenſions for human Glory, to agree thereto, we need but remember what has been already ſaid, that the love of eſteem has been grav'd in our Hearts by relation unto ſociety; for from thence it follows, that reaſonably theſe have the greateſt ſhare of that exterior Glory, who do moſt good to Society, and who are moſt conſiderable to the publick, be it by their ſervices, be it by their places, be it by the eminence of rank unto which Providence may have affixt domination. The Great have reaſon to pretend to homages, becauſe all that, meaſures it ſelf by relation unto Society: but they would be very

very vain and very little reaſonable, if hey ſhould think that the interior fund of their merit ſhould be greater than that of other Men; and if they ſhould not acknowledge, that it is here a preference of Order, and not a preference of Excellence. For one word more, the advantages of the Man that periſheth are nothing, compared to thoſe of the Man who periſheth not, and it muſt be very much that all the temporal ſociety of Men, with its divers Governments, its Power, its Dignities, *&c.* weigh not ſo much as the immortality of one ſingle Man.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Third irregularity of our Pride, which compoſes our vanity.

THE exceſſive love of Eſteem deceives us, not only in perſwading us that we have good qualities, which we have not in effect: but likewiſe in making us take for the ſprings of Glory, either eſtimable Goods, or Objects which are not ſo in any manner.

The term of Vanity is conſecrated by uſe to repreſent equally the diſpoſition of a Man who attributes to himſelf qualities which he hath, and to that of a Man who endeavours to do himſelf Honor by falſe advantages: but here we reſtrain it to this laſt ſignification, which is that which has more relation with the original of the expreſſion.

It ſeems that Man is become vain ſince that he has loſt the ſprings of his true Glory; in loſing that ſtate of Sanctity and Happineſs wherein God had placed him, for not being able to renounce the deſire of making himſelf eſteem'd, and finding nothing eſtimable in himſelf ſince ſin, or rather not daring more to caſt a fixed eye and ſtrong regard upon himſelf, ſince he finds himſelf culpable of ſo many crimes and the object of the vengeance of God, he muſt therefore ſpread himſelf abroad, and he muſt ſeek to make himſelf Honour, in cloathing himſelf with exterior things: and in that Men do ſo much the more voluntarily agree, as they find themſelves naturally ſo naked and ſo poor, the one as the other.

I find that the condition of Man in this regard doth not ill reſemble that of a Monarch ſtript of his Treaſures, who endea-

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vours to give a courſe to Copper-money, having no more Gold nor Silver.

It is that which will appear to us, if we conſider that the ſprings of Glory amongſt Men, reduce themſelves, either to things indifferent in that reſpect, or if you will, which are not ſuſceptible, neither of blame nor of praiſe, or unto things ridiculous, and which are very far from making us true Honour, and are very proper for to denote our abaſements, or unto things criminal, and which by conſequence cannot be but ſhameful in themſelves, or in fine, to things which draw all their Perfection and their Glory from the relation which they have with our weakneſſes and our defects.

I place in the firſt rank Riches, altho' they have nothing contemptible, they have nothing likewiſe of Glory in themſelves.

Our covetous and intereſſed deſire never informs it ſelf of the ſpring, nor of the uſe of Riches which it ſees in the hands of others; it is ſufficient for it that they are rich for to have its firſt homages; and although it profit not actually of their Riches, it hinders it not from reſpecting them by the poſſibility there is that it may profit one day.

But if it would pleaſe our Heart to paſs from a confuſed Idea to a diſtinct one, it would be often enough ſurpriſed at the

extravagance of its Sentiment; for as it is not eſſential to a Man to be rich, and that there muſt be ſome cauſe that ſhould give him wealth, it will find often that it eſteems a Man, becauſe that his Father was a wicked Man, or becauſe that he hath been himſelf a knave; and that then when it renders its exterior homages to Riches, it ſalutes the Theft, or praiſes Infidelity and Injuſtice.

It is true that this is not Mans intention, he follows his cupidity rather than his Reaſon: but a Man to whom you make court, is he obliged to correct throughout all theſe diſtinctions, the baſeneſs of your procedure, and to ſeparate that which your Intereſt gives him, from that which your Reaſon ſhould give him, if it conſulted it ſelf. No, no, he receives your exterior reſpects as a tribute which you render to his excellence; as your avidity has deceiv'd you, his pride fails not of illuding him. If his Riches augment not his Merit, they augment the opinion that he has thereof, in augmenting your complaiſance, he takes all at the foot of the letter, and fails not of interiorly agrandizing himſelf from that which you give him, whilſt you enrich your ſelf but very little with that which he gives you: it is not that one cannot find ſomething in riches, which ſeems

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to render them an object of eſteem to our Eyes, as there is ſomething in poverty which ſeems to render it an object of our contempt; and that in my opinion 'tis the firſt acquires us a ſort of power, which elevates us above others, and makes us eaſily go beyond them; whereas poverty puts us in a ſtate of neceſſity and weakneſs, which makes us not exceed others: but in that it may be ſaid, that Wealth is not glorious but by our Ambition, and that Poverty is not ſhameful but by our Pride.

We do not neverthelesſ by that, approve the proceeding of thoſe, who cannot ſuffer that God ſhould bleſs other perſons without ſetting himſelf againſt them; they turn themſelves on every ſide, they examine their faults with care, they pardon themſelves nothing: certainly if the eſteem which Men have for Riches came from Self-love, this contempt which they affect having for rich perſons, is always a mark of envy; and this envy is in it ſelf extreamly ſhameful: at bottom, th: dependance of Intereſt is a great deal better than that of envy; and it is better to give way voluntarily unto thoſe from whome one expects good, than to put ones ſelf under them, and make them as it were a forced hom-

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age, by the diſpleaſure one has at their proſperity which one envies.

A Man ought not to eſteem Riches but according to the good or bad uſe which he makes thereof: it is in the ſame manner we would that he ſhould conſider Birth, Authority and Dignities; all theſe things put Men in an engagement of doing commendable actions. If you fulfil the Duties unto which they engage you, they are to you the ſprings of Glory; if you anſwer ill to the Law they impoſe on you, they ſerve but to cover you with infamy.

Thoſe who being arrived at ſome degree of ſhining proſperity, grow drunk with their grandeur, refine very little in Sentiment from vain Glory; an apparent moderation which would ſeem to ſay, that they are above the things which elevates them, would it not do them a great deal more honor than this ill underſtood fierceneſs, which makes us think that they are below their fortunes, ſince they know ſo little how to bear it? that is ſo much the more ſurpriſing that it is not alone unto them who are not enough enlighten'd for to know the wrong which this proceeding does them, that it happens to know themſelves ill: but likewiſe unto them who know perfectly this Truth: the reaſon

dignities

then is, that Men when they come to any dignities change their places interiorly, if I may ſo ſay; Pride placing them in a more elevated Poſt than that which they enjoy'd before. The mind may to little purpoſe counſel them to appear as in the ſame place, and to affect for their Glory an equality of Soul, which hinders them from remarking the growings of their fortune; as Men guide themſelves much more by the Sentiment of Heart, than by the lights of their Judgment; it happens that inſenſibly they forget the refin'd deſigns of their vanity, and follow the bent which they have in profiting by all their advantages. Thoſe who have grown old in Grandeur, or who are born in the brightneſs of elevated fortune, are not altogether ſo ſubject to theſe dazlings of vain glory; becauſe that their Soul being accuſtomed to ſee it ſelf above others, is no longer ſo attentive to make the difference taken notice of, which diſtinguiſhes them from 'em: but it is not to be imagin'd with the vulgar, that theſe perſons have more humility and modeſty than the others. They would ſhew the ſame inſolence, if they did apprehend as the others, that their elevation were not enough remarkt. They owe their civility to a confirm'd Opinion, and that they think their ſuperiority inconteſtable, and that

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you may not doubt thereof, you ſhall ſee that the ſame perſons who are ſo civil towards thoſe who are extreamly below them, are fierce and inſupportable, when they have to do with People, who approach their condition: that comes aſſuredly from this, that the civilities which they ſhew unto perſons who are very much inferior to them, appears to them of no conſequence; they are aſſured that they will not take their civilities at the bottom of the Letter; and they can acquire the reputation of civility without doing prejudice to their rank; but it is not the ſame thing when they have to do with Men, who may enter into ſome ſort of compitition with them; as the diſtance which ſeparates them from the latter is not very great; their Pride ſeems to augment it as much as it can poſſibly, and makes them do a thouſand things which are neither reaſonable nor natural, for to make all the world take notice of this, that they fear it ſhould not be enough taken notice of.

There is one ſort of temporal advantages which we take for the ſprings of Glory, altho' in themſelves, and ſeparate from the uſe which Men make of them, they merit neither eſteem nor practice: but there muſt be added thereto, that Man makes himſelf very often valued by ways which make him ridiculous.

I will not only ſpeak here of thoſe, who affect to have qualities which they have not, altho this be that, which makes properly that which we call ridiculous people, or originals: Men give this quality to whomever they pleaſe: and laugh at the expence of whom they pleaſe: it may be if there were an order of reaſonable creatures exempt from our deffects, they would find that the ridiculouſneſs of human Nature, is not ſo bounded as we imagine our ſelves. Man, conſider'd in his natural Perfections, is aſſuredly a work of God, moſt worthy of admiration: but it is becauſe that he is admirable in one ſenſe, and that he finds himſelf ridiculous in another. Is there any thing, for example, worſe matcht with our natural Dignity, than the vanity which has for object the luxury of Cloaths; and is not this ſomething more ridiculous, that all this which makes Men laugh at, that imbroidery and gilding ſhould enter into the formal reaſon of Eſteem. That a Man well cloathed ſhould be leſs contradicted than another; that an immortal Soul ſhould give its eſteem and conſideration to Horſes, to Equipages, to Furniture, to Liveries, *&c.* and that the ornament of the Body ſhould have for inheritance the glory which appears to us to be the moſt ſhining ornament of our Souls. *Cicero* mocks it, he calls

a Man who forgot the Glory of his protection to tye himſelf to this ridiculous Vanity. *Vir in dicendis cauſis benè veſtitus*: But he ought not ſo much to have derided a Man who follow'd the common prejudice, as Men in general, who might be reproached, that their want of glory is ſo great, that they ſeek it even in that which by its firſt deſtination, ought to cover their ſhame and their nakedneſs. The adreſs of Dancing, for which there are People who value themſelves ſeriouſly, is one of the qualities, which would render us ridiculous, if we would render our ſelves in that high and ſublime ſituation wherein Nature and Religion places us. An immortal Soul which danceth and leapeth, is an object equally frightful and ridiculous. It is true, that this appears not ridiculous, becauſe it is too general. Men never laugh at themſelves; and by conſequence they are little ſtruck by this univerſal ridiculouſneſs which all may be reproacht of, or at leaſt the greateſt number: but their prejudice changes not the nature of things, and the ill matching of their actions with their natural Dignity, for being hid from their imagination, is not the leſs true.

That which is moſt ſad, is, that Men make themſelves now only valued by ways

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which would render them ridiculous, if they could conſider them as they ought; but let them ſeek to make themſelves eſteem'd by crimes.

We have already ſaid elſewhere, that they affix ſcandal unto unfortunate crimes, and eſteem unto crimes which ſucceed. They contemn in a ſingle Man, Theft and Robbery, which lead him unto Power: but they love in a Potentate great thefts and ſhining injuſtices, which conduct him to the Empire of the World.

Old *Rome* is a famous example of this Truth, it was in its birth a Colony of robbers, who ſought there the impunity of their crimes.

It was afterwards a Republick of High-way-men, who extended their injuſtices through all the earth. Whilſt theſe Robbers do nothing but ſpoil Paſſengers, baniſh from a little corner of the earth Peace and publick ſecurity, and enrich themſelves at the expence of ſome Perſons whom they find in their way. Men give them not too honeſt Names, and they pretend not likewiſe unto glory, but only to impunity: but ſo ſoon as by the favour of a bright proſperity, they ſee themſelves in a condition of ſtripping entire Nations, and of illuſtrating their injuſtices and their fury, in dragging at their Chariots Princes and Sovereigns;

Sovereigns; there is no more queſtion of impunity, they pretend to Glory; they dare not only juſtify their famous Robberies, but they conſecrate them. They aſſemble, as I may ſay, the Univerſe in the pomp of their Triumphs, for to lay out the ſucceſs of their crimes, and they open their Temples, as if that would make Heaven an accomplice of their Murders and Fury.

There are beſides an infinite number of things, which Men eſteem not, but by relation they have with ſome of their weakneſſes. Voluptuouſneſs makes them ſometimes find Honor in a debauch. The rich are debtors to thedeſires of the poor for the conſideration which they find in the World. Might draws its price in part from a certain power of doing what it will, which is the moſt dangerous Preſent which can ever be made unto Men. Honour and Dignity draw their principal luſter from our ambition; and ſo it may be ſaid moſt certainly, that the moſt part of things are not glorious, but becauſe we are irregular.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Wherein is continued the examination of the characters of the vanity of Men.

VAnity appears enough in all theſe things, without our being at too much trouble to find it. For what blindneſs is not this in Man to make himſelf valuable by advantages, which compoſe not the merit of his Perſon, or by the things which are not ſuſceptible in him, neither of eſteem nor of contempt, or things which render us ridiculous, in ſhewing the extreme diſproportion that there is between that which we are, and that which we ought to be, or in fine by criminal things, and by conſequence eſſentially ſhameful.

But it ſeems then that there may be another judgment made of the qualities of the Soul, which are reduced to the intellectual qualities which appertain to the underſtanding, or to moral virtues which appertain to the heart, becauſe that the one and the other enter in ſome ſort into the compoſition of Man, and make that which is called perſonal Merit.

Nevertheleſs, when we ſhall conſider things nearer, we ſhall find that there wants very much, of thoſe true ſprings of Glory, which are commonly imagined therein. When it ſhall be granted to the Philoſophers, who have choſen this kind of advantages for to make themſelves eſteem'd, that there is ſomething more pure in their pretended Glory, than that, that fortune and the prejudices of the vulgar affix unto exterior Goods, we ſhall convince them of vanity, and it may be that at bottom they will appear little more reaſonable than the reſt of Men.

The natural qualities are the Memory, the Mind, and the Judgment; the aquir'd qualities are either the Sciences, or the Arts, and in general, the knowledge of experience, or ſpeculations which adorn our Mind, in making it know that which it knew not before, or which ſerve to the uſe of life. Memory is in a manner counted for nothing in matter of vain-glory. Men do not pretend that this is a very great means for to make themſelves valuable; that which ſhews it, is that they think they may boaſt of their having a good memory, without too much want of Modeſty, and they fear not doing themſelves wrong in acknowledging that they have abundance; the cauſe muſt be attributed to this

to this, that their being in Man two ſorts of Faculties, the inferior and the ſubaltern Faculties, and the Faculties which direct and Govern; we naturally make more account of the Faculties which govern, than of the Faculties which ſerve, ſuch is the memory, which does nothing but furniſh Memoirs to the underſtanding: beſides, we have heard ſay that there are divers Appartments in the mind of Man, and that when he ſwells one he ſeldom fails of ſtreightning the others; it is therefore believ'd that in wanting of Memory, he ſhall appear to have Wit and Judgment. In general it is certain that he acknowledges not his faults, but either to acquire to himſelf a glory, by the merit of that acknowledgment which he eſteems more than the quality which he acknowledges he has not, or for to appeaſe the pride of others by an apparent humility, and for to oblige them by an artificial diſintereſſment to render the juſtice which is due to him.

Men value themſelves much for Wit, and as little for Memory; that appears both by the ſenſibility which they ſhew, when they are reproacht with the want thereof, and by the delicate precautions their modeſty takes, for to ſhew that they have it without boaſting. A Man who ſhould ſay I

have a great deal of Wit, would be inſupportable to others; but he ſhould ſay nevertheleſs, but what he ordinarily thinks. But he muſt diſguiſe his Thoughts, and endeavour to obtain a praiſe unto which he ſeems not to aſpire.

Without doubt Manis debtor enough to this ſort of vanity; becauſe that he owes to it a great many agreeable productions, without counting the pleaſure which he takes in the converſation of Perſons, who act or ſpeak by this motive: but ſometimes likewiſe this vanity becomes diſagreeable and tireſome.

From whence comes the habit Men take of contradicting in converſation; if it be not from a ſecret deſire that they have of perſwading that they have more light than others, and that they underſtand better than they the things they ſpeak of, or at leaſt from a ſtrong perſwaſion that they have in themſelves. They contradict thoſe more voluntarily than others, who take the aſcendant in company, becauſe that for pride they cannot ſuffer the pride of them who think themſelves more enlightned than others; they will contradict more freely in a numerous company, where there are ſeveral witneſſes of what they ſay, than when they are face to face, with a perſon with whom they cannot enter into conteſtation

teſtation without diſadvantage, becauſe he will be Judge and Party at the ſame time. And it happens likewiſe that they contradict, when they have no great matter to ſay, for when they cannot ſhew their Wit, they endeavour at leaſt to oppoſe the glory of thoſe who ſeek to make theirs appear. It is unto this ſame principle that we attribute the liberty which the greateſt part of Men give themſelves, of condemning the conduct of their Superiors, in that there is without doubt injuſtice and blindneſs; there is injuſtice, becauſe they judge of that which they know not, and which they cannot know, it not being poſſible that private Men, who are not entred into the Counſels of thoſe that Govern them, ſhould know if it be not very imperfect, the reaſons which theſe latter have for what they do. I add that there is blindneſs, becauſe that it is ordinarily ſeen that thoſe very perſons who erect themſelves as Judges and Cenſors of the actions of their Maſters, make pitiful faults, as ſoon as they are call'd themſelves unto ſome like employ; and how ſhould they not make faults, becauſe they cannot form a juſt and right judgment upon all that they ſee; the great rule forthe commonalty of Mankind, being that they are always to blame when they are miſerable, and that they are al-

ways worthy of eſteem and praiſe, then when they are favour'd with fortune, who know not neverthelefs that there is an unhappy ability, which they confound with ignorance, and a happy ignorance which obtains the glory of ability. I will ſay more, and boldly maintain it, that there are few great events which are due to the prudence of Men. It is the concourſe of circumſtances which makes the good fortune of great actions, there are Heroes of fortune, if I dare expreſs my ſelf thus, and, which are likewiſe greater in number than the Heroes of merit.

Beſides the Wit taken for this vivacity of imagination, which makes us conceive things with fire, and makes us produce them with facility, has a ſort of incompatibility with the judgment: it happens rarely but that theſe impetuous imaginations precipitate us inſtead of guiding us. They are the falſe Lights, which lead us towards Precipices. The wit to define it in a word, is an inſtrument in the hand of the Paſſions to do great faults.

I ſay not the ſame thing of the Judgment, which is without doubt of all the intellectual qualities the moſt eſtimable. We ate certainly deceiv'd, when we attribut great things to the Wit, it is not the Wit, but the Judgment which governs

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States, which diſciplines Armies, which excels in negotiations, which ſucceeds in Arts and Sciences: but not for to make two qualities fight which are in no wiſe oppoſite, it muſt be ſaid, that Wit is the perfection of the Judgment, and Judgment in its turn the perfection of Wit, with this difference nevertheleſs, that Judgment without the Wit is ſomething, whereas Wit without Judgment, is much leſs worth than nothing.

That which deceives the greateſt part of Men, is that they imagine upon a popular prejudice, that Wit is rare, and that good Senſe is very common; and it is juſt quite contrary; the Wit which imagines, which invents, which likewiſe refines, and which ſubtilizes in all things is common enough: but good Senſe which compares, which examines, which weighs, which conſiders the tenets and tendency of things, and determins not but when it has good reaſon to determine, is the moſt rare thing in the World.

Almoſt all Men have Wit, there is not even a paſſion which doth not inſpire Men therewith, and even Wine it ſelf ſometimes gives them vivacity: but there is hardly a Man who wants not Judgment, becauſe there is hardly any one, who deſires that which is truly profitable to him

from that which imports him not. They may have a good Senſe in the choice of the means which they imploy; but they have not in that of the end which they propoſe.

As even in the World Vivacity makes the Hair-brain'd, and Judgment perſons truly able; it is no wonder if it be found in Religion, that good Senſe believes, and Wit is incredulous; that is becauſe the latter determines upon the leaſt appearances, without ſtaying for any more, whereas the Judgment compares and examines all things before it determins.

The Learned Men have in vain endeavoured to gain a veneration for Knowledge, by the intereſt which they have of making that reſpected, which diſtinguiſhes them from others; I know not if in attracting the vain approbation of the vulgar, they have found the ſecret of ſatisfying themſelves. If that be, Vanity muſt come to the ſuccor of Science. For I pray what does the greateſt part of things profit, which we inſtruct a Man in who is made for Eternity? What is it that the human Sciences teaches us? the Words, the Etymologies, the Dates, the Facts which regard us no more, or which ſerve but to ſhew that we know them, the vain queſtions, either ridiculous or dangerous,

gerous, the ſpeculations without end, an infinity of fictions and lies, and almoſt nothing that is profitable to us, and with which our Soul might nouriſh it ſelf. How comes this beſides, that the greateſt part of Men know theſe things in ſo troubled and confuſed a manner; that theſe pretended knowledges ſerve but to caſt them into wandring? One need but have the confuſed Idea of things and a great deal of vanity, for to be perpetually in error; and it is certain that ordinary Learning gives the one and the other, for it is impoſſible to give any diſtinction unto knowledges which are hudled in ſo great a number; and it generally happens that they puff up themſelves by the acquiſition of this dark booty, as if they had reaſon to facilitate themſelves with the acquiſitions of new prejudices and new errors; aud as if the abundance of knowledge, which hinders the juſtneſs and rightneſs of the Judgment, were as much worth as their clearneſs and their diſtinction, which produces an effect quite oppoſite. In that they make advantage of the error of the vulgar who are uſed to confound theſe things: but impoſe them not on people truly able and enlightned, neither have they reaſon to be too well ſatisfied themſelves; even they themſelves who knew,

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beſt what they know, who joyn natural qualities to acquir'd, and who have accuſtomed themſelves to refine by the exactneſs of a diligent meditation the knowledges which clouds the brain of others by their confuſion, gain not at bottom a greater fruit of their Studies, than to know how much the knowledge of Man is bounded, they find themſelves ſurrounded on all ſides by impenetrable Abyſſes; they cannot go one ſtep without finding a difficulty, the number of their diſtinct knowledges is little; beſides, theſe knowledges are as it were buried in almoſt an infinite number of prejudices and errors, from which they muſt be ſeparated; and that which is more ſad ſtill, is, that if the knowledge of this character enlighten their Mind more than others, it is not ſeen that they ſerve more, at leaſtwiſe ordinarily, to the ſatisfaction of the Heart. There are, ſaid an Antient, who know meerly for to know, it is the effect of an unprofitable curioſity. *There are ſome who acquire Knowledge for to acquire Honors or Riches, it is a ſhameful traffick; in fine, there are ſome who know for to make their Knowledge appear, it is the effect of a very great vanity.*

In fine, it may be ſaid, that ordinary Science is unprofitable in nature, dangerous often enough in ſociety, pernicious

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in the Heart, and almoſt ever mortal in Religion; it is unprofitable in Nature, you may reaſon upon the cauſe of Storms, and of Sickneſs, upon the nature of Time and the certainty of death: but you cannot avoid any thing of all this. It is often dangerous in Society, becauſe that therein it excites Troubles and Diſorders. From thence it came that *Auguſtus* in the draught of Politicks, which he left to his Succeſſors, would have them baniſh Philoſophy from the Republick, becauſe that the drunkenneſs of their pretended Wiſdom was wont to make them contemn Authority. It is dangerous in the Heart, ſince it generally coſts us our Humilty, and mortal in Religion, becauſe that it ſets it ſelf up for Judge of Revelation, and would have us know by our ſelves, that which Faith perceives not but upon the teſtimony of God.

The incredulous Triumph in that they rarely ſee people of an extraordinary diſtinguiſht condition believe that which the vulgar believes in regard to the myſteries of Religion. Let them not deceive themſelves; the objection is not ſo ſtrong as they imagine. For a knowing Man is not, for to define him exactly, but a Man who has more errors and prejudices than other Men, and prejudices ſo much the more dan-

dangerous, as he is at a greater diſtance from knowing them by the preventions of his Pride; his great Reading furniſhes the materials of his Errors, in furniſhing him with confuſed Ideas, and his great vanity gives them Form, in changing the confus'd Ideas into diſtinct Ideas, and his leaſt conjectures into ſo many demonſtrations.

It appertains not but to the immortal Man, to take away all thoſe faults from ordinary Science, for making uſe thereof in reſpect of Eternity, it may be ſaid that he conſecrates the leaſt Knowledges in directing them to ſo great an end, that the moderation which is in the movements of his Heart, leaves a great diſtinction in his Ideas; that he heaps not up the Knowledges, but that he chuſes them; that he trafficks not for time, that which he can make uſe of for Eternity; that his Heart puffs not it ſelf up with the Science: but that the Science draws its perfection from the relation which it hath with the ſublime proſpects and motions of his Heart; that his Light inſtead of troubling Society, procures Good and Peace by the proſpect of that Eternal Society which we muſt have with God; and that in fine he makes not the Honour and Perfection of his Wit, to conſiſt in independancy, which elevating him above the revelation of God,

God, ſubjects him to the prejudices of Men, or to the illuſions of his own vanity; but that he believes to have known all things, when he has known that which it hath pleaſed God to teach him for his good.

It would remain that we ſhould value our ſelves for human Virtues, as Courage, Intrepidity, Strength, Liberality, Magnanimity: but this would be to know the Heart of Man but ill, to take them for the true ſprings of Glory. We would not ſay, that they came always from the exceſs of corruption: but we would not likewiſe erect them for true ſprings of Eſteem.

For in fine, What is Virtue in this Senſe? It is a Sacrifice of the leſſer paſſions to the greater; it is for to ſacrifice our other Affections, unite Pride and the love of Glory.

Libearlity is not, as we have already remarkt, but a commerce of Self-love, which prefers the glory of giving, before all that it gives.

Conſtancy but a vain oſtentation of the force of the Soul, and a deſire to appear above ill fortune.

Undauntedneſs, but an Art for to hide Fear, or to ſtrip it ſelf of its own weakneſs.

Magnanimity, but a deſire of ſhewing elvated Sentiments.

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The love of ones Country which has made the fineſt character of the Antient Heroes, was but a hidden way that their Self-love took for to gain Eſteem, Glory and Dignity.

Sometimes likewiſe it was an Ambition diſguiſed under Honourable and Reverend Names.

The Vengeance of *Cicero*, the Ambition of *Auguſtus*, the Intereſt of *Lucullus* had been ill receiv'd of the *Romans*, if they had appear'd under their true form, they muſt give them for pretext the love of their Country.

There likewiſe have been occaſions, wherein Men having ſome confuſed Idea of their Excellence, and ſeeking natural Grandeur, have turn'd themſelves on all ſides for to give unto their Actions, and unto their Conduct, an end worthy of that which they thought of their Perfections: but wanting Directions they have turn'd towards falſe Objects. *Brutus* offers unto Virtue, and repents thereof. *Cato* ſacrifices unto his Country, and takes not notice that under the fine name of Country which he adores, he labours for a ſociety of Robbers and Uſurpers; and that if the confus'd Idea of publick be glorious

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In a word, there is in human Virtues, a falſity which leaps into the Eyes of all the world, which hinders Men from eſteeming them without extravagance. Again, was there more of good faith in the injuſtice of thoſe Heroes, whom crimes have enobled, and injuſtice render'd celebrate and illuſtrious. They ſacrificed all to themſelves, as if all were there own. *Alexander* is a living expreſſion of this irregularity. After the manner that this furious Prince acted, one would ſay that he pretended that all things were made for his Pleaſure and his Glory, and that human kind was of no other uſe, but for to ſerve his deſires. He fires Cities, he ravages Provinces, he overturns Thrones, and makes Powers his ſport, as if the Nations were but a little duſt before him. Is it to be ſuffer'd, that a Man ſhould make unto himſelf Sacrifices, which he ſhould have a horror to offer to the greateſt of his Gods.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the two laſt characters of Pride, which are Ambition and Contempt of ones Neighbour.

THE exceſſive love of Eſteem produces another irregularity, which is Ambition, becauſe that the too violent paſſion we have of making our ſelves eſteemed by others, makes us aſpire to all that which may make us appear upon an eminent Theatre, whilſt we are confounded with the croud, others ſhare with us the reſpects of the Publick, we muſt get out of their company for to draw attention. Our Superiority requires for us preferences of Conſideration and Eſteem, it is that which makes us ambitous of it.

Every one boaſts of excelling in his profeſſion, how indifferent ſoever it be, and that not becauſe they love the excellency for the excellence it ſelf: but becauſe they would be more conſider'd than others. Thoſe who expoſe themſelves to War, love not the great dangers: but diſtinguiſht Glory.

But because the distinction which comes of Merit, and of Actions, may be either hid or subject to contestation, or not to be exposed to the view of all the World, our Heart is with Passion ambitious of another sort of elevation, which is incontestable, and acknowledg'd by every one, it is that of Grandeur, of Dignity and Might, according to the remark which we have already made.

Self-love is particularly flatter'd, then when it sees that those whom it fear'd as its Rivals in vain-glory, court it, and put themselves in a dependency on it.

It is inchanted with the power which submits them to it, and loves them so much the more, in that it fears them not as competitors: but the same sentiment of Pride which makes us love those who submit themselves to our Empire, makes us hate the necessity of the latter, which puts them in our dependency, and gives them so great temptation to hate us, that there is nothing but an eminent and heroick Virtue on our part, which can force them to hide their malignity.

In fine, the same reason which makes us seek to elevate our selves above others, not to be any longer in an obscurity, and in a confusion, which hinders us from being taken notice of, inspires us with the

bent which we have of contemning our Neighbour. We content not our ſelves with ſtanding a tiptoe for to appear greater than others; we ſtrive ſtill either to make them fall, or for to abaſe them for to appear greater by their abaſement.

The pleaſure ought not to be attributed only to our malignity, which Satyr and Comedy gives us. It ought likewiſe to be attributed to our Pride. We are ravisht with the ſeeing others abaſed, they are ſo many perſons who go out of the rank of thoſe who may aſpire to Glory with us: we take pleaſure above all to ſee them ridiculded, becauſe that there is not an abaſement ſcarce greater than this, nor which is more without return, Men having a ſhame to eſteem them whom they have formerly ſcoff'd.

Whence comes it that Men who never laugh to ſee a Stone or a Horſe fall, can hardly forbear when they ſee a Man fall, ſince the one is not without doubt more ridiculous than the other? It is becauſe there is nothing in our Hearts which intereſſes us in the fall of a Beaſt, when as there is ſomething in us which intereſſes us in ſuch a manner in the abaſement of other Men, that even the very Image of that abaſement affords us pleaſure. We think to laugh innocently always

ways, and we laugh hardly ever without crime.

This ſame Bent which makes us have this contempt for our Neighbour, which is called Inſolence, Haughtineſs, or Fierceneſs, according as we have for object our Superiors, our Inferiors, or our Equals. We ſeek for to abaſe thoſe more who are below us, thinking to elevate our ſelves proportionably as they deſcend lower; or for to prejudice our equals, to get our ſelves out of the rank of them, or even to cut down our Superiours; becauſe they caſt a ſhade upon us by their grandeur; our Pride betrays it ſelf viſibly in this: for if others are an object of contempt, why are we ambitious of their eſteem? or if their eſteem be worthy of forming the ſtrongeſt paſſion of our Souls, how can we contemn them? Should not this be, that the contempt of our Neighbour is rather affected than true. We interview his Grandeur, ſince his eſteem appears of ſo great value to us: but we make all our efforts for to hide it to do Honour to our ſelves.

From thence ſpring Slanderings, Calumnies, impoiſoned Praiſes, Satyr, Malignity and Envy. It is true that this hides it ſelf with an extream care, becauſe that it is a forced confeſſion of Merit, or of Happineſs, which we make of others,

and a forced homage which we render 'em.

Of all the sentiments of Pride, the contempt of one's Neighbour is the most dangerous, because it is that which goes the most directly against the good of Society, which is the end unto which the love of oneself relates, by the intention of Nature; it is likewise that which renders Men most odious.

When two Men are seen, one whereof shews Vanity, and Presumption; and the other seems not to be able to suffer this Pride, we may reckon boldly that the latter is tainted more dangerously with this fault than the other; for it is not but because he has Pride that he perceives the Pride of the other; and besides, it is a less criminal effect of Pride to presume too much of one's self, than to abuse one's neighbour.

Presumption and Confidence are a sort of Drunkenness for our Soul: but Hatred, Envy, and Malignity are then as madness. Envy is an implacable Sentiment, you may impose silence upon it by your good deeds, and by your civilities, but you shall not bend it; it will live as long as your Merit shall subsist, it will pardon you the greatest injuries it received of you; and at least, time will efface the remembrance: but it will

will never forgive you your good qualities.

Envy and Flattery are two faults altogether oppoſite, the Firſt ſhews an apparent contempt for others, which hides an effective eſteem. For Envy at bottom is a Sentiment which does Honour, it directs not it ſelf but towards that which it does eſteem; it lives by Merit, and dies not but with it; whereas flattery hides under an apparent eſteem the trueſt contempt, ſince it is born but from the ſuppoſition of the weakneſs of him who is the object. So one may ſay that there are Satyrs which praiſe very much, and Panegyricks very outragious. *Alexander* ſees not in the intoxication of his vanity, that the *Macedonian* ſtiffneſs does him more Honor than the Idolatry of the *Perſians*, he is nevertheleſs much obliged to his Friends, in that they would not laugh at him.

It is eaſy to judge by all that we have ſaid hereupon, how odious and deteſtable a fault Pride is, for all its irregularities are moſt criminal. The exceſſive love of Eſteem makes us overthrow Nature it ſelf, in changing the end into means, and the means into the end, for ſince the love of Eſteem is no more than the love of pleaſure, it is not but a means, of which

God

God makes uſe for to carry us to Virtue, and to the good of Society; Is it not againſt Nature that Men ſhould act, as if they were not in the World but for to be eſteemed? Preſumption blinds us that we may not know that which is truly eſtimable in our ſelves; it being certain that that which we are is infinitely above that which we think we are, and that our true perfections merit much more the attention of our Soul, than theſe imaginary qualities which we falſly boaſt of poſſeſſing. Vanity which ties it ſelf to the falſe ſprings of Glory, makes us loſe the ſight of the true and ſolid foundations of Honour, which are Piety and the Fear of God. The Contempt which we have for our Neighbour, is a Contempt which ſpurts up neceſſarily upon our ſelves, becauſe we are but little different from Beaſts; if it be true that we are ſo different from others, and that the diſtinction of Pride deſtroys all the Ideas of our natural Dignity.

But beſide theſe defects, there is one more hid in pride; which is the greateſt of all; it is that it makes us uſurp the Glory of God himſelf. Our Perfections are Talents which God truſts us withal for to make them valuable. The profit then which reſults, is the Glory which we ought to attribute unto him as being his good:

good: but Pride, Injuſtice, or rather this Sacriledge which robs all, reſpects not more the Rights of God, than the Rights of Men. All the regard which it hath for the Divinity, is, that it dares not own the Injuſtices which it does it, and that it has ſo much horror for its Sacriledges, that it dare not ſet them in the light, nor make Reaſon a Complice. It may be concluded from all that we have ſaid upon the ſubject, that Pride as well as Corruption in general, is almoſt equal in all the Men in the World; in ſome it manifeſts it ſelf more, in others it is more hid. All Men do not think equally of making themſelves eſteem'd, becauſe there are a great many unto whom Poverty gives more preſſing occupations: but I know not, if it may not be ſaid that they have all the ſame bent for Eſteem; that this Inclination may be hid, and that the Sentiment may be ſuſpended: but that it is almoſt the ſame thing in all Men, or rather that there is no difference but that which Grace makes. It may be ſome may ſhow more preſumption than others: but Pride is not leſs in timidity, and in thoſe punctilious ſhadows of a Man, who always fears, either to do himſelf wrong, or leſt others ſhould do it to him, than it is in preſumption it ſelf.

There

There are People who appear civil and honeſt, in reſpect of others: but they ſeek to get before them in the way of Glory; exterior civility being but to ſpeak properly, an apparent preference which we make of others to our ſelves, for to hide the effective preference which we make of our ſelves to all the World. In fine, there are thoſe who are Maſters of themſelves, when they are commended: but who are not at all, when they are blam'd. Modeſty holds good againſt the impreſſions of flattery: but it is confounded by the impreſſion of outrages. Pride maſters its Joy and its ſatisfaction: but it cannot command its Grief and Reſentment. In fine, there are thoſe who ſeem to elevate themſelves above the eſteem of other Men, and who would be, they fancy, angry to ſhare the approbation of the publick, but penetrate into the motives of this chagrin Philoſopher, and you ſhall find that Pride has a great ſhare in him. A Man fill'd with the opinion of his own Merit, finds often that Men do not do him that Juſtice which is due to him. He muſt ſee Mankind upon their knees before him, for to take from him his ill humour, and if he be not adored, he is a Man-hater.

It ſeems in fine by this, that Pride lives by the errors of others, and on illuſions which

which it frames to it ſelf. It has eſtabliſht I know not how many falſe Maxims in the World, about which all the World reaſons, as upon true Principles, and by the favour of which, it thinks to make its pretenſions valid. Men keep theſe errors in ſpight of good Sence, which informs them of what is ſenſleſs in them, becauſe that it is from the diſpoſition of their Hearts that theſe errors come. For to cure them of theſe illuſions, one muſt moderate the exceſſive love of Eſteem which reigns in their Hearts; and there is no other way of deſtroying the latter, than to turn their Soul towards the Eternal and Infinite Good, the only ſpring of our Happineſs and our Glory.

Theſe are the reflexions which we had to make upon our Bents, and our moſt general irregularities, until we ſhall have made more particular diſcoveries in the Science of the Heart, which is ſo fine, ſo important, and ſo worthy of our application in all manners: may it pleaſe God to Bleſs by his Grace, thoſe which we have made in this Writing, and make them ſucceed unto his Glory, and to our Eternal Salvation, *Amen.*

The End of the Second Part.

ERRATA's *to the Second Part.*

PAge 2. line 5. read diſpoſeth. p. 42. l. 19. decree r. deſire. p. 46. l. 24. r. Taught us. p. 49. l. 4. r. Loves it ſelf. p. 53. l. 29. for loves r. loſes. p. 54. l. 25. for leave it, r. bear it. p. 57. l. 7. r. affections. l. 17. r. intereſts were. p. 67. l. 3. r. *exempeus*. p. 84. l. 19. r. *Aſcalontia*. p. 90. l. the laſt. for jangling r. chagrin. p. 92. l. 2. r. fear death. p. 96. l. 18. for troubles r. truths. l. 19. for troubles r. truths. p. 100. l. 4. r. ſeaſoning. p. 120. l. 11. for buſineſs r. baſeneſs. p. 123. l. 21. for injuſtice r. juſtice. p. 136. l. 21. thundering. r. ſlandering. p. 142. l. 19. r. ſimple motive p. 144. l. 3. for they r. we. l. 4. r. confuſed. l. 21. r. I know not. p. 146. l. 11. r. of eſteem. p. 161. l. 15. r. renounce cupidity. p. 172. l. 28. for practiſe r. praiſe. p. 174. l. 1. for protection. r. profeſſion. p. 178. l. the laſt. for abundance r. a bad one. p. 183. l. the laſt for deſires r. diſcerns. p. 185. l. 19. r. felicitate. p. 189. l. 19. r. unto pride.